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Chapter 1
General Introduction
One thing that is ubiquitous in our economy is information imperfection, by which
we refer to a situation in which di↵erent parties of a transaction have access to
di↵erent information. One common example happens in the labor market. Workers
know better about their own skills, industriousness, productivities, etc., while
employers can hardly know the true competence of prospective workers, although
they are able to observe certain information on the applicants such as education
levels or certificates. Such imperfections are also shared on the capital market:
the relationships between banks and borrowers act similarly to an employment
relationship between employers and job seekers. Borrowers are usually more familiar
with their projects and possess more accurate information about the quality of
their projects, while lenders such as banks have limited access to such information
and have di culties knowing whether it is likely for borrowers to default. More
examples are trading goods between a seller and a buyer, signing an insurance
contract between an insurer and his client, and so on.
The impact of information depends on the market structure and to what extent
market participants can access to the information. The problems caused by the
information imperfections can be alleviated when there are signals which can reveal
the hidden information, at least to some extent. Thus, it is common for the party
with informational disadvantage to resort to such signals even when it is costly.
For example, employers ask for certificates or design tests and interviews to infer
the true productivities of candidate workers; banks carry out investment analysis
or ask for collaterals or other requirements from the borrowers. Yet on the other
hand, the party with more information may also have the incentive to signal or
reveal their private information when they can expect to be treated di↵erently.
The signal, or the information derived from the signals, plays an important role in
1
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the decision-making process.
1.1 Imperfect Information and Information cri-
teria
In a decision problem with information asymmetry, it is possible and common for
the party with information disadvantage to collect information before the decision
is made. We could say that information is signaled no matter this information
collection is active or passive. Decision makers observe signals and update their
beliefs, and the updated beliefs - the posterior beliefs - are taken use of to make
their decisions. Yet the information contained in the signals is not always true and
precise, since signals and the unknown characteristics are generally not perfectly
correlated. It is natural to think that more reliable signals with more accurate
information could contribute to a more e cient performance. In order to formulate
this evaluation of signals, an information system or an information structure is thus
used to describe the relationship between signals and underlying states, various
information criteria are proposed based on the information system. By virtue of
this, we are allowed to consider which way of collecting information can provide
less noisy information and are therefore more preferable.
One classical criterion was developed by Blackwell (1951, 1953), who considers
the comparison of two experiments from a statistical perspective. That is, a more
informative system should be statistically su cient for a less informative one,
which also means that a less informative system can be duplicated from a more
informative one by adding some random transmission errors, or “garbling” as is
called. Large literature follows Blackwell’s informativeness criterion, yet alternative
criteria have also been introduced (see Lehmann (1988), Kim (1995), Persico (2000),
Jewitt (2007), Quah and Strulovici (2009)).
On the other hand, there are information criteria which are defined on the
expectation conditional on signal realizations. Since decisions, after signals being
observed, are made according to the posterior distributions, the expectation condi-
tional on signal realizations seems to be crucial. A more reliable signal is supposed
to have larger impact on the posteriors, and thus the conditional expectations
should be more disperse (see Ganuza and Penalva (2010)). This kind of criteria
is very intuitive and therefore of interest to us. It comes the question that which
kind of information criteria could be adopted in a certain decision-making problem
with asymmetric information. Therefore, the relationship between classical infor-
2
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mation criteria and the dispersion of conditional expectations are examined in the
first chapter, which also provides a theoretic foundation of how to formalize the
revelation of information.
1.2 Information imperfection on the credit mar-
ket and credit crisis
In the credit market, it has long been understood that asymmetric information
plays a central role in determining the market equilibria (since Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981)). Large literature has investigated the significant influence of the asymmetric
information on the credit market, showing how the strategies and the interactions
of lenders and borrowers are determined in the circumstances with asymmetric
information. Lenders’ lack of information on the relevant characteristics of the
borrowers may result in the outcome of underinvestment. Credit is said to be
rationed in this sense. However, the possibility for the flip side of this story is
also extensively studied: the investment level may turn out in excess of the social
e cient level (see De Meza and Webb (1987) and Alberto and Filippo (2013)).
With asymmetric information lenders have di culties knowing whether it is likely
for borrowers to default, and this leads to moral-hazard and adverse-selection
problems in the financial market. Therefore, financial intermediaries such as banks
may choose either screening or monitoring, or both technologies to alleviate these
problems. We pursue our study along their lines, but proceed from a di↵erent
perspective: when borrowers can choose to disclose the quality of projects or to
keep silent, to which extent may the revelation of information impact the amount
of the projects financed, and thus, the type of the equilibrium?
From another viewpoint, by taking look at the financial crisis that we experi-
enced, especially the credit crisis during 2007-2008, we saw that it was primarily
driven by the investment and activities concerning the opaque securities such
as mortgage-backed securities (MBS), credit default swaps (CDS). Complicated
structured financial vehicles and the securitization were booming. Credit was
o↵ered even when the investors were lack of relevant information on the projects.
However, as the turmoil burst, lending standards tightened and credit is hoarded.
A credit crunch was spread throughout the financial market, and the tightening of
credit led to contractions in the real economy (see Brunnermeier (2009), Acharya
and Skeie (2011) and so on). The lending with insu cient information and the
investment in the opaque structured products naturally lead us to considering a
3
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possible explanation of credit crisis from the perspective of information asymmetry.
Therefore, in Chapter 3 we consider a signaling model in a competitive credit
market where borrowers have the option of revealing information or keeping opaque,
discuss the opacity of the market in the equilibrium, and attempt to explain the
credit crunch and the instability of the financial market.
1.3 Imperfections of labor market and discrimi-
nation
Labor market is another example where imperfect information prevails. The
asymmetric information a↵ects employers’ hiring decision, as well as workers’
decisions on skill or education investment. A prominent example is statistical
discrimination. Lang and Manove (2011) show that under asymmetric information,
the blacks overinvest in observable characteristics (e.g. education) to overcome
the disadvantage in job hunting as employers find it more di cult to evaluate the
blacks compared to the whites. Empirical work with similar facts can also be seen
in Rivkin (1995), and Cameron and Heckman (2001).
Yet Lang and Manove (2011) are silent about labor market friction captured
by employment rate which becomes another central measure of discrimination in
nowadays literature. The purpose of the fourth chapter is therefore to propose
a tractable theory based on a relatively new branch of equilibrium search model
to explain why when discrimination is potentially present in the market and
why the discriminated group may invest more in skills compared to the favored
one. Di↵erent from the random search model, Moen (1997) along with Shimer
(1996) suggest that if individual firms are able to post wage to maximize the
expected profit, then the socially optimal allocation of resources results. The
critical di↵erence between directed search (with wage posting) and random search
(with wage bargaining) is whether the information on the wages is available for
the workers. If yes, then workers’ search strategy depends on these wages, or their
search is directed by the wages. Moreover, workers take into account the trade-o↵
between wages and the induced matching probability to maximize their expected
utility from search; firms perceive this relationship that is induced by their posted
wages, subject to which the profit is maximized. The search externality can be
internalized and th e ciency can result.
The role of asymmetric information is absent in both Moen (1997) and Shimer
(1996). While Guerrieri et al. (2010) consider adverse selection problem in
4
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competitive search context. The private information of the workers exists ex ante
(before search) and persists ex post (after matching). In our model, wages can not
be conditioned on the group identity, it is as if there is asymmetric information ex
ante (before search); what makes our context di↵er from the information system in
Guerrieri et al. (2010) is that once a worker-firm match gets formed, the information
is revealed in the sense that firms can do what they want - to discriminate at
the hiring stage. Another related work is by Grout (1984), which gives rigorous
theoretical investigation on the holdup problem in a context without search friction.
If the gains from investment have to be shared ex post with the trading partner,
the social incentive of investment is dampened. In our model, we argue that
holdup is related to our discrimination problem: when workers sink skill investment
cost before entering into labor market, firms are able to extract larger surplus by
creating some discriminatory hierarchy among workers. This is a re-interpretation
of the result from Lang, Manove and Dickens (2005).
1.4 Outline of the thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized with three self-contained chapters. Each can be
read independently from one another. It starts from a theoretical perspective by
looking into information criteria, and then considers two problems regarding credit
market and labor market, respectively.
In Chapter 2, I review some information criteria and pay special attention on
the precision criteria which are defined on the conditional expectations by Ganuza
and Penalva (2010). More specifically, the study seeks to find links between the
dispersion of conditional expectations and Blackwell’s informativeness criterion.
The result shows that Blackwell’s informativeness criterion does not necessarily
imply or be implied by the dispersion of conditional expectations in general discrete
cases, although Blackwell’s informativeness can imply the dispersion of conditional
expectations when the signal is binary. Besides, Persico’s accuracy criterion is also
analyzed in this chapter. Following Persico’s accuracy criterion, a similar criterion
is constructed, which can imply the dispersion of conditional expectations under
some, though strict, conditions.
In Chapter 3, which is coauthored with Prof. Bertrand Wigniolle, we consider
a lender-borrower relationship where borrowers have better information on their
own projects than lenders and can choose to disclose this information or not.
Signaling is costly and is borne by the borrowers. The decision of information
revelation is endogenized, and so is the market opacity. We characterize the
5
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equilibrium with respect to the risk-free interest rate and show that the existence
and the characteristics of the equilibrium depend on the level of the risk-free
interest rate: there only exists an opaque equilibrium, in which all borrowers do not
reveal information and are funded, when the interest rate is low; there only exists
transparent equilibrium, in which only borrowers who own good projects reveal
information and are financed, when the interest rate is high enough; and there are
multiple equilibria where both opaque and transparent equilibria can be possible
when the interest rate is in an intermediate range. The existence of multiple
equilibria admits possible jump from an opaque equilibrium to a transparent one,
which occurs with a decrease of interest rate and a reduction of credit granting at
the same time. Moreover, we extend the model to an OLG context and examine the
long run convergence of the equilibrium. Under di↵erent parameters, the market
is likely to converge either to an opaque or a transparent stationary state, and
for some configurations of parameters there is no convergence in the long run -
there may be permanent oscillations between opaque and transparent equilibria.
Both the static and the dynamic frameworks provide possible explanations of
the instability of the credit market and indicate a possible way of explaining the
phenomenon of credit crunch during the financial crisis.
In Chapter 4, which is coauthored with Sheng Bi, we study how the hiring
discrimination may a↵ect the skill investment decision of workers in the directed
search model. We see that a holdup problem on workers’ skill investment arises when
employers can adopt discriminatory hiring norms to extract higher than socially
optimal profit. When hiring priority is determined both by productivity-dependent
(skill level) and -independent characteristics (discrimination), the decision of skill
investment becomes strategic between the discriminated and favored groups. In
frictional markets with posted wage, the skill investment in equilibrium depends
on market tightness. The discriminated group, compared to the favored one, tends
to underinvest in skills when the market gets tighter, although there also exists an
equilibrium where the favored group underinvests in skills while the discriminated
one does not. The payo↵s of both workers and firms are also analyzed here. Besides,
we further discuss on the problem in a wage bargaining context. With bargained
wage, similar equilibrium in which the favored group underinvests exists, and firms
incur cost for an intermediate range of bargaining power when they discriminate.
6
Chapter 2
Informativeness and the
dispersion of posterior
distributions
Abstract
In a decision problem with uncertainty the decision maker can receive signals
which reveal some of the information about the unknown true state. In order to
evaluate the informativeness of di↵erent signals, or di↵erent information systems
in which signals are generated, various criteria have been developed over the past
few decades. Since decisions, after signals being observed, are made according
to the posterior distributions, the expectation conditional on signal realizations
is likely to be crucial in deciding the informativeness of signals. Therefore, the
relationship between some classical information criteria and the dispersion of
conditional expectations (Ganuza and Penalva’s supermodular precision criterion)
is examined here. The study shows that Blackwell’s informativeness criterion does
not necessarily imply or be implied by the dispersion of conditional expectations in
general discrete cases, although binary cases could somehow enlighten us. Besides,
Persico’s accuracy criterion is also analyzed in this paper. Following the accuracy
criterion, a similar criterion is constructed, which can imply the dispersion of
conditional expectations under some conditions.
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2.1 Introduction
Uncertainty exists nearly everywhere in the economy, such as the future price of a
stock, the uncertain return of a project, or the unobservable skill of a worker in
the labor market. The recognition of imperfect information has had a profound
influence and has provided a remarkable method for explaining economic and social
phenomena. Although they may not be sure about the true state, agents can,
in most cases, overcome the uncertainty by obtaining related information that is
conveyed in some signals, which may be derived from personal investigation, or
suggested by an expert, or purchased from some institutions, or even stolen. Their
decision will then be based on the revised knowledge about the true state, i.e. the
posterior belief of the state.
But how could we tell the quality of the information? How will distinctive
signals influence the decision process? Consider an extreme case where the signals
could precisely reveal the future state, then the revised belief will depend completely
on the realized value of the signal rather than the prior belief. On the other hand,
if the informational content of the signal is relatively low, the posterior belief will
be similar to the prior belief and di↵erent signal realizations will not form much
di↵erent posterior beliefs. That is to say, the posterior distribution is less disperse
under less informative signals. This could also be extended to the expectation
of one’s payo↵ conditional on signal realizations. So more information should
lead to more disperse conditional expectations. In fact, following this intuition,
Ganuza and Penalva (2010) propose a new kind of criteria for evaluating di↵erent
information systems, which they refer to as precision criteria.
This type of precision criteria are practical since the decisions are often made
on the basis of conditional expectations, and they are therefore useful for a large
range of economic decision problems, such as auctions, investments on education,
etc., and the formalization of precision criteria provides an easier way to interpret
the informativeness of signals. Nevertheless, it is unconventional to evaluate
informativeness based on conditional expectations rather than directly on the
underlining information systems.
Therefore, I try to bridge the gap between the precision criteria and the
traditional informativeness criteria, such as the informativeness criterion (Blackwell,
1951 and 1953) and the accuracy criterion (Persico, 2000), which are considered in
this paper. As for the precision criteria, we focus here only on Ganuza and Penalva’s
supermodular criterion, which is defined with the dispersive order. By examining
the properties of the dispersive order, we see that Blackwell’s informativeness does
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not generally imply or be implied by the supermodular dispersion, although there
can be some link between the two criteria in a binary case in the sense that there
are only binary signal realizations. In addition, we provide a necessary condition of
the dispersive order for discrete random variables as well as a characterization for
the case with binary random variables. Moreover, we consider Persico’s accuracy
criterion, with which we construct a similar criterion. And the result shows that
the kind of accuracy criteria is possible to be connected with the dispersion of
conditional expectations (in term of Ganuza and Penalva’s supermodular criterion).
As for the literature on information criteria, it dates back to Blackwell (1951,
1953), where he introduces the informativeness criterion by considering two statisti-
cal experiments. It follows the intuition that the statistic from a more informative
experiment should be more su cient. Therefore, Blackwell’s informativeness crite-
rion is also referred to as the su ciency criterion. In a more economic context, it
means that more informativeness always provides a higher value to decision makers
regardless of the decision problems in question or prior beliefs that they share.
That is, all the utility maximizers prefer a more informative system.
Although large literature follows the Blackwells informativeness criterion1,
alternative criteria have also been introduced. For example, Lehmann (1988)
considers information structures with monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP),
which indicates that higher signals are more favorable. He proposed the so-
called e↵ectiveness criterion from the intuition that better information should
be more correlated with the true state. Following the same intuition, Persico
(2000) formalizes Lehmanns criterion and call it accuracy criterion. Moreover, Kim
(1995) points out the Blackwell’s criterion is too restrictive and provides a so-called
e ciency criterion with the consideration of a agency model.
More recently, Jewitt (2007) relates the Blackwell’s criterion with Lehmann’s
and extends Lehmann’s results in a general single crossing preference (SCP) case,
and Quah and Strulovici (2009) even generalize the results to the cases where
SCP does not hold. Even closer to the purpose of this paper, Brandts et al.
(2014) provide di↵erent information criteria based on the joint density of signals
and underlying states, which imply the dispersion properties of the conditional
expectations.
This paper focuses exclusively on the supermodular precision. In fact, due to
the intrinsic property of the dispersive order, which the supermodular precision
bases on, the connection between this criterion and traditional criteria can hardly
1See Le Cam (1964), Ponssard (1975), Cre´mer (1982), Schlee (2001), Eckwert and Zilcha
(2003), etc.
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be built up. We see that the dispersive order, and thus the supermodular precision
criterion, require highly on the prior distributions, which other criteria usually do
not need. Therefore, a less demanding criterion by losing the harsh restrictions on
the priors may provide more possibility of linking the dispersion of posteriors and
other information criteria.
In this paper, we start with reviewing the most essential concepts in section
2.2. Then, in section 2.3, we examine the relationship between Blackwell’s infor-
mativeness criterion and the supermodular precision criterion for discrete cases. In
section 2.4, we provide conditions which can link Perciso’s accuracy criterion with
the supermodular precision criterion. Finally, section 2.5 concludes this chapter.
2.2 Informativeness and dispersive orders
2.2.1 Information systems
In the setting of statistical decision theory, uncertainty can be characterized by a
random state of nature. As stated before, a decision maker takes actions before
knowing the true state but after observing a signal which is correlated to the true
state. We further assume that the agent has a prior probability distribution of the
state of nature, then he can infer additional information from the signal and revise
his belief about the true state via Bayes’ Rule. In this context, an information
system is used to formalize how the signals are generated by the true state.
Definition 2.1. The triplet (⌦, Y, F ) is defined as an information system, where
⌦ is the set of states, Y is the set of signals, and F is a stochastic transformation
from ⌦ to Y , represented by the conditional density function f(y|!), for any y 2 Y
and ! 2 ⌦.
In the finite discrete case, suppose that there are N possible states, i.e. ⌦ =
{!1, ...,!N}, and M di↵erent signal values, i.e. Y = {y1, ..., yM} . Then, the
transformation F can be represented by a N⇥M matrix with the entry fij showing
the probability of generating a signal yj under the state !i, where i 2 {1, 2, ..., N}
and j 2 {1, 2, ...,M}. Note that Pj fij = 1 for any i (and similarly, we also haveR
Y f(y|!)dy = 1).
In fact, for a certain decision problem, an information system is sometimes
described with another term - the information structure, which mainly refers to
the joint distributions of the signals and the states, or more specifically, the family
of probability density functions (or distributions) of the signals conditional on the
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state of nature. So we may also use simply the transformation F to indicate the
information system (⌦, Y F , F ) when there is no ambiguity.
Then, for a given prior ⇡(·) defined on ⌦, agents can update their beliefs; the
posterior belief is given by:
⌫(!|y) = f(y|!)⇡(!)
µ(y)
, 8! 2 ⌦, 8y 2 Y, (2.1)
where µ(y) =
R
⌦ f(y|!0)⇡(!0)d!0. Decisions then will be made according to the
posterior belief ⌫(!|y).
The availability of additional information allows agents to better react to
the risky environment, which leads naturally to the consideration of the value
of information conveyed in the signals, or of a certain information system (the
way how signals are related to the true states). Consider an expected utility
maximizer with a utility function u(a,!), where a 2 A is the action the agent
takes. After receiving a signal y, the agent chooses the optimal action a⇤(y) which
solves the maximization problem maxa2A
R
!2⌦ u(a,!)⌫(!|y)d!. And the value of
the information is
V :=
Z
y2Y
µ(y)
⇣Z
!2⌦
u(a⇤(y),!)⌫(!|y)d!
⌘
dy. (2.2)
That is, the value of information is the agent’s ex ante expected utility from
an optimal chosen decision rule. Then, it is feasible to compare two di↵erent
information systems for a given decision problem.
2.2.2 The preference over di↵erent signals
In the decision problem with uncertainty, the decision is made based on the posterior
distribution after a certain signal is obtained. Thus, we may ask a question - which
signal does a decision maker prefer? It is natural to assume that a decision maker
will infer a higher expected state or a higher expected utility from the observation
of a signal with higher value, and thus prefer a higher signal. Actually, this intuitive
assumption can be ensured by the following property.
Definition 2.2. The densities {f(y|!)}y2Y,!2⌦ have the monotone likelihood ratio
property (MLRP)2, if for every y0 > y and !0 > !, we have
f(y0|!0)f(y|!)  f(y0|!)f(y|!0)   0. (2.3)
2In our case, we may also directly say that an information system satisfies MLRP.
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Note that f(y
0|!)
f(y|!) is the ratio of the densities between receiving a higher signal
realization and a low one in a certain state. And the definition of MLRP states
that this ratio is greater in a larger state !0 compared to that in a lower state
!. According to Milgrom (1981), the family of densities {f(y|!)}y2Y,!2⌦ has
the MLRP if, and only if, y0 > y implies that the posterior distribution ⌫(·|y0)
dominates the posterior distribution ⌫(·|y) in the sense of first-order stochastic
dominance for every non-degenerate prior distribution ⇡(·), which is also called
that the signal y0 is more favorable than the signal y. By the definition of first-order
stochastic dominance, we can easily get that a higher signal is thus related to a
higher underlying state.
The MLRP seems natural and it is not di cult to be satisfied by relabeling
the states and signals while keeping the correlations between them unchanged. In
the rest of this paper, we consider information systems which have the MLRP if
without any other specification.
2.2.3 Blackwell’s informativeness
When there is more than one way of obtaining information, i.e. more than two
information systems available, we would consider the problem of how to choose
a better one. For this purpose, various criteria have been proposed during the
past few decades in order to evaluate two information systems in terms of the
informativeness of the generated signals. One classical criterion is developed by
Blackwell (1953) which follows the intuition that a more informative system should
have a higher value regardless of the decision problems in question or prior beliefs
that the decision makers share. That is, all the utility maximizers prefer a more
informative system. On the other hand, a more informative system should be
statistically su cient for a less informative one, which means that a less informative
system can be duplicated from a more informative one by adding some random
transmission error. Actually, Blackwell shows that the two ideas coincide with each
other. Following the second idea, more informativeness can be formally defined as
below3.
Definition 2.3. Let (⌦, Y F , F ) and (⌦, Y G, G) be two information systems. Then
(⌦, Y F , F ) is said to be more informative than (⌦, Y G, G), denoted by F  i G, if
there exists a stochastic transformation   from Y F to Y G represented by a stochastic
3See Marschak and Miyasawa (1968), where the term ”garbling” is used for this stochastic
signal transformation process.
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density kernel   such that for all ! 2 ⌦ and yG 2 Y G, it holds true that
g(yG|!) =
Z
yF2Y F
 (yG, yF )f(yF |!)dyF . (2.4)
For the finite case, information systems can be represented with matrices,
thus Definition 2.3 can be modified by replacing equation (2.4) with the following
condition:
G = F   (2.5)
where   is a stochastic matrix.
As a matter of fact, a more informative system, as defined above, is indeed
preferred by every expected utility maximizer, i.e. V F   V G for all utility functions
u, as stated in the well-known Blackwell’s Theorem.
2.2.4 Orders of dispersion
Intuitively, signals containing more useful information have a stronger impact on
posterior distributions, which may in turn lead to more dispersive conditional
expectations. Thus, Ganuza and Penalva (2010) introduce a new kind of criteria
for evaluating di↵erent information systems by applying di↵erent stochastic orders
to conditional expectations of the states, which they call the precision criteria.
Two criteria - the supermodular precision and the integral precision - based on
two di↵erent orders are discussed in their study. For instance, the supermodular
precision is defined on the basis of the dispersive order, which is also one of most
important dispersion criterion we will focus on later.
Definition 2.4. x˜ and z˜ are two real-valued random variables with distributions
Fx and Gz, respectively. Then, x˜ is said to be greater than z˜ in the dispersive order
(denoted by x˜  disp z˜), if for any 0 < p  q < 1,
F 1x (q)  F 1x (p)   G 1z (q) G 1z (p) (2.6)
where F 1x and G
 1
z are quantile functions of x˜ and z˜. That is, F
 1
x (p) =
inf{x|Fx(x)   p} and G 1z (p) = inf{z|Gz(z)   p} for any p 2 [0, 1].
Rearranging equation (2.6), we can directly get the following characterization
of the dispersive order.
Lemma 2.1. x˜  disp z˜ if, and only if, F 1x (p) G 1z (p) is increasing in p 2 (0, 1).
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From the definition, the dispersive order requires that the jump of the quantile
function of the two random variables coincide with each other in the discrete case.
Formally, we have
Lemma 2.2. Let x˜ and z˜ be two discrete random variables with the support
{x1, ..., xn} and {z1, ..., zn}, respectively, where x1 < ... < xn and z1 < ... < zn.
Then, x˜  disp z˜ implies that Pr(x˜ = xi) = Pr(z˜ = zi) for any i 2 {1, ..., n}.
Proof. See appendix.
From the above lemma, we see that the dispersive order exposes relatively
strict restrictions on the probability distributions of the two random variables, if
they are discrete and have the same number of possible realizations. Note that
if the two random variables have the same support, then they follow the same
distribution. We may refer to this necessary condition of the dispersive order as
the equal probability condition.
Now we can introduce Ganuza and Penalva’s criterion based on the dispersive
order to describe the dispersion property of the conditional expectations. The
intuition is that a more informative signal should provide more e↵ective revisions
for updating the belief, i.e., having more influence on the posteriors and thus the
conditional expectations. When the signal is fully uninformative, the expectation
conditional on signal realizations will equal to the unconditional expectation for
any signal realization; while when signals can e↵ectively revise posterior belief, the
conditional expectation varies a lot with di↵erent signal realizations. Hence, it
is natural to link the precision of signals with the dispersion of the expectation
conditional on signals.
Let !˜ be the random variable of the state and y˜F and y˜G be random variables
of the two signals generated from information system (⌦, Y F , F ) and (⌦, Y G, G),
respectively4. Then, as in Ganuza and Penalva (2010), we can define the so-called
supermodular precision criterion as follows.
Definition 2.5. An information system (⌦, Y F , F ) is said to be more supermodular
precise than another system (⌦, Y G, G), denoted by F  sm G, if E[!˜|y˜F ]  disp
E[!˜|y˜G].
Roughly speaking, the dispersive order requires necessarily that the more
dispersive random variable has a broader support. Thus, in order to compare any
4Without any other specification, we will use in the paper the tilde sign to represent the
corresponding random variables.
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realizations of di↵erent signals, an alternative characterization of supermodular
precision can be formalized by introducing a transformed signal which is defined
as x˜k = F k(y˜k), k 2 {F,G}, where F k is the cumulative distribution function of
y˜k. According to the probability integral transform 5, the new signal is uniformly
distributed on the interval [0,1] when F k is continuous and strict increasing,
regardless of the original distribution of signal y˜6. With this transformation of
variables, we now restate Lemma 1 of Ganuza and Penalva (2010) in the following,
which provides another characterization of the supermodular precision criterion.
Lemma 2.3. (⌦, Y F , F ) is more supermodular precise than (⌦, Y G, G) if
EF [!˜|x0]  EF [!˜|x]   EG[!˜|x0]  EG[!˜|x] (2.7)
for any x, x0 2 (0, 1) such that x0 > x.
Lemma 2.3 describes the relation between signal precision and the conditional
expectations in a more explicit way. It is obvious that the di↵erence between
the two conditional expectations, denoted by  E(x) := EF [!˜|x]   EG[!˜|x], is
monotonically increasing in x. Moreover, the conditional expectation for the more
precise information system, EF [!˜|x], is always steeper than that in the less precise
one, EG[!˜|x], which shows that the conditional expectation is more sensitive to
the changes in signal realizations if the system is more precise.
Similar as the supermodular precision criterion, Ganuza and Penalva (2010) also
introduce the integral precision which is also defined on conditional expectations
but with another stochastic order - the convex order. But in the following of this
paper we just focus on the supermodular precision criterion and try to find links
between this precision criterion with traditional criteria.
5The probability integral transform theorem states that if X is a random variable with
continuous cumulative distribution function FX(x), then U = FX(X) is uniformly distributed
over the interval [0,1].
6The transformed signal is uniformly distributed only when the distribution function F is
continuous and strictly increasing, yet Lehmann (1988) provides a construction of an equivalent
signal, which can solve the problem of the discontinuity of the distribution function.
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2.3 Relationship between informativeness and su-
permodular precision
2.3.1 Binary examples
Example 1. Each project requires an initial investment of 1 and generates a
payo↵ q˜ in the next period. There are two types of projects, namely, low- and
high-revenue projects, with payo↵s of qL and qH , respectively, where qL < qH .
Assume that a fraction ⇡ of the projects are of low-revenue, while the high-revenue
projects comprise the remaining fraction 1   ⇡. Assume that 0 < ⇡ < 1. The
investment decision is made after observing a payo↵-related signal y˜ 2 {yL, yH}.
Let pt be the probability of receiving signal yt when the project is of type s,
where t, s 2 {L,H} and t 6= s, i.e., pt := Pr(yt|qs). Then, pt can be interpreted
as the “error probability”. Furthermore, we assume that pL = pH = p 2 [0, 12).
Intuitively, the larger the error probability p is, the less information the system can
provide. Specifically, p = 0 indicates the full informativeness of the information
system, while p = 12 shows that the system is fully uninformative. Therefore, the
information system is characterized by ({qL, qH}, {yL, yH , F}), where
F =
 
1  p p
p 1  p
!
.
Lemma 2.4. For the binary case stated as above, the larger the error probability p
is, the smaller the di↵erence between the conditional expected payo↵s is. That is,
E[q˜|yH ]  E[q˜|yL] is decreasing in p.
Proof. See appendix.
In another word, Lemma 2.4 shows that
EF [q˜|yH ]  EF [q˜|yL] > EF 0 [q˜|yH ]  EF 0 [q˜|yL], for any 0 < p < p0 < 1/2, (2.8)
where EF and EF
0
represent the expectation calculated under the information
systems with parameters p and p0, respectively. Equation (2.8) exhibits a property
of the dispersive order, although, by Lemma 2.2, the necessary condition of
EF [q˜|y˜]  disp EF 0 [q˜|y˜] requires that the probability of EF [q˜|y˜ = yL] and EF 0 [q˜|y˜ =
yL] are equal, which is also equivalent to PrF (y˜ = yL) = PrF
0
(y˜ = yL). Therefore,
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to draw the conclusion of the dispersion of the conditional expectations we need in
addition that
⇡(1  p) + (1  ⇡)p = ⇡(1  p0) + (1  ⇡)p0.
In fact, the equal probability condition together with equation (2.8) is also
su cient to show the dispersive orderings. More generally, we have the following
characterization of the dispersive order in a binary case.
Lemma 2.5. Let x˜ and z˜ be two discrete random variables, with the supports
supp(X) = {lx, hx} and supp(Z) = {lz, hz}, respectively. Then, x˜  disp z˜ if, and
only if, (1) hx   lx   hz   lz; and (2) Pr(x˜ = lx) = Pr(z˜ = lz).
Proof. See appendix.
Hence, we know that for some prior distribution p < p0 implies that EF [q˜|y˜]  disp
EF
0
[q˜|y˜]7. That is, the information system F is more supermodular precise than
the information system F 0. Nevertheless, in order to ecsure condition (2) in Lemma
2.5, the only possible prior distribution for this example is ⇡ = 1/2.
Now we consider some general binary information systems.
Example 2 There are two information systems which are characterized by
({qL, qH}, {yL, yH}, F ) and ({qL, qH}, {yL, yH}, G), respectively, where
F =
 
1  p1 p1
p2 1  p2
!
and G =
 
1  q1 q1
q2 1  q2
!
with p1, p2, q1, q2 2 (0, 1), p1 + p2 < 1 and q1 + q2 < 1.
Proposition 2.1. F and G are two information systems as stated above, with
the prior distribution (⇡, 1   ⇡). Then, F  i G implies F  sm G for the prior
0 < ⇡ < 1 such that PrF (y˜ = yL) = PrG(y˜ = yL), i.e. ⇡(1   p1) + (1   ⇡)p2 =
⇡(1  q1) + (1  ⇡)q2.
Proof. (See the appendix.)
Although the informativeness criterion implies the supermodular precision
criterion which is defined by the dispersion of the conditional expectations, the
implication also depends on the prior, which ensures one of the necessary conditions
of the dispersive order.
7Moreover, if the investment decision is made on the basis of the expected utilities of the
possible payo↵s, we can also have the same conclusion that a higher error probability results in a
smaller dispersion of conditional expected utilities as long as the utility function is increasing.
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2.3.2 General discrete cases
Now we consider a more general case where ]Q = n and ]Y = m, the result
becomes unclear. Let Q = {q1, ..., qn}, sorted in increasing order, be a finite set of
possible payo↵s, with the prior probability {⇡1, ..., ⇡n}; Y = {y1, ..., ym} is the set
of signals, which is also sorted in increasing order. Two information systems are
identified by the following matrices, F and G, respectively.
F =
0B@f11 · · · f1m... ...
fn1 · · · fnm
1CA and G =
0B@g11 · · · g1m... ...
gn1 · · · gnm
1CA .
Suppose that F is more informative than G in Blackwell’s sense, denoted as
F  i G. That is, there exists a stochastic matrix   = ( ij)m⇥m such that
G = F  (2.9)
Actually, the result in Lemma 2.5 can be easily generalized to the finite discrete
case. However, the implication between informativeness and the supermodular
precision does not hold any more, even for those priors which can ensure the equal
probability condition to hold. An counter example is show in the following.
Let
F =
 
0.9195 0.0517 0.0288
0.1053 0.2399 0.6548
!
, G =
 
0.7141 0.1974 0.0885
0.2489 0.1381 0.6130
!
.
We can check that both F and G satisfy MLRP. And for such information
systems, there exists a stochastic matrix
  =
0B@0.7638 0.1902 0.04590.1043 0.4208 0.4750
0.2191 0.0261 0.7549
1CA ,
such that G = F . That is, F  i G.
However, even for the prior (0.4113, 0.5887), which ensures the same probability
of each signal realization, i.e. PrF (yi) = PrG(yi), for any i 2 {1, 2, 3}, we have
EF [q˜|y3]  EF [q˜|y2] = 0.1010 < EG[q˜|y3]  EG[q˜|y2] = 0.4082.
In fact, the property at the extremes can be kept, while the monotonicity of
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EF [q˜|ys]  EG[q˜|ys] with respect to ys can be possibly violated in the intermedi-
ate values when there are more than two signal realization values. The MLRP
guarantees the monotone increasing of the conditional expectations in both infor-
mation system, yet the speed of the increasing can di↵er, which possibly makes
the di↵erence of the conditional expectations fluctuate.
Although the result cannot be duplicated for general information systems, it is
true as long as the signal space contains only 2 elements, i.e. m = 2. Formally,
Proposition 2.2. F and G are two information systems with finite states and 2
signals, and the prior distribution is (⇡1, ..., ⇡n). Then, F  i G implies F  sm G
for the prior (⇡1, ..., ⇡n) such that PrF (y˜ = yi) = PrG(y˜ = yi) for all i 2 {1, ..., n}.
Proof. See appendix.
That is, as long as there are binary signal realizations, the expected payo↵s
can still be ranked by the dispersive order even when the set of possible payo↵s
contains more than two elements. Moreover, all the results can be reproduced
for the expected utility of the payo↵s, as long as the utility function is strictly
increasing.
From the above analysis we see that the equal probability requirement of
the dispersive order makes the connection between supermodular precision and
Blackwell’s informativeness very di cult. However, even when we ignore the
requirement on the priors, when the signals have more than realizations, the
dispersive property of the conditional expectations may not be obtained. In fact,
the precision criteria, which are defined on the conditional expectations instead of
on information systems, is already out of the convention. As shown in Brandt et
al. (2014), these precision criteria do not possess the property that the ordering is
invariant to the relabeling of the unknown states.
Still, it is natural for us to think about discarding the equal probability require-
ment when we consider the discrete cases, yet still keeping the core idea of Ganuza
and Penalva (2010).
2.4 Other information criteria and the disper-
sion of posteriors
Alternative criteria for comparing two di↵erent information systems have also been
introduced in the literature. For example, Lehmann (1988) considers information
systems with MLRP, which is also known as the property of a liation; for this
19
2. INFORMATIVENESS AND DISPERSION OF POSTERIORS
certain class of decision problems, Lehmann proposed the so-called e↵ectiveness
criterion. With MLRP, we have the property that the higher a signal realization is,
the higher the underlying state we can infer. As the information system describes
the correlation between the signals and the true state, a signal from a better
information system should be more correlated with the true state. Persico (2000)
formalizes Lehmann’s criterion, where the informativeness of an information system
is defined in the following way, where the term “accurate” is used.
Adopting Persico’s notations, in the following we denote the signal as x˜ and the
underlying state as v˜. More specifically, let v˜ be a random variable representing
the unknown state with support V. For any v 2 V, let H(v) and h(v) be the
prior distribution and density functions of V , respectively. Decisions are made
after observing a realization of signal x˜ that is related to the unknown state, and
the conditional distribution and density of x˜ are denoted by F (·|v) and f(·|v),
respectively. Assumed that the signal x˜ is uniformly distributed on the interval
[0, 1]. That is, the marginal density of x˜, denoted by µ(x), equals unity for any
x 2 [0, 1]. According to Persico,
Definition 2.6. Two information structures with signals x˜✓ and x˜⌘ are denoted
by I✓ and I⌘, respectively, which admit MLRP. Then, information structure I✓ is
said to be more accurate than the other I⌘, if
Tv(x) := (F
✓) 1
 
F ⌘(x|v)|v  (2.10)
is non-decreasing in v, for every x.
The function Tv(·) can be seen as a transformation of the signals, and the
increasing property of Tv means that the transformation adds more correlation on
the less informative signal x˜⌘ and yields a more accurate signal x˜✓.
Clearly, equation (2.10) is equivalent to
F ✓(Tv(x)|v) = F ⌘(x|v). (2.11)
Inspired by Persico’s criterion, we now consider two information structures with
signals x˜✓ and x˜⌘, respectively, which satisfy the following property:
f ✓(Tv(x)|v˜  v) = f ⌘(x|v˜  v), 8v 2 V, (2.12)
In the following part of this section, we show the informativeness captured by
such a criterion could have some relationship with the dispersion of the expectations
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conditional on signals. In order to proceed the analysis, it is useful to observe and
show that the conditional density of the signal given the state is lower than some
value v, f(·|v˜  v), is decreasing for any given v.
Lemma 2.6. For any given v 2 V, f(x|v˜  v) :=
R v
v f(x, v
0)dv0
H(v)
is decreasing in
x, where f(x, v) is the joint density of signals and states.
Proof. Directly from Lemma 1 in Brandt et al. (2014).
Before turning to investigating the links between the accuracy of information
and the dispersion of conditional expectations, we first show a necessary lemma as
follows.
Lemma 2.7. For any given v 2 V, there exists x¯v 2 (0, 1) such that Tv(x¯v) = x¯v,
i.e. f ✓(x¯v|v˜  v) = f ⌘(x¯v|v˜  v). Moreover, if T 0v(x) < 1, we have Tv(x) >
x, 8 0  x < x¯v and Tv(x) < x, 8 x¯v < x  1.
Proof. For any v 2 V, we haveZ 1
0
f ✓(x0|v˜  v)dx0 =
Z 1
0
f ⌘(x0|v˜  v)dx0 = 1 (2.13)
Since f ✓(·|v˜  v) and f ⌘(·|v˜  v) are continuous, by the mean value theorem for
integration, there must exist an x¯v 2 (0, 1) such that f ✓(x¯v|v˜  v) = f ⌘(x¯v|v˜  v).
That is, Tv(x¯v) = x¯v.
Let T˜v(x) := Tv(x)  x, then T˜ 0v(x) = T 0v(x)  1 < 0 since T 0v(x) < 1. That is,
T˜v(x) is decreasing in x. Note that T˜v(x¯v) = Tv(x¯v)  x¯v = 0, thus we have
T˜v(x) > T˜v(x¯v) = 0, for any 0  x < x¯v. (2.14)
T˜v(x) < T˜v(x¯v) = 0, for any x¯v < x  1. (2.15)
⌅
Moreover, taking derivative of equation (2.12) with respect to x yields
@
@x
f ✓(Tv(x)|v˜  v) T 0v(x) =
@
@x
f ⌘(x|v˜  v). (2.16)
From Lemma 2.6 we know both @@xf
✓(·|v˜  v)) and @@xf ⌘(·|v˜  v)) are negative,
which implies T 0v(x) > 0.
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Now we can get the link between condition (2.12) and the dispersion of the
conditional expectations.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose that for any given v 2 V, @2f✓(x|v˜v)@x2 > 0 for any
0  x < x¯v and @2f✓(x|v˜v)@x2 < 0 for any x¯v < x  1. Then, condition (2.12) with
T 0v(x) < 1 implies that E
✓[v˜|x˜✓] is more dispersive than E⌘[v˜|x˜⌘].
Proof. Note that 0 < T 0v(x) < 1 for any v 2 V, then from equation (2.16) we
have
@
@x
f ✓(Tv(x)|v˜  v) < @
@x
f ⌘(x|v˜  v). (2.17)
Now consider the case where 0  x < x¯v. By Lemma 2.7, we have Tv(x) > x.
Therefore,
@
@x
f ✓(Tv(x)|v˜  v) > @
@x
f ✓(x|v˜  v), (2.18)
since @
2f✓(x|v˜v)
@x2 > 0.
When x¯v < x  1, Tv(x) < x, and the property of the second order derivative
of f ✓(x|v˜  v) implies the same as equation (2.18). Therefore, by equations (2.17)
and (2.18), we have
@
@x
f ✓(x|v˜  v) < @
@x
f ⌘(x|v˜  v), for any x 2 [0, 1]. (2.19)
Equivalently,     @@xf ✓(x|v˜  v)
     >      @@xf ⌘(x|v˜  v)
     , for any x 2 [0, 1], (2.20)
which shows that the graph of f ✓(x|v˜  v) is steeper than that of f ⌘(x|v˜  v) on
the whole interval of [0, 1].
For any x 2 [0, 1], the expectation of v˜ conditional on signal x˜k = x is given by
Ek[v˜|x˜k = x] =
Z
V
vfk(v|x)dv =
Z
V
vdF k(v|x) = vF k(v|x)  v¯
v
 
Z
V
F k(v|x)dv
= v¯  
Z
V
Z v
v
fk(v0|x)dv0dv = v¯  
Z
V
Z v
v
fk(x, v0)dv0dv.
where k 2 {✓, ⌘}.
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Denote  (x) := E✓[v˜|x˜✓ = x]  E⌘[v˜|x˜⌘ = x], then we get
 (x) =
Z
V
Z v
v
 
f ⌘(x, v0)  f ✓(x, v0) dv0dv
=
Z
V
H(v)
  R vv f ⌘(x, v0)dv0
H(v)
 
R v
v f
✓(x, v0)dv0
H(v)
 
dv
=
Z
V
H(v)
 
f ⌘(x|v˜  v)  f ✓(x|v˜  v)   dv (2.21)
Thus, we can see that equation (2.19) provides a su cient condition for  0(x) >
0, which means E✓[v˜|x] E⌘[v˜|x] is increasing in x. Therefore, we have shown that
E✓[v˜|x˜✓] is more dispersive than E⌘[v˜|x˜⌘]. ⌅
2.5 Conclusion
With looking into the intrinsic property of the dispersive order, this paper focuses
on the supermodular precision criterion, which is defined on the dispersion of the
expectation conditional on signal realizations. We attempt to link this precision
criterion with other information criterion in this chapter. Yet in fact, the dispersive
order requires require highly on the prior distributions in the discrete cases. For
example, when the random variables have the same number of realizations, the
dispersive order requires what we call the equal probability condition. This
requirement on priors is usually not needed for other criteria, although it could
be solved by considering the normalization of signals. Even so, the connection
between the supermodular precision criterion and Blackwell’s informativeness can
hardly be built up except for the binary case. As long as there are more than two
signal realizations, the monotonicity of the di↵erence between the two conditional
expectations can not be kept. And in the last section of this paper, another
criterion which is based on Persico’s criterion, with the normalization of signals
in a continuous case, is taken into account, yet it is still di cult to see a clear
and interpretable link to the dispersion of conditional expectations. For the same
purpose, some new criteria are proposed and thoroughly discussed in Brandt et al.
(2014), where more formulations of dispersion are considered and more links are
presented.
In this paper we see that Blackwell’s informativeness criterion does not neces-
sarily imply or be implied by the dispersion of conditional expectations in general
cases, while in the monotone decision problems the relationship between dispersion
of conditional expectations and some informativeness criterion, which is defined
23
2. INFORMATIVENESS AND DISPERSION OF POSTERIORS
similar as accuracy criterion, could be built up under some conditions. This
could provide theoretical basis for applying the dispersive orders directly to de-
cision analysis. Actually, this is just a preliminary study in this topic, and more
informativeness and dispersion criteria are under investigation.
Appendix 2.A Proofs of propositions
Proof of Lemma 2.2. Let Fx and Gz be the distribution functions of x˜ and z˜,
respectively. Let Pi := Fx(xi) and Qi := Gz(zi) for any i 2 {1, 2, ..., n}.
By contradiction, we suppose there exists some k 2 {1, 2, ..., n} such that
Pr(x˜ = xk) 6= Pr(z˜ = zk) and Pr(x˜ = xi) = Pr(x˜ = zi) for any i < k. That
is, k is the smallest index where there are unequal probabilities. Hence, we have
Pi = Qi for any i < k and Pk 6= Qk.
If Pk > Qk, let ↵ = Qk and   = Pk, thus ↵,   2 (0, 1) with ↵ <  . And we
have
F 1x ( )  F 1x (↵) = xk   xk = 0
and we know that
G 1z ( ) G 1z (↵)   zk+1   zk > 0,
Note that F 1x (↵) = xk, since Pk 1 = Qk 1 < Qk, i.e. Fx(xk 1) < ↵. And the
inequality comes from G 1z ( )   zk+1. Therefore, we have F 1x ( )   F 1x (↵) <
G 1z ( ) G 1z (↵), which contradicts x˜  disp z˜ by Definition 2.4.
If Pk < Qk, we first consider the case Pk < Qk < Pk+1. Take ↵ = Qk and
  = Pk+1, then we have F 1x (↵) = F
 1
x ( ) = xk+1, while G
 1
z (↵) = zk and
G 1z ( ) = zk+1. Therefore, we have F
 1
x ( )   F 1x (↵) = 0 < G 1z ( )   G 1z (↵)
which forms the same contradiction as above.
When Pk < Pk+1  Qk, there must exist some l > k + 1 such that Pl 1 <
Ql 1 < Pl since Pn = Qn = 1. Take ↵ = Ql 1 and   = Pl, then we have
F 1x (↵) = F
 1
x ( ) = xl, while G
 1
z (↵) = zl 1 and G
 1
z ( ) = zl. We get the same
contradiction as before. ⌅
Proof of Lemma 2.4. Note that the probability of receiving a low signal is given
by
Pr(yL) = Pr(qL)Pr(yL|qL) + Pr(qH)Pr(yL|qH) = ⇡(1  p) + (1  ⇡)p,
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then we have
Pr(qL|yL) = Pr(qL)Pr(yL|qL)
Pr(yL)
=
⇡(1  p)
⇡(1  p) + (1  ⇡)p
and
Pr(qH |yL) = Pr(qH)Pr(yL|qH)
Pr(yL)
=
(1  ⇡)p
⇡(1  p) + (1  ⇡)p.
Thus, the conditional expectation of the payo↵ is
E[q˜|yL] = Pr(qL|yL)qL + Pr(qH |yL)qH
=
⇡(1  p)
⇡(1  p) + (1  ⇡)pqL +
(1  ⇡)p
⇡(1  p) + (1  ⇡)pqH .
Similarly, the expected utility of the payo↵ conditional on the high signal is given
by
E[q˜|yH ] = ⇡p
⇡p+ (1  ⇡)(1  p)qL +
(1  ⇡)(1  p)
⇡p+ (1  ⇡)(1  p)qH .
(It is obvious that E[q˜|yL] = qL and E[q˜|yH ] = qH when the error probability
p = 0 - the information system is fully informative, while when p = 12 the two
conditional expectations are the same and equal to the unconditional expectation,
i.e. E[q˜|yL] = E[q˜|yH ] = ⇡qL + (1  ⇡)qH .)
Taking derivatives of the conditional expected utilities of payo↵s with the error
probability p yields that
dE[u(q˜)|yL]
dp
=
⇡(⇡   1)u(qL) + ⇡(1  ⇡)u(qH)
[⇡(1  p) + (1  ⇡)p]2
>
⇡(⇡   1)u(qL) + ⇡(1  ⇡)u(qL)
[⇡(1  p) + (1  ⇡)p]2 = 0
where the inequality follows the fact that u is increasing and qH > qL. Similarly,
we have
dE[u(q˜)|yH ]
dp
=
⇡(1  ⇡)u(qL) + ⇡(⇡   1)u(qH)
[⇡p+ (1  ⇡)(1  p)]2 < 0
Denote  E := E[u(q˜)|yH ]  E[u(q˜)|yL], then we get
d E
dp
=
dE[u(q˜)|yH ]
dp
  dE[u(q˜)|yL]
dp
< 0.
Therefore, we show that E[q˜|yH ]  E[q˜|yL] is decreasing in p. ⌅
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Proof of Lemma 2.5. Let Fx and Gz be the distribution functions of x˜ and z˜,
respectively. First, suppose x˜  disp z˜. (2) is a direct result of Lemma 2.2. Let
Pr(x˜ = lx) = Pr(z˜ = lz) = p¯, we have p¯ 2 (0, 1). Let p = p¯ and p0 = p¯+ ", where
" 2 (0, 1 p¯). Then, by Definition 2.4, we have F 1x (p0) F 1x (p)   G 1z (p0) G 1z (p).
That is, hx   lx   hz   lz, and thus (1) is true.
Now suppose (1) hx   lx   hz   lz, and (2) Pr(x˜ = lx) = Pr(z˜ = lz). We show
that condition (2.6) holds true for any 0 < p  p0 < 1. For any p¯ < p  p0 < 1, we
have F 1x (p
0) F 1x (p) = hx hx = 0 and G 1z (p0) G 1z (p) = hz hz = 0. For any
0 < p  p0  p¯, we have F 1x (p0)  F 1x (p) = lx   lx = 0 and G 1z (p0) G 1z (p) =
lz   lz = 0. For 0 < p  p¯ < p0 < 1, we have F 1x (p0)   F 1x (p) = hx   lx
and G 1z (p
0)   G 1z (p) = hz   lz. According to (1), we have F 1x (p0)   F 1x (p)  
G 1z (p
0)   G 1z (p). Thus, condition (2.6) holds true for any 0 < p  p0 < 1, and
x˜  disp z˜ .
⌅
Lemma 2.8.
F ⌫i G () p1(1  q2)  (1  p2)q1 and p2(1  q1)  (1  p1)q2.
The proof of the above lemma follows directly from the definition of Blackwell’s
informativeness, and the proof of Proposition 2.1 will need this above lemma.
Proof of Proposition 2.1. As before, it is su cient to show that the result holds
true for the conditional expected utilities of the payo↵s when the utility function
is increasing. The conditional expectations of the utilities in the more informative
information system are given by
E[u(q˜)|yL] = ⇡(1  p1)u(qL) + (1  ⇡)p2u(qH)
⇡(1  p1) + (1  ⇡)p2
E[u(q˜)|yH ] = ⇡p1u(qL) + (1  ⇡)(1  p2)u(qH)
⇡p1 + (1  ⇡)(1  p2)
For the less informative one, we have
E¯[u(q˜)|yL] = ⇡(1  q1)u(qL) + (1  ⇡)q2u(qH)
⇡(1  q1) + (1  ⇡)q2
E¯[u(q˜)|yH ] = ⇡q1u(qL) + (1  ⇡)(1  q2)u(qH)
⇡q1 + (1  ⇡)(1  q2)
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Thus, we have the di↵erence of the expected utilities conditional on signal yL in
the two di↵erent information systems
E[u(q˜)|yL]  E¯[u(q˜)|yL]
=
⇡(1  p1)u(qL) + (1  ⇡)p2u(qH)
⇡(1  p1) + (1  ⇡)p2  
⇡(1  q1)u(qL) + (1  ⇡)q2u(qH)
⇡(1  q1) + (1  ⇡)q2
=
⇡(1  ⇡)[u(qH)  u(qL)][p2(1  q1)  (1  p1)q2]
[⇡(1  p1) + (1  ⇡)p2][⇡(1  q1) + (1  ⇡)q2]  0
since p2(1   q1)  (1   p1)q2, which, according to Lemma 2.8, derives from the
assumption that F ⌫i F¯ . Thus, we have E[u(q˜)|yL]  E¯[u(q˜)|yL]. Similarly, the
first inequality of the equivalence condition in Lemma 2.8 yields that
E[u(q˜)|yH ]  E¯[u(q˜)|yH ] = ⇡(1  ⇡)[u(qH)  u(qL)][(1  p2)q1   p1(1  q2)]
[⇡p1 + (1  ⇡)(1  p2)][⇡q1 + (1  ⇡)(1  q2)]   0
That is, E[u(q˜)|yH ]   E¯[u(q˜)|yH ]. In addition, we get
E¯[u(q˜)|yL]  E¯[u(q˜)|yH ] = ⇡(1  ⇡)[u(qH)  u(qL)](q1 + q2   1)
[⇡(1  q1) + (1  ⇡)q2][⇡q1 + (1  ⇡)(1  q2)]  0
since q1 + q2  1. Therefore, we can conclude that E[u(q˜)|yL]  E¯[u(q˜)|yL] 
E¯[u(q˜)|yH ]  E[u(q˜)|yH ], i.e. the conditional expected utilities in the more infor-
mative system are more dispersive compared to the less informative one. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 2.2. In order to shed some light on the more general discrete
cases, we start the proof with the N ⇥M case. Suppose that F  i G. That is,
there exists a stochastic matrix   = ( ij)m⇥m such that G = F . Let ui = u(qi)
be the utility of the payo↵ for any i = 1, ..., n, where u is strictly increasing. Thus,
for any signal ys, s = 1, 2, ...,m, the conditional expected utility under the more
informative information system F is
EF [u(q˜)|ys] =
nX
i=1
⇡iP (ys|qi)
P F (ys)
u(qi) =
Pn
i=1 fis⇡iui
P F (ys)
where P F (ys) =
Pn
j=1 ⇡jP
F (ys|qj) =
Pn
j=1 ⇡jfjs.
Similarly, in the less informative information system G, we have
EG[u(q˜)|ys] =
Pn
i=1 gis⇡iui
PG(ys)
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where PG(ys) =
Pn
j=1 ⇡jgjs.
Denote  (ys) ⌘ EF [u(q˜)|ys]  EG[u(q˜)|ys], then we have
 (ys) =
Pn
i=1 fis⇡iui
P F (ys)
 
Pn
i=1 gis⇡iui
PG(ys)
=
Pn
i=1 fis⇡iui
Pn
j=1 ⇡jgjs  
Pn
i=1 gis⇡iui
Pn
j=1 ⇡jfjs
P F (ys)PG(ys)
=
Pn
i=1
Pn
j=1 fisgjs⇡i⇡jui  
Pn
i=1
Pn
j=1 fjsgis⇡i⇡jui
P F (ys)PG(ys)
=
Pn
i=1
Pn
j=1 fisgjs⇡i⇡j(ui   uj)
P F (ys)PG(ys)
=
P
i<j ⇡i⇡j(ui   uj)(fisgjs   fjsgis)
P F (ys)PG(ys)
(2.22)
The fourth equation is obtained by swapping the indexes i and j and exchanging
the summations. Since ⇡i > 0, ⇡j > 0, P F (ys) > 0, PG(ys) > 0 and ui   uj < 0,
the sign of (2.22) depends on the term fisgjs   fjsgis. Since we know G = F , we
can have
fisgjs   fjsgis = fis
mX
k=1
fjk ks   fjs
mX
k=1
fik ks =
X
k 6=s
(fisfjk   fikfjs) ks.
The MLRP of F shows that fisfjk   fikfjs could be either positive, if k > s, or
negative, if k < s. Yet in the cases where m = 2, we can confirm that  (y1) < 0
and  (y2) > 0. That is, the expected utility of payo↵ is more disperse under a
more informative system even when the set of possible payo↵s contains more than
two elements. However, the result seems unclear when the signal space expands
(m > 2). In fact, the property at the extremes can be kept, while the monotonicity
of EF [u(q˜)|ys]  EG[u(q˜)|ys] with respect to ys can be possibly violated.
⌅
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Chapter 3
Endogenous information
revelation in a competitive credit
market and credit crunch
Coauthored with Professor Bertrand Wigniolle
Abstract
This paper focuses on the role of dissipative signal in a competitive credit
market with asymmetric information. Borrowers can resort to costly certification,
which signals the quality of their projects; signaling is costly and borne by the
borrowers. This has the e↵ect of easing the information disadvantage on the side of
lenders for their making decision on loan issuance. Besides the finding of equilibria
in a one-shot economy, we spot a close relationship between the opacity of credit
market and the fundamental funding cost, i.e. the risk-free interest rate. To further
examine its dynamic interaction with the market degree of opacity, the interest
rate is endogenized by extending the model to an OLG context. We show that the
market is likely to converge to either an opaque or a transparent stationary state,
and more interestingly, for some configurations of parameters there exist permanent
oscillations between two di↵erent regimes, which provides us a theoretical support
of the (in)stability of the credit market and indicates a possible way of explaining
the credit crunch during the financial crisis.
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3.1 Introduction
We had gone through the vast financial instability during the global financial crisis
of 2007-2008, which was primarily driven by mortgage-backed securities. The
foundations laid in the pre-crisis period are the low interest rate environment and
a decline in lending standards. Structured investment vehicles were booming and
the extent of securitization brought excessive opacity into the financial market.
Yet as the turmoil burst, the capital of financial institutions eroded and, at the
same time, lending standards tightened. Even with injections of liquidity from
central banks, banks started hoarding funds and became reluctant even to lend
to each other1. A credit crunch was spread through economic agents, and the
tightening of credit led to contractions in the real economy - asset prices dropped,
unemployment increased, and growth of outputs bogged down2.
The information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders could be one reason
to explain the inappropriate lending. Having the information advantage, borrowers
may resort to a costly way of revealing their information in order to increase
the chance of being financed. With this key assumption of costly information
disclosure, we are able to represent the existence of di↵erent equilibria, and even
the existence of multiple equilibria. Moreover, we are able to observe from the
model that, unqualified borrowers may also be financed if they keep opaque and
when the credit market is relatively loose. Thus, the information asymmetry and
the costly information revealing could be a possible way of explaining the credit
crunch we experienced and the volatility of the credit market.
In this paper, we consider a signaling problem in competitive credit market. In
our model, borrowers, who seek for funding to finance their projects, have private
information about the return on their own projects, and they are o↵ered with
the option of costly disclosing the information or remaining opaque. Banks, who
collect deposits and serve as a lender, charge di↵erent interest rates according
to the type of the borrowers (opaque or transparent). Endogenizing the interest
rate by considering imperfectly elastic credit supply, we show that, according to
di↵erent values of the safe interest rate, there may exist three types of equilibria
- the opaque equilibrium in which all borrowers do not reveal information and
are funded, the transparent equilibrium in which only borrowers who own good
projects reveal information and are financed, and the multiple equilibria where
1Interbank spreads in Europe soared to nearly 200 basis points at the peak in September
2008, while up to 500 basis points in the US, compared to the level around 10 basis points before
the crisis (Heider et al., 2009).
2See also Brunnermeier (2009), Acharya and Skeie (2011) and so on.
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both opaque and transparent equilibria can be possible. Besides, we extend the
context to a dynamic framework by endogenizing the interest rate through an
OLG model, where savings at period t constitute the credit supply on the credit
market at period t+ 1. At each period, the economy can be either in an opaque or
a transparent equilibrium. We provide the dynamics of the credit market which is
governed by the evolution of two variables - the interest rate and the type of the
state. Both opaque and transparent steady states can possibly occur in the long
run.
The main result in the static model is that the level of risk-free interest rate
determines the type of the equilibrium in the credit market, and thus the opacity
of the market. We show that there only exists transparent equilibrium when
the safe interest rate is high, while low interest rate leads to opaque equilibrium.
More interestingly, when the interest rate is in an intermediate range, there exists
possibility of multiple equilibria, which shed some light on the indeterminacy of the
credit market. For example, a possible case is that there is an abrupt jump from
an opaque equilibrium to a transparent equilibrium, which indicates a situation of
credit crunch - a decrease of credit supply together with a decrease of the interest
rate. By integrating the basic static model into an OLG framework, we form the
dynamics of the safe interest rate, showing that there may exist the convergence
to di↵erent types of equilibria in the long run; and with some parameter settings,
there may even exist cyclical oscillations between opaque and transparent equilibria.
The indeterminacy in the static context is spread out in the long run, and we may
even have systematically permanent fluctuations in the financial market and as
well as in the real economy.
Since the pioneer work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), large literature has studied
the role of asymmetric information played on determining the credit market
equilibria. Lenders lack of information on the relevant characteristics of the
borrowers may result in the outcome of underinvestment. Credit is said to be
rationed in this sense. Yet, the possibility for the flip side of this story is also
extensively studied: the investment level may turn out in excess of the social
e cient level. For example, De Meza and Webb (1987) shows that if expected
returns on the project could di↵er, overinvestment may occur under some plausible
assumptions on the distribution function of the project return. A recent paper by
Alberto and Filippo (2013) reinforces this direction in a dynamic context how the
adverse selection fosters a strong boost on investment, capital accumulation and
capital inflows. We pursue our study along their lines, but proceed from a di↵erent
perspective: how are the equilibria impacted by taking into account the borrowers’
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option of costly revealing the information on their project returns.
As for signaling problems in credit market, studies can be dated back to Leland
and Pyle (1977), where they consider a similar problem and assume that signaling
through the choice of one’s financial structure. And classical treatment on adverse
selection problem in the credit market can, for example, be found in Besanko and
Thakor (1987), where the principal designs contracts to induce self-selection. More
studies can be found in Milde and Riley (1988), Cremer and Khalil (1992), and
Tirole (2006). Yet in our model, we simplify the principal (banks)’s decision-making
problem without losing the key insights in such literature.
Regarding the study on the macroeconomic dynamics in credit market, similar
results are found as in Azariadis and Smith (1998), where they establish the results
by considering the production sector and focus on how the capital stock changes
and therefore the switches among di↵erent equilibria. In our paper we focus more
on the credit market and start from the decision of typical borrowers and lenders,
which provides more microeconomic foundations.
One feature of our model is to incorporate the decision of dissipative signaling.
In the static model with endogenous interest rate, despite the simple setup we
choose, the decision of information revelation is endogenized, and so is the market
opacity. Unlike the literature with asymmetric information in credit market,
borrowers in our model can choose to be transparent or opaque depending on which
financial environment they are experiencing - namely, the level of the safe interest
rate and the willingness of banks’ lending. Thus, we are able to characterize the
equilibrium with respect to a safe exogenous market interest rate, and therefore, to
address the link between fundamental funding cost and the type of the equilibrium,
as well as the market opacity and the aggregate output.
Another feature is that we address the long run fluctuations in addition to the
short-term indeterminacy. Therefore, we are able to demonstrate the switches in
the type of equilibrium and credit crunch may explain economic fluctuations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 considers the signaling
problem in a static model and decision making of the two type agents is analyzed;
full characterization of the equilibrium is given in section 3.3; and in section 3.4 we
consider endogenized interest rate and show how credit supply a↵ects the market
equilibrium and the opacity. Then, in section 3.5 we consider the problem in an
OLG model and show the possible stationary states and the transition between
di↵erent states in the long run. And the final section concludes this chapter.
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3.2 The model
3.2.1 Assumption
Consider a credit market populated by two kinds of agents: entrepreneurs and
investors. The entrepreneurs, who are also termed as borrowers, need to raise
capital for launching their projects, and the investors, also termed as lenders, seek
meanwhile to provide loans for them. Both borrowers and lenders are risk-neutral.
Each borrower needs to raise 1 unit of fund to proceed with his project, which
yields a random return of V . However, borrowers are heterogeneous; the return to
the project varies across borrowers and is private information of the owner of the
project himself. The borrower knows the true value of the return v that his project
will realize3, while lenders only know the cross-sectional distribution H(v) of the
project return V . The associated density function h(v) is positive and continuous
for any v 2 [v, v¯] and zero elsewhere.
Unlike the models in most of the literature, where borrowers who have the
private information are all required to report or signal the information (whether
truthfully or falsely), borrowers in our model, when facing a certain loan contract
proposed by a lender, have the option to choose either to publish information to
attract investment or keep silent. Publishing information is costly; the cost is c > 0
and borne solely by the borrower. This cost can be regarded as, for example, a cost
due to being committed to obtaining certain certificate, being exposed to harsher
auditing or monitoring terms, which the borrow has to pay during or at the end
of the implement of the project. We call the borrowers who reveal information
transparent borrowers and those who do not reveal information opaque borrowers.
The borrowers who choose to be transparent reveal full information on the return
to their projects4 and the cost is paid at the end of the period when the project has
been accomplished. Lenders know the exact realization of the return v once the
information is released; otherwise, they have no more information on the return
other than the distribution of V , H(v).
Lenders (Banks) o↵er the loans which must be repaid with interest at the end
of the period. The repayments required by lenders are di↵erent for transparent and
opaque borrowers. So lenders propose a loan contract with a pair of repayment
3A weaker assumption could be that borrowers have better information than lenders, but
not full information, which could be described by using some information criteria. Yet strong
assumptions here could also capture the properties that we would like to show in this model.
4We could consider the cost as a certification cost, so we could focus on the situation where
only truthful revelation is possible.
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requirements (R1, R2), in which R1 is the required repayment for opaque borrowers,
and R2 for transparent borrowers5 6. The timeline of the model is summarized in
Figure 3.1.
Banks propose
loan contracts (R1, R2)
Borrowers reveal
info. or not
Banks (Lenders) issue
loans or not
Equilibrium determined
Figure 3.1: Timing of the Decisions.
The repayment Ri is fulfilled only when the realization of the return on the
project v, net of the certification cost c, exceeds the corresponding amount. That
is, when a bank issues loan to an opaque borrower to finance his project, R1 can
be fulfilled only if v   R1; when a bank invests in a transparent project, R2 can
be fully repaid if v   c   R2. Otherwise lenders could only collect whatever the
projects realize, i.e. v and v   c for opaque or transparent financing, respectively.
Borrowers have no initial endowment to be pledged.
Thus, the payo↵ of a transparent borrower who owns a project with the return
v, given that his loan application is approved, is
⇡TB = max{v   c R2, 0}. (3.1)
And the payo↵ of an opaque borrower with a project of the return v, if he can
obtain the loan, is
⇡OB = max{v  R1, 0}. (3.2)
If the application of loans is rejected, the payo↵ of either type of the borrowers is
zero, i.e. ⇡TB = ⇡
O
B = 0.
If v < R1, the borrower obtains a null gain no matter whether he undertakes
the project or not. It is assumed in this case that the borrower always undertakes
the project if he can get a loan. This assumption can be explained by the fact that
the entrepreneur can also get non-market benefits or private outcomes from leading
5Assume that the credit is not constrained; a lender will provide 1 unit of loan once she
decides to invest - the loan size of all contract is 1, so R1 also equals to 1 + r1, where r1 is the
required interest rate on the loan.
6The interests charged by banks (R1, R2) are assumed to be independent of the return on
the projects, since we consider a competitive credit market in the model and the competition on
the market will finally drive the interest rate down to the level with which zero-profit condition
is satisfied.
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a project, such as gaining experience, extending social networks, and building
reputations. As a consequence of this assumption, when there exist opaque projects
being financed in an equilibrium, all opaque borrowers get loans in this equilibrium.
Consider the funds are supplied by depositors at a safe interest rate r0, and
denote R0 = 1+ r0. Then, the profit of a bank, if it o↵ers the loan to a transparent
borrower with a project of return v, is
⇡TL = min{R2, v   c} R0. (3.3)
The expected profit of a bank, if it provides the loan to an opaque borrower, is
⇡OL = E[min{R1, V }| V is opaque 7] R0. (3.4)
To summarize, we have the expected payo↵ of both borrowers and lenders
shown below in Figure 3.2.
Lender
Borrower
Lender
reveal information
NOT reveal information
issue loan
NOT issue loan
NOT issue loan
issue loan
⇡TB = max{v   c R2, 0}
⇡OB = max{v  R1, 0}
⇡TL = min{R2, v   c} R0
⇡OL = E[min{R1, V }| V is opaque] R0
⇡TL = 0
⇡TB = 0
⇡TL = 0
⇡TB = 0
Figure 3.2: Payo↵s of Borrowers and Lenders.
7“V is opaque” refers to the borrowers who choose not to reveal information.
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3.2.2 Optimal decisions
Now we consider the decisions of some typical lender and borrower. The decision
made by the borrower of whether or not to reveal information depends on the
strategy taken by the lender. Thus, we first take account of the lender’s decision.
The lender choose to invest in a transparent borrower if and only if ⇡TL   0. That
is,
min{R2, v   c} R0   0 , R2   R0 and v   R0 + c. (3.5)
As for the decision of investing in an opaque project, we first introduce two
notations: define hO and hT as the seeming probability density functions corre-
sponding respectively to opaque and transparent projects. That is, the density
function of V , h(v), is divided into two parts according to the types of the borrowers.
Thus, we have h(v) = hO(v) + hT (v) for all v 2 [v, v¯], where hO and hT are the
parts of the density function which refer to opaque and transparent borrowers,
respectively. Both hO and hT are non-negative and defined on [v, v¯]. The corre-
sponding seeming distribution functions are denoted by HO(v) =
R v
v hO(v)dv and
HT (v) =
R v
v hT (v)dv.
The lender issues loans to opaque borrowers if and only if the expected payo↵
of her investing in opaque projects is greater than or equal to that of not investing,
i.e. ⇡OL   0. Note that HO(v¯) is the fraction of opaque borrowers, equation(3.4)
can be written as
⇡OL =
R R1
v vhO(v)dv +R1
 
HO(v¯) HO(R1)
 
HO(v¯)
 R0. (3.6)
Therefore, if opaque projects can be financed in an equilibrium, R1 must satisfy
ZO(R1) :=
R R1
v vhO(v)dv +R1
 
HO(v¯) HO(R1)
 
HO(v¯)
  R0. (3.7)
Note that the function ZO is non-decreasing in R1, and Z 0O < 1 for any R1 2 (v, v¯),
with minZO(R1) = ZO(v) = v and maxZO(R1) = ZO(v¯) = E[V |V is opaque].
Then, we can consider the borrower’s decision of whether or not to release
information about the return on his project. There are two cases in which borrowers
have the incentive to be transparent.
Case 1: A borrower can be willing to reveal information if he cannot get loans
as an opaque applicant. So firstly, the condition of borrowers’ choosing to be
transparent in this case is that banks issue loans to transparent borrowers (⇡TL   0)
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but not to opaque ones (⇡OL < 0) . Secondly, the payo↵ of being transparent for
the borrower must be non-negative, i.e. ⇡TB = max{v   c   R2, 0}   0, which is
always true. Therefore, borrowers choose, in such a case, to reveal information
under the following conditions,8<:min{R2, v   c}   R0ZO(R1) < R0 (3.8)
which are equivalent to 8>><>>:
R0  R2  v   c
R0  v   c
ZO(R1) < R0
(3.9)
Case 2: The second case in which borrowers have the incentive to reveal
information is, if: firstly, they can get loans if they reveal information; secondly, in
contrast to Case 1, they can also get loans if they do not reveal information; thirdly,
the payo↵ of being transparent is however higher than that of being opaque, which
makes being transparent more attractive. Thus, borrowers reveal information and
become transparent if8>><>>:
min{R2, v   c}   R0
ZO(R1)   R0
max{v   c R2, 0}  c   max{v  R1, 0}
(3.10)
which can be simplified as follows,8>><>>:
R0  R2
R0  v   c
ZO(R1)   R0
and
8<:R1   R2 + c, if v   R2 + c.R1   R0 + c, if v < R2 + c. (3.11)
From Case 1 and 2, we can deduce that a borrower does not reveal information
if: either v < R0 + c, or v   R0 + c but with ZO(R1)   R0. In the first situation,
the return on the projects net of the signaling cost is too low to assure lenders
of any positive profit, and revealing information about the low-quality of one’s
project is simply ruling out any possibility of getting financed - no bank invests in
the projects if she foresees the default. In the latter situation, projects are good
enough to attract investment from lenders, but they can also be financed if they
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remain opaque. Then it can be more profitable for borrowers to remain opaque.
One of the possible circumstances is when v   R2 + c and R1 < R2 + c, where
being opaque provides the borrower with a payo↵ ⇡OB = v   R1, which is larger
than that of being transparent, ⇡TB = v  c R2. The other case is when v < R2+ c
and R1 < R0 + c, where we have ⇡TB = 0 and ⇡
O
B = v  R1 > 0 since we are in the
case where v   R0 + c > R1.
In any of these cases the conditions ((3.9) and (3.11)) are easier to be satisfied
for a larger certification cost c. That is, borrowers tend to be less willing to be
transparent when the cost of information disclosure is relatively high, which is
consistent with our intuition. Note also that if v = R2+ c or if R1  c = R2, it may
be a limit case in which the borrower is indi↵erent between revealing information
or not.8
To sum up, we have the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.1. No borrower with v < R0 + c chooses to be transparent in any
circumstance.
Lemma 3.2. Regardless of the decision of the lenders, if:
1. R1 < R2 + c, no borrower with v   R2 + c reveals information; thus, all
borrowers are opaque.
2. R1 > R2 + c, all borrowers with v   R2 + c choose to be transparent (and the
rest remains opaque);
3. R1 = R2 + c, borrowers with v   R2 + c are indi↵erent between revealing
information or not.
As stated in Lemma 3.1, bad borrowers have unanimous decisions under any
circumstance, while good borrowers do not. However, good borrowers’ decision
depends more on the relative values of the two di↵erent repayment requirements
rather than the absolute values. What really matters is the di↵erence between
the two types of repayments, compared with the cost of information disclosure.
According to the optimal decisions of borrowers, we can get the aggregate loan
demand with respect to the repayments R1 and R2, on the opaque and transparent
markets respectively; similarly, the aggregate loan supply can be derived by virtue
of the optimal decision of lenders. The aggregate demand and supply of loans are
depicted in Figure 3.3 and 3.4, for transparent and opaque markets respectively.
8It is also indi↵erent for borrowers to reveal information or not when R0+c < v < R1 < R2+c
and ZO(R1)   R0, in which case ⇡OB = ⇡TB = 0. Yet, the interval (R0 + c, R2 + c) is empty in
equilibrium where R2 = R0.
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R2R0 R1   c
Demand
Supply
Demand/Supply
1 H(R2 + c)
1 H(R0 + c)
Figure 3.3: Aggregate demand and supply of loans on the transparent market.
Demand
Supply
Demand/Supply
R1R2 + c
1
H(R2 + c)
Figure 3.4: Aggregate Demand and supply of Loans on the opaque market.
3.3 Market equilibrium
3.3.1 Definition
In a competitive credit market with free entry, one necessary condition for the
market equilibrium is the zero-profit for the banks. The equilibrium can be captured
by the seeming density functions hO and hT and a loan contract (R⇤1, R
⇤
2). In the
equilibrium, banks maximize their profits by deciding whether to grant loans or not;
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borrowers, with the consideration of lenders’ decision, maximize their payo↵s by
choosing between revealing information or being opaque, captured by the seeming
density functions hO and hT . Furthermore, due the competition in the credit
market, banks earn zero-profit in the equilibrium, by which the level of equilibrium
interests (R⇤1, R
⇤
2) can be pinned down. The existence and the type of equilibria
are determined by the parameters in the model.
The equilibrium of the loan market is solved under the assumption that bor-
rowers always prefer to implement their project rather than doing nothing when
the profit in both cases is zero. As a consequence, when there is a market for
opaque projects, all projects (both opaque and transparent projects) are financed.
Indeed, an opaque project that is financed can never lead to a negative profit for
the borrower. Therefore, he prefers to implement it rather than inaction. Under
this assumption, the equilibrium can be defined as follows:
Definition 3.1. An equilibrium of the credit market is characterized by density
functions for opaque and transparent projects hO and hT , loan repayments for
opaque and transparent projects R⇤1 and R
⇤
2 such that:
1. h = hO + hT .
2. if Supp(hT ) 6= ;, then R⇤2 = R0 and Supp(hT ) ⇢ [R0 + c, v¯]. Moreover,
a either 8R1   R0, ZO(R1) < R0 ;
b or 9R⇤1   R0 + c such that ZO(R⇤1) = R0.
3. if Supp(hT ) = ;, then an equilibrium corresponds to a value R⇤1  R0 + c
such that
R R⇤1
v vh(v)dv +R
⇤
1
 
1 H(R⇤1)
 
= R0.
The definition corresponds to di↵erent possible cases. If Supp(hT ) 6= ;, there
may exist a market for transparent projects, where the loan repayment R⇤2 must
equal to R0 due to the zero-profit condition in equilibrium. 2.a of Definition
3.1 corresponds to Case 1 in section 3.2, where there is no market for opaque
projects. A borrower can obtain a loan only if he is transparent (and qualified).
2.b corresponds to Case 2, where a market for opaque projects exists with a loan
repayment R⇤1. But since the required interest from opaque borrowers is relatively
high, R⇤1   R0 + c,, revealing information can make qualified borrowers benefit
from the low interest for transparent financing. Finally, 3 of Definition 3.1 refers
to the case where there is no market for transparent projects. No borrower reveals
information if they are able to be financed as opaque borrowers with a lower
financing cost, R⇤1  R0 + c.
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3.3.2 Characterization
As we have discussed above, no borrower with project v < R0+c reveals information
under any circumstance, since to disclose the insu cient quality of the project
would disable them from being financed. What matters more is the decisions of
those borrowers with v   R0 + c. We may refer to the borrowers with v   R0 + c
as good borrowers, and those with v < R0 + c as bad ones. To avoid the triviality,
we assume that
Assumption 3.1. v¯ > R0 + c.
That is, at least some borrowers are good. Besides, it also shows that the cost
of information disclosure is relatively small compared to the maximum value of the
possible return on a risky project. By this assumption, we also have H(R0+ c) < 1.
Before providing a full characterization of the equilibrium, we first look more
into two extreme cases: borrowers with v   R0 + c are all opaque, or all of them
are transparent. If there exists an equilibrium where all borrowers are opaque, i.e.,
hO = h, the highest repayment that a lender can set is R1 = R0 + c; otherwise,
good borrowers would choose to be transparent. Note that zero-profit condition
requires ZO(R1) = R0, and ZO is increasing in R1, thus to ensure the existence
of an equilibrium with the repayment R⇤1  R0 + c such that ZO(R⇤1) = R0, it is
necessary to have ZO(R0 + c)   R0 with hO = h. That is,
 (R0) :=
Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)
 
1 H(R0 + c)
    R0. (3.12)
The inequality  (R0)   R0 has a simple interpretation. It means that, if no
borrower reveals information, the expected gain of a lender, with requiring loan
repayment R0+ c, is strictly higher than the funding cost R0. Therefore, there may
exist a repayment loan R⇤1 < R0 + c that ensures the equilibrium of the opaque
market. We consider this case, in which all (financed) projects are opaque, as an
opaque equilibrium.
At the other extreme, if all good borrowers, those with project return v   R0+c,
choose to be transparent (and get funded) in an equilibrium, the repayment of
transparent loans, R⇤2, must be equal to R0. The reason why they choose so could
be that there is no market for opaque projects when the repayment of opaque loans
R⇤1 is smaller than R0 + c and therefore attractive to good borrowers. That is,
ZO(R1) < R0, for any R1  R0 + c. (3.13)
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Note that ZO is increasing, the necessary condition for the non-existence of opaque
market becomes
ZO(R0 + c) =
R R0+c
v vh(v)dv
H(R0 + c)
< R0,
since hO = h for any v < R0 + c and hO = 0 for any v   R0 + c. Rearranging the
above condition yields,
 (R0) :=
Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv +R0
 
1 H(R0 + c)
 
< R0. (3.14)
The first term of  (R0) can be seen as the maximum of possible expected gain
on opaque market (though it does not exist under condition (3.14)), while the
second term, R0(1   H(R0 + c)), is the gain from issuing loans to transparent
borrowers. The sum of the two terms is smaller than R0 so that it is unprofitable if,
given that all good borrowers are transparent, lenders invest also in bad projects.
Therefore, we can have the case in which only good borrowers reveal information
and have the loans approved. This is referred to as a transparent equilibrium.
The two functions above play important roles in depending the existence and
the type of the equilibrium, and we see that both function  (R) and  (R) are
increasing, and that  (R) <  (R) for any R. Moreover, we have
• If  (R0) > R0, then  (R0) >  (R0) > R0;
• If  (R0) < R0, then  (R0) <  (R0) < R0.
Now we provide a complete characterization of the di↵erent types of equilibria
that may exist in this model. First, we consider that the opaque equilibrium in
which all borrowers choose to be opaque.
Proposition 3.1 (Opaque Equilibrium). Assume that the following inequality
holds: Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv +R0
 
1 H(R0 + c)
 
> R0 (3.15)
Then, there exists a unique market equilibrium that is opaque: no borrower reveals
information and all projects are financed with a loan repayment R⇤1 < R0 + c which
is determined by Z R⇤1
v
vh(v)dv +R⇤1
 
1 H(R⇤1)
 
= R0.
Under the above condition, the whole market is opaque, while another case that
we have discussed above is the transparent equilibrium, in which only borrowers
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who reveal information can be financed. And the transparent equilibrium is
characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2 (Transparent Equilibrium). Assume that:Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)
 
1 H(R0 + c)
 
< R0. (3.16)
Then, there exists a unique market equilibrium that is transparent: all borrowers
with v   R0 + c reveal information and are financed with repayment R0. The
borrowers with projects v < R0 + c choose to be opaque and are not financed.
Under this condition, only a mass 1 H(R0+ c) of borrowers can get loans and
proceed with their projects. Although the credit market is completely transparent
and therefore there is no risk due to the lack of information, the credit is rationed
and production is hampered.
Proposition 3.3 (Multiple Equilibria). Assume that the two following inequalities
hold: Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv +R0
 
1 H(R0 + c)
 
< R0; (3.17)Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)
 
1 H(R0 + c)
 
> R0. (3.18)
Then there exist 3 types of equilibria:
1. a transparent equilibrium in which borrowers with v   R0 + c reveal infor-
mation and are financed with loan repayment R0, whereas borrowers with
v < R0 + c remain opaque and are not financed.
2. an opaque equilibrium in which no borrower reveals information and all
projects are financed by loans with repayment R⇤1 < R0 + c such thatZ R⇤1
v
vh(v)dv +R⇤1
 
1 H(R⇤1)
 
= R0.
3. a multiplicity of (unstable) equilibria such that R⇤1 = R0 + c. All borrowers
with v < R0 + c remain opaque. Borrowers with v   R0 + c are split into
two parts - either opaque or transparent. Transparent projects are financed
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by loans with repayment R0 and opaque borrowers by loans with repayment
R0 + c. hO is such thatZ R0+c
v
vh(v)
HO(v¯)
dv + (R0 + c)
(HO(v¯) HO(R0 + c))
HO(v¯)
= R0.
We have seen the first two possibilities in the previous propositions, and the
market opacity is the same as stated above, i.e. ↵O = 1 and ↵T = 0. In the third
case of Proposition 3.3, all borrowers are financed, and at least a mass H(R0 + c)
of borrowers are opaque (bad/unqualified). Besides, since good borrowers are
indi↵erent between revealing information or not, the equilibrium no longer exists
once there is some deviation of any good borrower, and is therefore unstable.
The three propositions are based on the inequalities, which rely on the two
functions   and  . Proposition 3.1 corresponds to the case  (R0) > R0 (and
thus  (R0) > R0). Proposition 3.2 is obtained when  (R0) < R0 (and thus
 (R0) < R0 ). Finally, Proposition 3.3 corresponds to the intermediate case
 (R0) < R0 <  (R0). Furthermore, if we consider the two functions   and  at
some threshold values, i.e. when  (R0) = R0 or  (R0) = R0, we can also have
multiple equilibria (see Proposition 3.6 and 3.7 in the appendix).
The existence of multiple equilibria provides us a possible way of understanding
the instability of the credit market, while we will first characterize the equilibrium
with respect to the safe interest rate, which helps to link the type of equilibrium with
the funding cost, and leave more detailed explanations on the multiple equilibria
in the following subsections.
3.3.3 Characterization with respect to the safe interest fac-
tor R0
As shown in the previous propositions, the existence and the type of the equilibrium
depend on the signs of  (R0) R0 and  (R0) R0, and thus on the value of R0
and the shape of the two functions. We denote Rˆ and Rˇ as the threshold values
such that  (Rˆ) = Rˆ and  (Rˇ) = Rˇ, respectively. That is, we haveZ Rˆ+c
v
vh(v)dv + Rˆ
 
1 H(Rˆ + c)  = RˆZ Rˇ+c
v
vh(v)dv + (Rˇ + c)
 
1 H(Rˇ + c)  = Rˇ
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Besides, we know that
 0(R) = c h(R + c) +
 
1 H(R + c)  > 0
 0(R) = 1 H(R + c) > 0,  00(R) =  h(R + c) < 0.
Both functions are strictly increasing, and moreover,  is strictly concave, with
min  (R) =  (v   c) = v   c, min  (R) =  (v   c) = v, and max  (R) =
 (v¯   c) = max  (R) =  (v¯   c) = E[V ]. Due to the monotonicity and the
concavity of the function  , it is su cient to have  (v¯   c) = E[V ] < v¯   c to
ensure the uniqueness of the threshold Rˇ. This su cient condition imply that the
cost of disclosing information is relatively small and the highest possible return
on one’s project is comparatively far from the average, which is intuitively very
reasonable. Yet we have to impose harsher condition on function  , since its second
order derivative is lack of some nice property. Thus, we consider in the following
assumptions below in order to make sure the uniqueness of the threshold values.
Assumption 3.2.
R v¯
v vh(v)dv + c < v¯.
Assumption 3.3. 9! Rˆ such that  (Rˆ) = Rˆ.
Figure 3.5: Graphs of two key functions   and  .
Since  (R) <  (R) for all R < v¯  c, the following inequality holds: Rˆ < Rˇ (see
Figure 3.5 and the proof is shown in the appendix). And by focusing on the cases
in which the equilibrium is stable (o↵ the thresholds), we can now characterize the
equilibrium with respect to the value of the risk-free interest rate.
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Proposition 3.4. Assume that the preceding assumptions hold. Then,
1. if R0 < Rˆ, there exists a unique opaque equilibrium where all projects are
financed, and the demand for loans is H(v¯) = 1;
2. if R0 > Rˇ, there exists a unique transparent equilibrium where projects such
that v   R0 + c reveal information and are financed; the demand for loans is
1 H(R0 + c);
3. if Rˆ < R0 < Rˇ, there exist two stable equilibria. One equilibrium is opaque,
all projects are opaque and financed; the demand for loans is H(v¯) = 1.
The second one is transparent, borrowers with projects v   R0 + c reveal
information and are financed; the demand for loans is 1 H(R0 + c).
Due to the monotonicity of the functions   and  , it is easy to see that R0 < Rˆ
is equivalent to  (R0) > R0. By Proposition 3.1, there exists uniquely the opaque
equilibrium. Similarly, R0 > Rˇ implies that  (R0) < R0, which in turn implies
that there is only transparent equilibrium according to Proposition 3.2. And the
third case corresponds to the conditions stated in Proposition 3.3, where multiple
equilibria exist.
More precisely, when the risk-free interest rate R0 is low enough, i.e., lower than
the smaller threshold Rˆ , there exists only opaque equilibrium; when R0 is very
high, there can only be transparent equilibrium. This is in line with our intuition.
When the funding cost is low, banks tend to lower their lending standards, take
more risk and invest without adequate information on the projects, some of which
may be unprofitable. On the other hand, they become more cautious when the
funding cost is high, and therefore only invest in those opaque and qualified projects.
Besides, when the interest rate is within some moderate range of values, it can be
either type of the equilibrium, reflecting di↵erent tightness of the credit granting.
Hence, if we consider the opacity of the credit market as the proportion of opaque
borrowers among all the borrowers that are financed, we can also see that the
opacity of the credit market is basically decreasing - from 1 to 0, as the risk-free
interest rate r0 increases.
Here in our model, we have simplified the basic setup, which includes the full
knowledge of the return of the borrower and the complete revelation of their private
information. Though this yields some discontinuity of the credit demand and the
market opacity with respect to the risk-free interest, the main property of the
model is kept that the demand of the credit tends to be decreasing in the interest
rate, while the transparency of the credit market is increasing as the fundamental
interest rate rises.
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3.4 Credit supply and market transparency
Consider banks obtain funds from their depositors at the risk-free interest rate r0,
and all the previous analysis have been done under the assumption that each bank
faces a perfectly elastic supply of funds at an exogenous risk-free interest rate r0.
Now we consider r0, thus R0, as endogenous.
From Proposition 3.4, we know how the demand of loan is related to the risk-free
interest rate. Here we further assume that the supply of loan from the banks -
corresponding to consumers’ savings, S(R0), is increasing in R0. In a competitive
credit market, R0 is a result of equating the supply and the demand of loans in
the credit market. Therefore, any change in the credit supply a↵ects the value of
R0, and further influence the market equilibrium and the opacity of the market
(see Figure 3.6).
Rˆ Rˇ
1
1 H(R0 + c)
Opaque Eqm.
Multiple Eqm.
Transp. Eqm.
Demand
Supply
v¯   c R0
Figure 3.6: Demand and supply of loans
During the period when credit is easy to obtain (due to the broader inflow
of funds and larger willingness of banks’ lending), as we had experienced before
the financial crisis burst, interest rate is relatively low, and the funding cost of a
lender is also low. This allows lenders to take more risk of investing in opaque but
possibly unprofitable projects. More interestingly, as the credit supply becomes
tighter, with the interest rate falls in the range of (Rˆ, Rˇ), banks may still have the
incentive to issue loans to opaque projects, since the cost is not very high, though
it is also likely that they only provide funding to those transparent and qualified
borrowers if they have less confidence in the market and are more concerned about
defaults in the future, resulting a transparent equilibrium at the end. That is, it
might be either an opaque or a transparent equilibrium. In such a situation, there
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can be some jump from one equilibrium to the other, and if, for example, a jump
from an opaque equilibrium occurs, we can observe a decrease in credit supply
together with a decrease in the interest rate.
However, a decrease in the interest rate is more often in line with an increase
in credit supply, since the cost of providing loans is smaller. Therefore, what is
shown in our model provides us a theoretical explanation for credit crunch, where
the reduction of credit happens without an increase of the interest rate. In our
model, lenders may still choose to invest in opaque projects when the situation of
the credit market is no longer suitable for opaque lending, i.e. when R > Rˆ. Thus,
we can experience an opaque equilibrium if all lenders coordinate in this more
aggressive way, in the sense that lenders issue loan contracts to opaque but possibly
unprofitable projects. Yet due to the existence of multiple equilibria, when lenders
become less confident about the market and realize this excessive willingness of
“irresponsible” and “inappropriate” lending, they may cut o↵ the credit supply to
opaque borrowers and end up in the transparent equilibrium. The jump from the
opaque equilibrium to the transparent one happens, credit crunch occurs. Credit
is reduced even the interest rate is getting lower, which results in less projects
funded and less production in the economy, as we saw during the financial crisis.
3.5 Macroeconomic dynamics
In this subsection we incorporate the static model into an OLG economy. At each
date t = 0, 1, ... a continuum of agents of unity mass are born. Each agent lives
for three periods: youth, adulthood and old age. When he is young, the agent
is endowed with a project that requires one unit of funding to proceed in the
next period; and during the old age, the agent is retired. Assume that the agent
consumes only in the last two periods.
A generation-t agent lives during period t   1, t and t + 19. In period t   1,
the agent owns a project of return v, which is privately observed by himself. He
applies at a bank for one unit of loan with the repayment of Rt in period t,
while Rt is determined in t  1. As in the static model, he can, according to his
knowledge of v, decide whether or not to disclose the return on his project and
to be certified/monitored during the implementation of the project with bearing
an extra cost c > 0 in period t. We then call an agent a transparent borrower if
he decides to certify his project; and he is referred to as an opaque borrower if he
chooses not to reveal the information.
9Period t refers to a period starting at date t and ending just before date t+ 1.
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In period t, the agent carries out the project if it is funded10 and produces
v. The income from the project, denoted by Pt(v), is max{v   Rt, 0} if he is
opaque, and max{v Rt  c, 0} if he is transparent; Rt is predetermined in period
t. Moreover, he can also earn an exogenous labor income w, no matter his project
is accomplished or not. Let It(v) := w + Pt(v), denoting the total income of the
agent. The agent allocates his total income between current consumption ct and
savings st, which will, accumulated with a factor Rt+1, support his consumption
when he is retired in period t+ 1, denoted by dt+1.
Period t  2 Period t  1 Period t Period t+ 1 Period t+ 2
Generation t
Generation t  1
Generation t+ 1
Agent
Bank
observe v and Rt
choose O ot T
issue loans
allocate It(v)
between ct and st
consume dt+1
collect st
collect loan repayments
(Gt 1)
(Gt)
(Gt+1)
repay depositors of Gt
Y: A:
O:
Young Adult Old
Young Adult Old
Figure 3.7: Timing of the OLG model.
Financial intermediaries, such as banks, collect savings and finance the projects
when it is profitable. Banks have no more information on the projects than the
distribution of v, denoted by H(v), if borrowers do not disclose it; the corresponding
density is denoted by h(v). Banks have no operating costs and are in perfect
competition. The time structure of the OLG model is presented in Figure 3.7.
The agent maximizes his CES utility by choosing the optimal levels of con-
sumptions. That is,
max
(ct,dt+1)
u(ct, dt+1) = (ct)
  1
  +   (dt+1)
  1
  11
10No private benefit.
11Note that ct, st, as well as dt+1, are all determined by the income, which is a function of
project return v, yet we omit v for the moment.
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subject to the budget constraints:
ct + st = It(v) and dt+1 = stRt+1.
where   ,   > 1.
From the constraints, we have ct = It(v)   st and dt+1 = stRt+1, so we can
rewrite the optimization problem as
max
st
u(It(v)  st, stRt+1) = (It(v)  st)  1  +   (stRt+1)  1  .
First order condition gives
     1
 
(It(v)  st)  1  +       1
 
(stRt+1)
  1  Rt+1 = 0 ,
which yields the optimal savings as:
st =
It(v)
1 +    R1  t+1
. (3.19)
Thus, the aggregate savings in period t, St, is given by :
St =
Z v¯
v
st(v)h(v)dv =
Yt
1 +    R1  t+1
, (3.20)
where Yt =
R v¯
v It(v)h(v)dv is the aggregate income earned by generation t during
adulthood. The aggregate savings St constitute the supply of the credit market in
period t+ 1.
The uncertain part of Yt, thus of the total credit supply St, comes from the
income of the projects, which depends on whether the agents’ loan applications are
approved or not, as well as on the type of the agent as a borrower, i.e. a transparent
one or an opaque one. According to the analysis of the static model shown in
Proposition 3.4, there exists opaque equilibrium when Rt < Rˇ and transparent
equilibrium when R > Rˆ, with Rˆ < Rˇ.
Therefore, for an opaque equilibrium, where all projects are opaque and financed,
we have
Y Ot =
Z v¯
v
 
w + (v  Rt)
 
h(v) dv = w +
Z v¯
v
v h(v) dv  Rt. (3.21)
with Rt < Rˇ; while in an transparent equilibrium, only borrowers with v   R0 + c
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are financed and produce, the aggregate income from the production is then given
by
Y Tt = w+
Z v¯
Rt+c
(v Rt  c)h(v)dv = w+
Z v¯
Rt+c
vh(v)dv  (Rt+ c)
 
1 H(Rt+ c)
 
.
(3.22)
Denote the aggregate savings in an opaque and a transparent equilibrium as SO
and ST , respectively. Then, the supply of loans if it is in an opaque equilibrium,
denoted as LsO, is
LsOt = S
O
t =
w +
R v¯
v v h(v) dv  Rt
1 +    R1  t+1
, (3.23)
and the supply of loans in a transparent equilibrium, denoted as LsT , is
LsTt = S
T
t =
w +
R v¯
Rt+c
vh(v)dv   (Rt + c)
 
1 H(Rt + c)
 
1 +    R1  t+1
. (3.24)
The equilibrium is determined by both the loan supply, Ls, and the loan demand,
denoted by Ld, where the supply corresponds to the aggregate income as we have
discussed above; the demand for credit depends on which type of equilibrium will
occur in the following period. According to Proposition 3.4, the loan demand is
unity when Rt+1 < Rˇ and the equilibrium in t+ 1 is opaque, while when Rt+1 > Rˆ
and the equilibrium in t+1 is transparent, the demand for loans is 1 H(Rt+1+ c).
That is,
LdOt = 1 (3.25)
and
LdTt = 1 H(Rt+1 + c). (3.26)
Consequently, the dynamics of the interest rate is driven by the following four
equations, with equating the credit supply and demand for each period in four
cases.
1. When there are opaque equilibria in both period t and t + 1, we have
LsOt = L
dO
t , i.e.,
w +
R v¯
v vh(v) dv  Rt
1 +    R1  t+1
= 1,
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which can be written as,
1 +    R1  t+1 = w +
Z v¯
v
vh(v)dv  Rt, (3.27)
with Rt < Rˇ and Rt+1 < Rˇ.
2. When the equilibrium is opaque in period t and transparent in period t+ 1,
we have LsOt = L
dT
t , i.e.,
w +
R v¯
v vh(v) dv  Rt
1 +    R1  t+1
= 1 H(Rt+1 + c),
which can be written as
 
1 H(Rt+1 + c)
 
(1 +    R1  t+1 ) = w +
Z v¯
v
vh(v)dv  Rt, (3.28)
with Rt < Rˇ, and Rt+1 > Rˆ.
3. When the equilibrium is transparent in period t while opaque in period t+ 1,
we have LsTt = L
dO
t , i.e.,
w +
R v¯
Rt+c
vh(v)dv   (Rt + c)
 
1 H(Rt + c)
 
1 +    R1  t+1
= 1,
which can be written as,
1 +    R1  t+1 = w +
Z v¯
Rt+c
vh(v)dv   (Rt + c)
 
1 H(Rt + c)
 
, (3.29)
with Rt > Rˆ, and Rt+1 < Rˇ.
4. When there are transparent equilibria in both period t and t+ 1, we have
LsTt = L
dT
t , i.e.,
w +
R v¯
Rt+c
vh(v)dv   (Rt + c)
 
1 H(Rt + c)
 
1 +    R1  t+1
= 1 H(Rt+1 + c),
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which can be written as,
 
1 H(Rt+1+c)
 
(1+   R1  t+1 ) = w+
Z v¯
Rt+c
vh(v)dv (Rt+c)
 
1 H(Rt+c)
 
,
(3.30)
with Rt > Rˆ, and Rt+1 > Rˆ.
Rt is predetermined in period t, then given R0, the four di↵erence equations
(3.27), (3.28), (3.29) and (3.30) can completely capture the evolutions of the interest
rate.
To simplify the expression of the dynamics of Rt, we define the following
functions:
FO(R) := w +
Z v¯
v
v h(v)dv  R;
F T (R) := w +
Z v¯
R+c
v h(v)dv   (R + c) 1 H(R + c) ;
GO(R) := 1 +    R1  ;
GT (R) :=
 
1 H(R + c)  (1 +    R1  ).
It is straightforward to see that all the four functions are decreasing in R, and
moreover, we have
FO(R)  F T (R) =
Z R+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R + c)[1 H(R + c)] R
=  (R) R
8<: > 0, R < Rˇ;< 0, R > Rˇ.
and
GO(R) GT (R) = (1 +    R1  ) H(R + c) > 0.
Let St denote the state of the economy in period t, and St 2 {O, T}. Then the
dynamics of Rt can be summarized by a recurrence relation of the pair of sequences
(Rt, St). That is,
GSt+1(Rt+1) = F
St(Rt), (3.31)
where St = O when Rt < Rˇ, St = T when Rt > Rˆ and St = O or T when
Rˆ < Rt < Rˇ.
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3.5.1 Existence of stationary states
A stationary state corresponds to a fix point of the dynamic system described in
(3.31), i.e. a pair value of the interest rate and the state of the economy, (R, S).
Since the state can be either of opaque, O, or transparent, T , we have two possible
stationary states stated as follows:
GO(R) = FO(R) , or GT (R) = F T (R),
where R must accord with the state according to Proposition 3.4.
Hence, the existence of the opaque regime requires that there exists R < Rˇ
such that GO(R) = FO(R). i.e.,
1 +    R1   = w +
Z v¯
v
v h(v)dv  R. (3.32)
We can see that both FO and GO are decreasing, and FO is linear with a slope
of  1 while GO is convex to the origin. Thus, to ensure the two curves to intersect
with each other we have a necessary condition for the existence of the opaque
equilibrium, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5. If there exists a stationary state which is opaque, then we have
 (    1)
 
1  
 
 w +
Z v¯
v
vh(v)dv   1. (3.33)
We can see from condition (3.33) that a higher value of w is more favorable to
ensure an opaque stationary state. That is, the higher the wage is, the more likely
an opaque stationary state exists. In fact, the higher the wage is, the larger the
aggregate savings, and thus the credit supply, are. A larger supply tends to push
the interest rate lower and the banks are more aggressive to issue loans. Therefore,
opaque and even unqualified projects can also be financed. A state with opaque
equilibrium is more likely to happen. Moreover, to ensure a solution to equation
(3.32) which is smaller than Rˇ, it is su cient to have FO(Rˇ) > GO(Rˇ).
And the transparent steady state is implied by the existence of R > Rˆ such
that
 
1 H(R+c)  (1+   R1  ) = w+Z v¯
R+c
v h(v)dv (R+c) 1 H(R+c) . (3.34)
It is easy to check that R = v¯   c is a solution of equation (3.34 )when w = 0 -
54
3.5 Macroeconomic dynamics
both sides of the equation are equal to zero. By the continuity, there also exists
transparent steady state when w > 0 in a neighborhood of R = v¯   c.
The intuition follows similar argument as above. The low wage reduces the
credit supply, which in turn causes more cautiousness of the lending, and only
transparent projects can have a chance to be approved.
3.5.2 Simulations with a uniform distribution
Now we assume that v is uniformly distributed in the interval [ ,   +  ], thus we
have h(v) = 1/  when v 2 [ ,   +  ] and zero elsewhere. Then functions F S and
GS become
FO(R) = w +   +
 
2
 R;
F T (R) = w +
(  +    R  c)2
2 
;
GO(R) = 1 +    R1  ;
GT (R) =
  +    R  c
 
(1 +    R1  ).
The above four functions govern the motion of the interest rate and decide the
type of the state of the economy in each period. Now we can see the interest rate
and the equilibrium evolve over time as well as the changing of market opacity.
Take Figure 3.8 for example. Starting with an initial interest rate level which is
smaller than Rˆ, the only possibility is an opaque state. Thus, start with (R0, O),
according to (3.31), we have
GS1(R1) = F
O(R0), which implies S1 = T.
Since GO(R) 6= FO(R0) for any R, the transparent state is the only possible state
for the next period - period 1. Then, we can in turn find R2, which can equate
GS2 to F T (R1) (note that S1 = T ), and determine both the interest rate and the
state for period 2, and so on so forth.
As we discussed in the previous subsection, there exists a transparent stationary
state when w = 0. By choosing a parameter setting with   = 1,   = 4, w = 0, c =
0.3,   = 0.5,   = 1.5, as shown in Figure 3.8, we see that the economy converges
into a transparent equilibrium in the long run. In fact the F functions show also
the level of aggregate output, and therefore the convergence shown in Figure 3.8
describe a steady state with null output, although it seems unattractive to us.
This is again in line with the analysis above, which shows that the equilibrium
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c = 0.3; γ = 1; δ = 4; w = 0; β = 0.5; σ = 1.5;
1 2 3 4
1
2
3
4


 
 ^ v
 


Figure 3.8: Simulation with a uniform distribution.
interest rate is R = v¯  c. That is, although transparent projects could be financed,
there is only a mass zero of borrowers (with v   R + c = v¯) that are qualified and
therefore reveal information.
Note that the wage goes directly into the F functions and thus can shift the
level of F functions by taking di↵erent values. Hence, by raising the wage to
w = 0.5, we have a more meaningful case, in which the market converges in the
long run to a transparent equilibrium with considerable output (see Figure 3.9).
In such a state, all projects are transparent. But as we have seen in the static
model, the interest rate is high and the production is in a relatively low range - the
transparency of the credit market is achieved with a compromise of the aggregate
output.
We have seen that the wage plays an important role on determining the level of
F functions (while the G functions remain the same with di↵erent wages). Hence,
we can imagine that some significant changes of the wage may lead to di↵erent long
run states, which is true when we increase the wage to w = 1.9. In Figure 3.10,
even starting from a high level of interest rate, the market goes from a transparent
state to an opaque stationary state in the long run.
What we have seen here is in accordance with the analysis in the previous
subsection. When the wage is very low, credit is constrained as a result of fewer
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c = 0.3; γ = 1; δ = 4; w = 0.5; β = 0.5; σ = 1.5;



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
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

Figure 3.9: Simulation with a uniform distribution with w = 0.5.
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c = 0.3; γ = 1; δ = 4; w = 1.9; β = 0.5; σ = 1.5;


 ^ v

 

Figure 3.10: Simulation with a uniform distribution with w = 1.9.
savings which constitute the credit supply, and there only exists one transparent
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c = 0.3; γ = 1; δ = 4; w = 1.2; β = 0.5; σ = 1.5;



 ^ v


Figure 3.11: Simulation with a uniform distribution with w = 1.2.
stationary equilibrium with relatively high interest rate in the credit market;
production is hampered since limited projects can be funded and the necessary
certification cost brings in further ine ciency in the economy. Yet when the wage
is high enough, credit supply is adequate and opaque equilibrium occurs with
higher level of production and low interest rate.
With some wage of moderate level the dynamics may evolve without a certain
pattern, especially when the interest rate falls into the intermediate range, where
there exists uncertain path that the evolution may follow. Besides, the state may
change between opaque and transparent equilibrium. This more interesting case is
as shown in Figure 3.12, where we can observe cyclical switches between opaque
and transparent states when the interest rate is moderate. Although such a path is
not stable, it could illustrate some permanent fluctuations of the credit market and,
in turn, of the real economy. Moreover, as the output in an opaque equilibrium is
always higher than that in a transparent one, a switch from an opaque state in the
credit to a transparent one therefore also indicates economic contraction.
By adjusting the value of the wage w, which contributes to the credit supply, we
show similar patterns here as in the static framework, though from a dynamic per-
spective. In addition to the indeterminacy we see in the static model, the dynamic
model further demonstrates the instability of financial market and fluctuations of
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c = 0.3; γ = 1; δ = 4; w = 1.7; β = 0.5; σ = 1.5;


 ^ v

Figure 3.12: Simulation with a uniform distribution with w = 1.7.
the real economy caused by the imperfection of the credit market.
3.6 Conclusion
We characterize the equilibrium in a competitive credit market, where a borrower’s
profitability is private information to oneself and he could choose to disclose
it through a costly but dissipative signal. The existence and the type of the
equilibrium depends on the interest rate - when the interest rate is very low, the
exists only an opaque equilibrium, and when the interest rate it high enough,
there only exists a transparent equilibrium; in addition, in the intermediate level,
there can be multiple equilibria. Hence, a close relationship between the opacity
of the credit market and the fundamental funding cost can also be established.
In addition, by endogenizing the interest rate, the interaction between credit
supply and demand shows us distinctive states in the equilibrium, where an easing
monetary policy corresponds to a larger credit supply, and therefore, more opacity
in the market. More interestingly, when the banks tend to issue more loans, and
thus to finance opaque projects even when the interest rate is not low enough, the
possibility of jumping from one type of the equilibrium to the another may occur.
Credit crunch can be observed when there is a jump from an opaque equilibrium
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to a transparent one.
Moreover we further examine the dynamic interaction with the market degree of
opacity, the interest rate is endogenized by extending the model to an OLG context.
We show that, by changing the level of wages and thus the credit supply, the
market is likely to converge to either an opaque or a transparent equilibrium, and
for some configurations of parameters there exist permanent oscillations between
two di↵erent regimes, which provides us a theoretical support of the (in)stability
of the credit market and further indicates a possible way of explaining the credit
crunch during the financial crisis.
Appendix 3.A More propositions on multiple equi-
libria
Proposition 3.6 (Multiple Equilibria with Half-Opaque Equilibrium). Assume
that the following equality holds:Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv +R0
 
1 H(R0 + c)
 
= R0. (3.35)
Then there exist 2 types of equilibria:
1. an opaque equilibrium, where all borrowers are opaque and funded by loans
with repayment R⇤1 < R0 + c.
2. half-opaque equilibrium where R⇤1 > R0 + c, R
⇤
2 = R0. The borrowers with
v   R0 + c reveal information while the others, with v < R0 + c, remain
opaque, but all are funded.
In a half-opaque equilibrium, we can see that the opacity of the credit market is
↵Half O =
H(R0 + c)
1
= H(R0 + c).
Also note that the expected profit of a lender on the opaque market is indepen-
dent of the value of R1 once R1 exceeds R0+ c. Therefore, we could have equilibria
with di↵erent repayments of opaque funding, with the same opacity on the credit
market and the same productions in the real sectors.
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Proposition 3.7 (Multiple Equilibria with Unstable Opaque Equilibrium). As-
sume that the following equality holds:Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)
 
1 H(R0 + c)
 
= R0 (3.36)
Then there exist 2 possible equilibria:
1. a transparent equilibrium, where only borrowers with v   R0 + c reveal
information and are funded, while the others remain opaque and are not
financed.
2. an (unstable) opaque equilibrium where R⇤1 = R0 + c. All borrowers remain
opaque and are financed.
In fact, good borrowers are indi↵erent between being opaque or transparent
when R⇤1 = R0 + c. The existence of opaque equilibrium implies that hO = h for
any v and that the gain of a lender on the opaque market, ZO, can equal to the
funding cost R0. That is,
ZO(R
⇤
1) =
Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)
 
1 H(R0 + c)
 
= R0
However, good borrowers may also choose to reveal information due to the indi↵er-
ence. Once it happens, the profit of a lender on the opaque market will fall below
R0, and the credit market cannot clear any longer and the equilibrium collapse.
More precisely, it switches to the transparent equilibrium which is stable.
Appendix 3.B Proofs of propositions.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. First we show that if condition (3.15) holds true, there
exists an equilibrium which corresponds to Case 3 of Definition 3.1. That is,
Supp(hT ) = ; - no borrower reveals information, and all projects can be financed
in the equilibrium at a loan repayment R⇤1 < R0+c such that
R R⇤1
v vh(v)dv+R
⇤
1
 
1 
H(R⇤1)
 
= R0. This is true sinceZ R⇤1
v
vh(v)dv +R⇤1
 
1 H(R⇤1)
 
<
Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)
 
1 H(R0 + c)
 
,
while the right hand side is larger than
R R0+c
v vh(v)dv + R0[1 H(R0 + c)], and
therefore larger than R0 according to condition (3.15).
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Next, we show that under condition (3.15), the opaque equilibrium, i.e.,
Supp(hT ) = ;, is the only possible equilibrium. Suppose that there would ex-
ist some equilibrium in which Supp(hT ) 6= ;, then by definition we would have
R⇤2 = R0 and Supp(hT ) ⇢ [R0 + c, v¯].
Moreover, we would have for one possibility that ZO(R1) < R0 for any R1   R0,
i.e.,
ZO(R1) =
R R1
v vhO(v)dv +R1
 
HO(v¯) HO(R1)
 
H(v¯)
< R0. (3.37)
Therefore, no lender would issue loans to opaque borrowers and no good borrower
would choose to be opaque: Supp(hO) 6⇢ [R0 + c, v¯]. So, we have hO = h for any
v  R0 + c and zero otherwise, and thus HO(v¯) = H(R0 + c). Then, the lender’s
(potential) expected gain from the opaque market by charging R1, ZO(R1), becomes
ZO(R1) =
R R1
v vh(v)dv +R1
 
H(R0 + c) H(R1)
 
H(R0 + c)
with R1  R0 + c, and it reaches its maximum value at R1 = R0 + c. According to
(3.37), we have
RR0+c
v vh(v)dv
H(R0+c)
< R0. That is,Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv +R0
 
1 H(R0 + c)
 
< R0,
which contradicts condition (3.15).
If we would be in the other case of Supp(hT ) 6= ;, i.e. there exists R⇤1   R0 + c
such that ZO(R⇤1) = R0. Note that if R
⇤
1 > R0 + c, Supp(hO) 6⇢ [R0 + c, v¯], then
we have for R⇤1 > R0 + c,
ZO(R
⇤
1) =
R R⇤1
v vhO(v)dv +R
⇤
1
 
HO(v¯) HO(R⇤1)
 
H(R0 + c)
=
R R0+c
v vh(v)dv
H(R0 + c)
= R0
which is a contradiction to condition (3.15).
If R⇤1 = R0+ c, Supp(hO)   [R0+ c, v¯], then we have hO = h for any v < R0+ c,
and hO = h  hT for any v   R0 + c, with hO, hT   0. Then, we have
R0 = ZO(R
⇤
1) = ZO(R0 + c) =
R R0+c
v vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)
 
HO(v¯) H(R0 + c)
 
HO(v¯)
>
R R0+c
v vh(v)dv
H(R0 + c)
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which is also a contradiction to condition (3.15).
Therefore, neither of the cases of Supp(hT ) 6= ; is true, and the existence of
the opaque equilibrium is unique under condition (3.15).
Now we show that if there only exists an opaque equilibrium where no borrower
reveals information but all are financed, with the equilibrium repayment R⇤1  R0+c
such that
R R⇤1
v vh(v)dv + R
⇤
1
 
1   H(R⇤1)
 
= R0, then condition (3.15) must hold
true. Suppose not, i.e.
R R0+c
v vh(v)dv +R0
 
1 H(R0 + c)
   R0. Then we have
either Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)
 
1 H(R0 + c)
 
< R0
or Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)
 
1 H(R0 + c)
    R0.
For the first case, for any R1  R0 + c,Z R1
v
vh(v)dv+R1
 
1 H(R1)
   Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv+ (R0 + c)
 
1 H(R0 + c)
 
< R0
which contradicts the existence of the opaque equilibrium. In the other case, the
inequality assures the existence of a value of R⇤1   R0 + c such that ZO(R⇤1) = R0
for some hO and hT with hO + hT = h for any v, which violates the uniqueness of
the existence of opaque equilibrium. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 3.2. First we show that under condition (3.16) there exists
an equilibrium in which all good borrowers reveal information and get financed
and all those with v < R0 + c choose to be opaque and cannot obtain any loan.
Consider some density function hO = h for any v < R0 + c and zero elsewhere, and
some hT = h for any v   R0 + c and zero elsewhere, we have hO + hT = h for any
v. In such a case, the expected gain of a lender investing in opaque projects is
ZO(R1)  ZO(R0 + c) =
R R0+c
v vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)
 
H(R0 + c) H(R0 + c)
 
H(R0 + c)
<
Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)
 
1 H(R0 + c)
 
< R0.
That is, ZO(R1) < R0 for any R1 > R0. By definition, the equilibrium correspond-
ing to Case 2.a - the transparent equilibrium - exists.
Then, we show that the transparent equilibrium uniquely exists under condition
(3.16). Suppose not, then we have either Supp(hT ) 6= ; with some R⇤1   R0 + c
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such that ZO(R⇤1) = R0, or Supp(hT ) = ; with some some R⇤1  R0 + c such that
ZO(R⇤1) = R0. Note that in either of the alternatives, opaque projects could also
be funded. We will show that it can not be true under condition (3.16).
If R⇤1 > R0 + c, then all borrowers with v > R0 + c reveal information, so
hO 6⇢ [R0 + c, v¯], i.e., hO = h for any v < R0 + c and zero elsewhere. Thus, we
have for any R⇤1 > R0 + c
ZO(R
⇤
1) =
R R0+c
v vh(v)dv
H(R0 + c)
<
Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)(1 H(R0 + c)) < R0.
Or if R⇤1 = R0 + c, it is indi↵erent for good borrowers to be transparent or opaque,
but the highest profit that a lender could get from the opaque market, if it exists,
is when all good borrowers are opaque - no loss due to the certification cost. That
is, the maximum expected gain of a lender is, with hO = h for any v,
maxZO(R
⇤
1) =
Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)(1 H(R0 + c)) < R0.
And if R⇤1 < R0+c, all good borrowers would also choose to be opaque, i.e., hT = ;,
the expected gain of a lender also has a upper boundary since ZO is increasing.
That is,
ZO(R
⇤
1)  ZO(R0 + c) =
Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)(1 H(R0 + c)) < R0.
Since none of the possible value of R⇤1 can yield ZO(R
⇤
1) = R0, it is impossible
to have other type of equilibria, and the transparent equilibrium is unique.
Now we show that if the transparent equilibrium uniquely exists, we haveR R0+c
v vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)(1 H(R0 + c)) < R0. Suppose it is not the case, i.e.Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)(1 H(R0 + c))   R0. (3.38)
Consider first that the strict inequality holds true. Note that, for any R1 <
R0 + c, no borrower reveals information, so hO = h for any v, and we have
ZO(R1) =
Z R1
v
vh(v)dv+R1
 
1 H(R1)
 
<
Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv+(R0+c)(1 H(R0+c))
Then under the strict inequality of (3.38), there exists some R⇤1 < R0 + c, such
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that ZO(R⇤1) = R0.
If Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)
 
1 H(R0 + c)
 
= R0,
then consider hO = h for all v (and thus hT = 0), and R⇤1 = R0+c, which guarantee
the existence of another equilibrium (corresponding to 3. of Definition 3.1) other
than the transparent one, since we have
ZO(R
⇤
1) =
Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)(1 H(R0 + c)) = R0.
That is, condition (3.38) violates the uniqueness of the transparent equilibrium
in either of the cases. Therefore, condition (3.16) is also the necessary condition of
the unique existence of the transparent equilibrium. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 3.3. As we have shown in the previous propositions, condition
(3.17) is su cient to assure the existence of a transparent equilibrium - the expected
gain from the opaque market if it exists is too low for any lender to invest in opaque
projects, so good borrowers choose to be transparent and are financed while bad
borrowers who do not reveal information cannot be funded. That is, there exists a
transparent equilibrium.
Besides, condition (3.18) implies that there exists R⇤1 < R0 + c such that
ZO(R⇤1) = R0 when all borrowers are opaque, and therefore exists an opaque
equilibrium.
Then, we show that condition (3.17) and (3.18) imply the third case stated in
Proposition (3.3), where R⇤1 = R0 + c. By lemma 3.2, borrowers with v   R0 + c
are indi↵erent between reveal information or not. We can see that the more good
borrowers choose to be opaque, the higher the profit of a lender is, since more
opaque projects imply less cost of dissipative signaling. Thus, the maximum profit
a lender may get is when all borrowers are opaque, i.e., hO = h for all v   R0 + c.
Thus, we have
max ⇡OL =
Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)[1 H(R0 + c)] > R0.
On the other hand, the minimum of lender’s profit on opaque market is when all
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good borrowers are transparent, i.e., hO = 0 for all v   R0 + c. So we have
min ⇡OL =
R R0+c
v vh(v)dv
H(R0 + c)
< R0.
Therefore, there exists a h⇤O (and thus H
⇤
O) such thatZ R0+c
v
vh(v)
H⇤O(v¯)
dv + (R0 + c)
(H⇤O(v¯) H⇤O(R0 + c))
H⇤O(v¯)
= R0
where h⇤O = h for any v < R0 + c and 0 < h
⇤
O < h for v   R0 + c. In this case, all
opaque projects can be financed with repayment R⇤1 = R0 + c and all transparent
projects are financed with loan repayment R0. ⌅
Lemma. For Rˆ and Rˇ such that
 (Rˆ) =
Z Rˆ+c
v
vh(v)dv + Rˆ[1 H(Rˆ + c)] = Rˆ,
 (Rˆ) =
Z Rˇ+c
v
vh(v)dv + (Rˇ + c)[1 H(Rˇ + c)] = Rˇ,
we have Rˆ < Rˇ.
Proof. Note that ( (R)   R)0 =  H(R + c) < 0 and  (Rˇ)   Rˇ = 0, we know
 (R) R  0 for any R   Rˇ. Suppose Rˆ   Rˇ, we have  (Rˆ)  Rˆ =  (Rˆ), which
contradicts the fact that  (R) <  (R) for any R. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 3.5. We know that an opaque stationary state exists if there
is some R < Rˇ such that GO(R) = FO(R), i.e.
1 +    R1   = w +
Z v¯
v
v h(v)dv  R.
Note that FO(R) has a constant slope  1, there exists a solution to the above
equation if GO(R⇤)  FO(R⇤), where R⇤ is such that (GO)0(R) =  1. That is,
(GO)0(R⇤) = (1   )     (R⇤)1   =  1.
Thus, we have R⇤ = (    1) 1   1, and the condition GO(R⇤)  FO(R⇤) becomes
1 +    ((    1) 1   1)1    w +
Z v¯
v
v h(v)dv   (    1) 1   1.
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By rearranging we have the condition as in equation (3.33). Note that this is just
the condition that ensures the existence of a solution to GO(R) = FO(R), the
solution is not necessarily smaller than Rˇ. Therefore, condition (3.33) is only a
necessary but not a su cient condition of the existence of an opaque stationary
state. ⌅
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Chapter 4
Holdup and hiring discrimination
with search friction
Coauthored with Mr. Sheng Bi
Abstract
A holdup problem on workers’ skill investment arises when employers can
adopt discriminatory hiring norm to extract higher than socially optimal profit.
When hiring priority is determined both by productivity-dependent (skill level) and
-independent characteristics (discrimination), skill investment decision becomes
strategic between the discriminated and favored group. We consider frictional
markets with posted wage. Depending on market tightness there may be equilibrium
or multiple equilibria with di↵erent choices of skill investment. With discriminatory
hiring, if in equilibrium in which both groups stay high skilled, both are worse o↵
and firms are better o↵; in any equilibrium in which one group underinvests in
skills, the other group remains high skilled and is better o↵, while firms are worse
o↵. We further discuss on the problem in wage bargaining (fixed sharing rule)
context. With bargained wage, similar equilibrium in which the favored group
underinvests exists, and firms incur cost for an intermediate range of bargaining
power when they discriminate.
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4.1 Introduction
A holdup problem arises when some investment is sunk ex ante by one party, and
the payo↵ is shared with that one party’s trading partner. Since cost has no other
use once sunk, that trading partner will have every incentive to squeeze the profit
at the ex post stage. In an important study on such a problem in a labor market
with search friction, Acemoglu and Shimer (1999b) shows that with firms’ sinking
capital and ex post wage bargaining, the equilibrium is always ine cient, since
wages paid ex post can be so high such that firms’ ex ante incentive of investment
is impaired; while if firms are able to post wages to direct workers’ search, then
the holdup problem to firms’ investment no longer appears; the e ciency can be
achieved, because wage posting allows workers to observe o↵ers and choose where
to apply, and it induces workers to optimize their expected payo↵ from application
by making trade-o↵ between every wage they observe and the probability of
obtaining it. Within conventional wage posting framework, we spot another source
of ine ciency in a holdup problem where workers sink skill investment cost: when
the market is crowded for the firms, by adopting a discriminatory hiring norm,
firms are able to expropriate higher profit than socially optimal level, and this has
the consequence of discouraging the investment incentives for both the favored
and discriminated groups. We analyze the impact of such rent seeking behavior of
firms on the structure of market segmentation, and on the workers’ skill investment
incentives.
When discrimination is absent, the wage posting economy with workers’ ex ante
skill investment attains e ciency in the equilibria, and we show which equilibrium
emerges depends on the rivalry between the log return to skill and the market
tightness which measures the degree of market competition. The fundamental
reason behind this e ciency result is that skill achievement is a quality which can
be legally written into the wage contracts. It is a di↵erent story when other (binary)
characteristics which are not closely related to productivity, such as gender, race,
height, origin etc. enter also into firms’ preference. Under equal pay legislation,
posted wages can not be conditioned explicitly on these characteristics; however, if
firms still select workers according to their preference on these characteristics, a
separating equilibrium results where separate firms post di↵erent levels of wages,
and workers of di↵erent groups sort themselves and apply to di↵erent wages: the
market is then endogenously segregated. On the side of firms, they have incentive to
adopt such discriminatory hiring norm, when workers’ return to skill investment is
su ciently high; in that case discrimination allows them to grasp higher operating
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profit than the socially optimal level. On the side of the workers, it proves that
both the discriminated and favored group are worse o↵: for the former, it is
because discrimination discretely reduces the labor market opportunity of these
workers, who anticipate discrimination, then demand lower wages, which makes
them cheaper to hire; for the latter, it is so because when firms are able to hire
the discriminated workers cheaply, it is as if firms enjoy larger “market power”,
which allows them to suppress further the unfavored workers’ expected payo↵.
Naturally, anticipating discrimination, all groups expect lower payo↵ from search,
jeopardizing their skill investment incentives.
A key feature of our study is the multidimensionality of characteristics based
on which workers are ranked. On one hand, there is ranking by productivity-
dependent type identity: workers are either high skilled (type H) or low skilled
(type L); the high skilled have priority to low skilled simply because firms’ profit is
increasing in productivity. On the other hand, there is ranking by productivity-
independent group identity: workers belong either to the favored group (group a) or
the discriminated group (group b). The resulting ranking schedule has the following
order: aH   bH   aL   bL. It reads: given any skill level, group a are preferred
to group b; the high skilled is always preferred to the low skilled. Under such
an “intertwined” ranking order, the skill investment decision for di↵erent groups
becomes strategically interdependent. Focusing on Nash pure strategy equilibrium
on skill investment, in the wage posting economy, we find that depending on
the value of market tightness there can be equilibrium or multiple equilibria on
skill investment due to that interdependence. Compared to the case without
discrimination, when the market is very crowded (market tightness is small) for
the firms, discrimination is profitable for firms and all the workers are worse o↵; as
the tightness further increases, both group can choose low skill and in equilibrium
whenever one group underinvest, the other group remains high skilled and is better
o↵, while the firms are worse o↵ with discrimination. In particular, there exists
an equilibrium in which the favored group underinvests while the discriminated
group remains high skilled; and in this case firms’ profits drop since workers’
underinvestment in skill leads to lower average productivity compared to the case
in which discrimination is absent.
In the economy where wages are bargained (determined according to a fixed
sharing rule) after matching hence do not direct search, we find similar equilibrium
where the favored group underinvest, hence earn lower expected payo↵ compared
to the case without discrimination within a certain region of bargaining power;
in such an equilibrium, surplus is transferred from firms and favored group to
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discriminated group. Firms’ profits are piecewise monotone, because increase of
workers’ bargaining power can increase workers’ incentive of skill investment, hence
discretely improves the market skill composition and average productivity. We
also find that there is an intermediate range of workers’ bargaining power for
values of which firms are worse o↵ by discriminating, due to discouraged skill
investment from discriminated group. All in all, the key di↵erence between wage
posting and wage bargaining is that the actual wage now exogenously pegs on the
productivity, and firms can no longer manipulate their market power by translating
their discriminatory preference into constantly lower wages.
Job search process is an important channel through which discrimination keeps
functioning in the labor market. Several papers have highlighted the impact of
discrimination through job search channel to the wages gaps. To name a few,
Pendakur and Woodcock (2010) show that the existent glass ceilings for the
immigrant and minority workers may be attributed by large measure to the poor
access to the jobs in high-wage firms; As well, in an important article from Ritter
and Taylor (2011), they show that most of the disparity in unemployment rate
could not be explained by cognitive skills that emerge at an early stage, although
for wage gap it could be the case. This result concerning the unemployment
disparity is confirmed by the finding that this disparity is still significant even for
workers of similar skill levels.
Our work is most closely related to the directed search literature1. In this
literature, search frictions are derived endogenously through agents’ sequential
strategic interactions. Taking into account strategic interaction allows the search
externality to be internalized. The resulting economy remains competitive, albeit
with a non-Walrasian market structure, and prices play an allocative role to achieve
e ciency. To the best of our knowledge, among the discrimination literature with
search friction, only two of them are built upon wage posting context. Lang,
Manove, and Dickens (2005, hereafter LMD) show that a discriminatory hiring
rule could lead to labor market segmentation and significant wage gap with even a
negligible di↵erence in productivity; however, their discriminated group turn out to
have lower unemployment rate, which is in sharp contrast with evidence. Merlino
(2012) aims at improving the result of LMD (2005). He considers further the
pre-matching investment from the firms’ side, and obtains technology dispersion
and realistic unemployment gap. His results rely on the strong assumption that
there is more discrimination in the high technology sector, and he is silent on the
workers’ skill levels. Our paper di↵ers from theirs, in that our focus is to analyze
1This literature is sometimes also termed as wage posting game with coordination friction
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how hiring discrimination could distort the structure of market segmentation, and
workers’ skill investment incentives.
While the setup of wage bargaining (no information of level of wage before
matching) is more prevalent, it neglects an important trade-o↵ that the workers
make to some extent in the search for jobs: the wage and the probability of obtaining
it. This endogenous link between wage and employment probability is especially
important, since wages convey information on whether the employers discriminate
or not. Having information of wages available before matching, workers are able
to adjust accordingly their search strategy to avoid being discriminated. Workers
apply to certain wage only when their expected payo↵ (wage times the employment
probability) from this application attains certain level, and a high wage which
attracts also the favored group discretely lowers the probability of employment for
the discriminated group to such an extent that their expected payo↵ at these high
wage firms does not meet the expected market payo↵. This setup is supported by
Lang and Lehmann (2012) and Heckman (1998), who mention that workers do not
apply randomly and they actually avoid prejudiced employers to some extent, which
implies between-group search externality is taken into account by the discriminated
workers. Moreover, it is well known that within-group search externality may
be prevalent when wages are bargained; while in wage posting context, we are
able to abstract from search externality and focus on discrimination.2 Hall and
Krueger (2010) use U.S. data to show that fraction of posted and bargained wages
are both around one third. They also document a negative relationship between
the education level and precise information concerning the expected pay. Brenzel,
Gartner and Shnabel (2013) focus on the employer’s side of the study in Germany,
and showed that around two thirds of the wages are posted, and the bargained
wages are more likely set for those with higher education and qualification. The
message is that not only is wage posting a prevalent wage determination process in
the labor market, more importantly, it is also dominant in the relatively low skilled
sector.3 Within our context, employers can not post wages contingent on workers’
group identity which is irrelevant to productivity, which could be understood as
due to the functioning of the equal opportunity legislation.
Literature addressing discrimination problem in random search context is
vaster. However, to have tractable such model convenient for linking to evidence,
the introduced discrimination is usually taste-based, hence to obtain realistic
2By focusing on posted wage, e ciency in wage determination is guaranteed (because strategic
interaction is taken into account) and we are able to focus on the e↵ect of discrimination.
3It is consistent with our knowledge that the more skilled workers, whose number is compara-
tively small, usually receive more attention and protections.
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outcome may often require making compromise on assuming ex ante di↵erences
in parameters governing relevant characteristics. Rosen (1997) is an exception
and shows that discrimination can result even if there are no di↵erences across
groups. Job opportunities arrive stochastically, minority workers choose reservation
productivities above which they accept the job; to avoid majority workers who
are always preferred, they choose to accept jobs even with low reservation wages.
Although private information is the key element in Rosen (1997)’s model, search
externality remains the main channel for the functioning of the discrimination
mechanism. Our focus is on how the ranking order of firms contributes to strategic
interdependence in workers’ skill investment decisions, and search externality is
internalized when search is directed.
There is also the important statistical discrimination literature4 which empha-
sizes the role of asymmetric information on qualities related to the productivity.
One strand of this literature derives group inequalities endogenously even in the
absence of ex ante group di↵erence on relevant characteristics. Their mechanism is
that decision makers’ asymmetric beliefs on relevant characteristics of members for
di↵erent groups could subsequently dim unfavored agents’ incentive on investment
on payo↵-relevant technology, which in turn justifies the firms initial beliefs. Our
context is di↵erent from this literature mainly in the point that, instead of relying
on the information friction which plays central role in generating the pessimistic
outcome, we work through a sequential game where agents could correctly antic-
ipate the pessimistic outcomes, hence choose to react accordingly in a rational
way.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 analyzes the case without discrim-
ination. We then move to the economy with discrimination: section 4.3 explains the
basic setups with discrimination; and we then examine how discrimination alters
the incentives of workers’ skill investment. In section 4.4 we further discuss the
problem in a wage bargaining context and provide further remarks on free-entry of
firms and heterogeneity of skill investment cost. And finally, section 4.5 concludes
this chapter.
4.2 The model without discrimination
We start with a context without hiring discrimination. Consider an economy
populated by two types of agents, workers and firms. The number of workers is
4We refer readers to the survey from Fang & Moro (2010)
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N5, with the index i 2 {1, 2, ..., N}, and the number of firms is M , with the index
j 2 {1, 2, ...,M}. Define the market tightness as   := NM .
We introduce a pre-matching skill investment stage into a standard wage posting
game. Each job seeker makes a skill investment decision before entering the labor
market, and the skill choice is binary - either to be high skilled or low skilled, with a
cost EH and EL for investing in high skill and low skill, respectively; EH > EL = 0.
A high skilled job seeker who pays EH is capable of producing yH , while a low
skilled one can only produce yL. This can be understood in the following way:
workers who enter into labor market after a longer period of training (schooling)
pay higher opportunity cost and are averagely expected to be more productive,
compared to those who spend a shorter period on schooling and enter the labor
market at an earlier stage. The workers’ skill level is public information, and both
the costs {EL, EH} and productions {yL, yH} are exogenous.
Firms are ex ante identical. Having observed the skill attainment of job seekers,
firms post wages conditional on skills. If firms choose to attract a high skilled
worker, they post wage wH , and the surplus at the ad interim stage is yH  wH . In
case hiring a low skilled worker, firms post wage wL and the ad interim profit from
hiring this worker is thus yL   wL6. Skill level is a characteristic of workers which
the wage contracts can be conditioned on. This characteristic is in contrast to
other qualities such as gender, race, height, etc., which should not be conditioned
on under equal pay legislation; when firms distinguish workers according to these
latter qualities, the wage contract becomes “incomplete”7; by this, we say that the
firm discriminates.
The timing follows a standard wage posting game, augmented with a pre-
matching skill investment stage (stage 0). More precisely,
Stage 0: Workers choose skill level, either L or H, and pay EL or EH accordingly.
Stage 1: Firms observe the skills of job seekers and announces wage (wL, wH).
Stage 2: Workers observe wage o↵ers, and choose which wage to apply to.
Stage 3: Firms select workers from the received applications, and they select
workers with identical skills with equal probability. Then the production is carried
on and payo↵s are realized.
5As noted by Lang, Manove, and Dickens (2005), the number N could be regarded as the
expected number of job seekers from the firms’ perspective.
6It would be useful to consider the firms adopting a skill-biased technology with productivity
y. A high skilled worker succeeds to produce y with probability pH , and therefore the expected
productivity is yH = pHy, and a low skilled gets the output with probability pL, and yL = pLy;
pH > pL. This formulation is adopted by Shi (2002, RES).
7Incompleteness of contract is the source of ine ciency for the holdup problem. See Acemoglu
and Shimer (1999) for related literature.
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We will focus on subgame perfect competitive equilibria (SPCE). Firms choose
wages to maximize profits, and workers maximize their expected payo↵ by choosing
firstly the skill level and then which wage to apply to.
4.2.1 Strategies, matching probabilities and payo↵ func-
tions
In the skill investment stage, workers choose from skill levels L and H. Let ↵ be
the fraction of the job seekers who choose to invest in high skill, and the remaining
fraction (1 ↵) is low skilled8. Then, having observed the skill levels of workers, firm
j posts wage wj(↵) = (wjH , w
j
L). Denote w(↵) = (w
1(↵), ..., wM (↵)). Define a type
t job seeker i’s strategy as a vector of probabilities ⇥it(w) = (✓
i1
t (w), ..., ✓
iM
t (w)),
where ✓ijt is the probability with which the type t worker i applies to firm j, and
t 2 {L,H}. It holds true thatPj ✓ijt = 1 for any i and t. Therefore, an equilibrium
is characterized by
⇣
↵⇤,w⇤(↵⇤),
 
⇥i⇤t (w
⇤)
 
i=1,2...N
⌘
.
Since we only consider symmetric equilibria, for a given firm j, ✓ijt has the
same value for any type t job seeker, so we denote ✓ijt = ✓
j
t for any j. As in the
literature, it is convenient 9 to proceed with a transformation of variable. We define
q, as the expected number of applications received by the firm; it is also called the
expected queue length. Denote qj as the queue length of firm j, and qjt as the queue
length of the type t workers in firm j. If a firm attracts both high and low skilled
workers, we have qj = qjL + q
j
H , where q
j
L and q
j
H are the queue lengths of type L
and type H workers applying to firm j, respectively. By definition, qjt is equal to
the number of workers of type t times their application probability: qjH = NH ⇥ ✓jH ,
and qjL = NL ⇥ ✓jL for any j, where NL and NH are the total number of workers of
type L and H respectively.
Job seekers. Job seekers observe all the wages w announced by the firms,
and choose which wage to apply to. To derive the employment probability of a
particular job seeker, we first consider the case in which the firm that this worker
applies for posts a single wage to attract a single type of workers. Then this type t
8Since the skill choice is binary, we can always interpret the profile of all workers’ skill levels
as a fraction of certain type among all workers. In a large market, ↵ can also be regarded as the
probability with which a job seeker chooses to invest in high skill by virtue of the Law of Large
Number (for the sake of symmetric equilibrium on the workers’ side, we have ↵i = ↵i
0
for any
i, i0 2 {1, 2, ..., N}).
9When the number of firms and workers are large, it is no longer convenient to operate with
the workers’ application strategy ✓ji , because it will tend to zero in the symmetric mixed strategy
equilibrium.
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worker’s probability of employment in that firm is, for any t 2 {L,H},
Prempt =
1  (1  ✓t)Nt
Nt✓t
! 1  e
 qt
qt
, when N,M !1, 10
since qt = Nt✓t. Notice that is
1 e qt
qt
is decreasing in qt: the higher the expected
number of applicants is, the lower the probability that this job seeker can be em-
ployed is. When a firm attracts both types of workers, the employment probabilities
of high and low skilled workers are,
PrempH =
1  e qH
qH
, and PrempL = e
 qH 1  e qL
qL
,
respectively. PrempH is the same as before due to their priority in the hiring, which
represents the within group competition e↵ect, while the employment probability
of low skilled workers, PrempL , has an extra term e
 qH , which is the probability with
which no high skilled worker applies to this firm, and which governs the between
group competition e↵ect.
Note that since q is a function of job seekers’ application strategy ✓, it depends
on, or more precisely, it is induced also by w. We now look more closely into their
causal relationship. We first distinguish two terms: (1) each job seeker’s expected
income from applying, ut, and (2) the expected “market” income, Ut. We refer to
the expected income as the expected payo↵ that a worker gains when applying
to a certain firm, namely, the product of the probability of his being employed
by this firm and the wage he gets in the firm. Thus, we have ut = Pr
emp
t wt for
t 2 {L,H}. The expected “market” income is the level of the expected income
that workers have in the equilibrium. Due to the large number of firms and the
competition among them, Ut is independent of a single firm’s wage posting strategy,
and thus any firm’s wage posting that provides an expected income lower than the
“market” level is unattractive to workers (and therefore this “market” level can also
be understood as the reservation wage).
Therefore, a particular type t job seeker is willing to send application to a firm
j only if his expected income from applying to the firm, ujt = Pr
emp,j
t w
j
t , is greater
than or equal to the expected market income Ut. In fact, Ut is also the maximum
of all possible expected incomes of type t workers from applying. Since any firm
who could o↵er wt such that Pr
emp
t wt > Ut would attract workers’ application
away from the original firms, and Ut would not be the expected income level in an
10Without a superscript j, we mean to refer to an arbitrarily firm. See appendix for the
detailed derivation.
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equilibrium. Therefore, we can rule out the case in which Premp,jt w
j
t > Ut, and we
have
qjt
8<: > 0, if Premp,jt wjt = Ut,= 0, if Premp,jt wjt < Ut. (4.1)
Job seekers make trade-o↵ between the wage and the probability of obtaining it.
From 4.1, we have the workers’ strategy in the job application subgame, qjt (w),
satisfies
qjt
8<: > 0, if wjt > Ut,= 0, if wjt  Ut, (4.2)
since the employment probability Premp,jt < 1. It is now more straightforward to
see that Ut is alike the reservation wage, above which the job seekers are willing to
apply to.
Firms. A firm can match with a type t worker if at least one type t worker
appears ex post, which happens with probability PrHirt = 1  (1  ✓t)Nt (the hiring
probability), since the probability with which no type t job seeker sends application
to this firm is (1  ✓t)Nt . Note that qt = Nt✓t, we have
PrHirt ! 1  e qt , when Nt !1.
This probability is increasing in q, showing that the more the expected number of
applicants, the higher the probability that the firm can fill the vacancy.
Firms post wages to maximize their expected payo↵. The expected payo↵ from
attracting a type t worker is the product of the probability of meeting a type t
worker and the net profit, i.e., ⇡t := (1  e qt)⇥ (yt   wt) , for t 2 {L,H}. Given
that both types appear in the market, if firms post both wL and wH to attract
both types, as shown by Shi (2006), they rank the high skilled in priority to the
low skilled. Then the total expected payo↵ (from attracting both types of workers)
is thus ⇡LH := (1  e qH )(yH   wH) + e qH (1  eqL)(yL   wL), where e qH is the
probability of no type H job seeker applies to this firm, since the firm considers
hiring low skilled workers only when they do not receive any application from the
high skilled.
Solution of wage posting subgame. The solution concept we adopt is
the subgame perfect competitive equilibrium (SPCE), and one way of solving the
equilibrium for the wage posting subgame is as shown in Burdett, Shi and Wright
(2001). Firms choose wages to maximize their expected profit, taking into account
the best responses of other firms as well as of the job seekers. As we consider a
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large economy in which a single firm’s deviation does not alter the expected market
income, firms therefore must o↵er workers a certain level of expected income -
the expected market income, which is taken as given in the stage where a firm
maximizes his profit and will later be determined endogenously11.
Thus, given a skill distribution of skill level ↵, the firm chooses wt, t = L or
H, to maximize his expected profit ⇡t, taking the expected market income Ut (the
other firms’ responses) and the functional relationship between wt and qt (job
seekers’ responses) as given. In the case of ↵ = 0 or 1, the firm attracts a single
type of workers, and the optimal strategy can be solved by
maxwt (1  e qt)(yt   wt)
s.to 1 e
 qt
qt
wt = Ut
(4.3)
for t 2 {L,H}. For a given Ut, solving wt from the constraint, substituting it
into the objective function, and maximizing with respect to qt, we can obtain an
optimal functional relationship between q⇤t and U
⇤
t . Using this obtained relationship,
with the help of the constraint, we then obtain an optimal functional relationship
between w⇤t and q
⇤
t . Besides, since in symmetric equilibrium all firms post the same
wages, so that all workers apply to each firm with equal probability, by definition
of q we have q⇤t =
N
M =  .
In the case of ↵ 2 (0, 1), i.e., there are both high and low job seekers in the
market, it is optimal for firms to attract both types at the same time (as shown in
Shi (2006)), and the wage posting subgame is solved by
maxwH ,wL (1  e qH ) (yH   wH) + e qH (1  e qL) (yL   wL)
s.to 1 e
 qH
qH
wH = UH
e qH 1 e
 qL
qL
wL = UL
(4.4)
Similar as above, solving (4.4), we can have
U⇤L = e
 q⇤H q⇤L yL (4.5)
and
U⇤H = e
 q⇤H (yH   yL) + e q⇤H q⇤L yL (4.6)
And in the equilibrium we have q⇤H =
NH
M =
↵N
M = ↵ , q
⇤
L =
NL
M = (1  ↵) , and
11As emphasized also in Lang, Manove and Dickens (2005), it is “a simplification of standard
subgame perfection in which aggregate variables are assumed constant with respect to the changes
in the strategy of an individual agent”.
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q⇤H + q
⇤
L =  . At last, it is important to remark that qt depends on wt continuously,
as remarked by Shi (2002). In this way, a marginal change of wage wt can only
lead to a marginal modification on the expected number of applicants qt.
4.2.2 Decentralized market equilibrium without discrimi-
nation
In this subsection, we consider the skill investment decision of job seekers at first
stage, and establish the decentralized market equilibrium in the nondiscriminatory
regime. Let ↵⇤ be the fraction of high skilled job seekers in the equilibrium. There
are three cases:
Case (1). ↵⇤ = 1. All job seekers are high skilled.
Case (2). ↵⇤ 2 (0, 1). Some job seekers invest in high skill, while the other
get low skill.
Case (3). ↵⇤ = 0. All job seekers are low skilled.
With Case (1) and Case (3), there exists only one type of skill level in the
market, and thus there is only one wage posted in equilibrium. However, the
market with Case (2) features two skill levels. As in Shi (2006), it is optimal for
firms to attract both skill types at the same time, while ranking the high skilled
in priority to the low skilled. We now show that the rivalry between the market
competition (captured by market tightness  ) and the magnitude of the return to
skill ratio yH yLEH EL are crucial in the determination of the equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1 (Return to skills). Given the return to skill ratio yH yLEH EL , define
 ˆ as yH yLEH EL = e
 ˆ. Then, we have
(i) When 0 <     ˆ, i.e. yH yLEH EL   e , there exists a unique equilibrium in
which all job seekers choose to obtain high skill, i.e. ↵⇤ = 1.
(ii) When   >  ˆ, i.e. 1 < yH yLEH EL < e
 , there exists a unique ↵⇤ 2 (0, 1) such
that yH yLEH EL = e
↵⇤ , and thus a unique equilibrium with ↵⇤ 2 (0, 1).
(iii) When yH yLEH EL  1 such that yH yLEHEL = e ˆ has no positive solution, there
exists a unique equilibrium in which all job seekers are low skilled, ↵⇤ = 0.
Proof. See appendix.
When the value of return to skill yH yLEH EL is su ciently large compared to e
 ,
which measures the intensity of competition of the market, job seekers find it a
dominant strategy to invest in high skill. There is no incentive for them to deviate
to low skill investment, and the output is highest among all the equilibria. When
the value of yH yLEH EL is moderate, there exists an equilibrium where job seekers are
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indi↵erent from being high skilled or low skilled; all firms find it optimal to attract
both skill types and the output is lower compared to the previous equilibrium. At
last, when the value of return to skill is su ciently low, it does not provide them
incentive to sink this fixed cost against the risky job search game they are going to
play; the equilibrium level of output turns out to be the lowest.
4.2.3 Constrained e cient allocations
The objective of this subsection is to find the e cient allocations in the centralized
market, and evaluate whether the decentralized market attains its e ciency. The
social planner maximizes the aggregate output, subject to the same matching
friction as in the decentralized equilibrium. More precisely, the social planner
chooses the fraction of workers to be high skilled, divides firms into di↵erent groups
to attract distinct compositions of workers, and assigns workers to match with
a certain group of firms. With the same matching friction as before, the social
planner is restricted to treat workers of the same skill level in the same way, and
assures that workers of the same type must match with firms from the same group
with the same probability.
Let ↵P be the fraction of high skilled workers the social planner chooses,
↵P 2 [0, 1]. Note that if the optimal arrangement ↵P⇤ = 1, all job seekers are high
skilled, and only one type of firms exists - those which attract high skilled workers.
It is similar for ↵P⇤ = 0. If ↵P⇤ 2 (0.1), there are both high and low skilled job
seekers and it is optimal for the planner to assign all firms to post wages for both
the high and low skilled (as shown in Shi (2006)). Furthermore, in the last case the
planner can also manage the priority of firms’ hiring di↵erently skilled workers -
whether to prefer high skilled to low skilled or otherwise. Let xP be the probability
of the firms ranking high skilled worker in priority to the low skilled. And qPt is
the expected number of applicants in a firm, t 2 {L,H}, which governs how the
planner assigns workers’ applications.
Thus, the social planner’s problem is to maximize the aggregate output as
follows.
max (1  e qPH ) e qPL + xP (1  e qPL ) yH + (1  e qPL ) e qPH + (1  xP )(1  e qPH ) yL
    (↵PEH + (1  ↵P )EL).12 (4.7)
If at least one high skilled visits a certain firm, with probability (1  e qH ),
the firm hires a high skilled worker, either with probability 1 when no low skilled
worker shows up, which happens with probability e qL , or with probability xP if
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there is at least one low skilled worker who shows up at the same firm, which occurs
with probability (1  e qL); it is similar for the case with low productivity. Since
firms and workers of the same skill are all identical from the planner’s perspective,
we have qP⇤H = ↵
P⇤  and qP⇤L = (1  ↵P⇤) , and the above objective includes all
cases with di↵erent values of ↵P . Solving the problem, we can see that the optimal
ranking is that firms always prefer high skilled workers, i.e., xP⇤ = 1, and we have
the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2 (Social Optimality). The skill investment and the labor allocation
are socially optimal.
Proof. See appendix.
In the proof, we can also verify that the threshold  ˆP for skill investment of
the social planner coincides with  ˆ in the decentralized economy. That is, when
0 <     ˆ = log yH yLEH EL , it is socially optimal that workers all invest in high skills;
when   >  ˆ, it is socially optimal to that a fraction of ↵P⇤ = ↵⇤ workers invest in
high skill, while the rest invest in low skills; and when yH yLEH EL  1 such that  ˆ has
no positive solution, all invest in low skill.
In the rest of the paper, we mainly focus on the first case, so that whenever
workers are discouraged to underinvest, it is due to the e↵ect of discrimination.
Assumption 4.1. Assume that yH yLEH EL   e . That is, 0 <     ˆ.
Under above assumption, all workers choose to be high skilled due to the high
rate of skill return. And the firms’ and workers’ expected income are summarized
in the following corollary.
Corollary 4.1. Under Assumption 4.1, we have that the expected profit of firms in
the equilibrium is ⇡⇤H = (1  e    e  ) yH , the wage of workers in the equilibrium
is w⇤H =
 e  
1 e   yH , and the expected income of workers is U
⇤
H = e
  yH .
Proof. See appendix.
4.3 The model with hiring discrimination
We now introduce discrimination. Consider an economy where workers can be
partitioned into two groups, group a and group b, according to certain trait which
is irrelevant to productivity. Gender, for example, is such one possible binary
partition of labor force. Denote   as the fraction of group a workers, and the
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fraction of group b workers is 1  . The two groups of workers are ex ante identical
in all other aspects.
Discrimination modifies the matching functions of agents. Specifically, in order
to formulate discrimination, we introduce a term x called hiring (ranking) rule
specified by firms. To be precise, x could be understood as the probability with
which the group a workers are selected when both groups are present. Notice that
when job seekers consider their probability of being hired, they have to take into
account of the impact from the competition with the other group. The probability
that a group a worker is employed by this firm (regardless of skill di↵erence for
the moment) is
Fa(qa, qb, x) :=
1  e qa
qa
 
e qb + x(1  e qb) .
Analogously, the probability that a group b worker is employed by this firm is
Fb(qa, qb, x) :=
1  e qb
qb
 
e qa + (1  x)(1  e qa) .
Then the part 1 e
 qa
qa
and 1 e
 qb
qb
capture the within group competition, while the
remaining parts with x capture the between group competition.
Notice that when x = 1, firms hire group b workers only when none of the
group a workers is present. Firms always prefer group a to group b, although they
have identical productivity. This is what we consider as discrimination of hiring.
The employment probability for group a and group b workers become, respectively,
Fa(qa, qb, 1) =
1  e qa
qa
(4.8)
and
Fb(qa, qb, 1) =
1  e qb
qb
· e qa . (4.9)
Another interesting example is x = 12 . The employment probabilities of the two
groups become symmetric, i.e.,
Fa(qa, qb,
1
2
) =
1  e qa
qa
⇣
e qb +
1
2
(1  e qb)
⌘
and
Fb(qa, qb,
1
2
) =
1  e qb
qb
⇣
e qa +
1
2
(1  e qa)
⌘
.
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Note that when qa = qb, the employment probabilities of both groups are
equal, Fa(qa, qb,
1
2) = Fb(qa, qb,
1
2), which is the case we consider as the one without
discrimination, and x = 12 is therefore considered as the hiring rule without
discrimination for such a case. Furthermore, we have Fa(qa, qb, 1)   Fa(qa, qb, 12)
for any (qa, qb) 2 R2+. That is, the employment probability of workers from the
preferred group (group a) is higher under discrimination than that in the case
without discrimination. Similarly, we can see that Fb(qa, qb, 1)  Fb(qa, qb, 12) for
any (qa, qb) 2 R2+, i.e., the employment probability of the discriminated group
(group b) is lower when there is hiring discrimination.
In fact, the employment probability of group a is increasing in x, whereas that
of group b decreases with x. Thus, for given (qa, qb) 2 R2+ \ (0, 0), there exists
xˆ 2 (0, 1) such that Fa(qa, qb, xˆ) = Fb(qa, qb, xˆ). We then say xˆ is the hiring rule
without discrimination13.
Indeed, x measures the intensity of the discriminatory preference. Given qa
and qb, for x 2 [0, xˆ) firms discriminate group a workers, and for x 2 (xˆ, 1] firms
discriminate group b workers. The closer x approaches to the extremes of the
interval [0, 1], the more intensive the hiring discrimination is. And the employment
probability of the preferred (discriminated) group is always increasing (decreasing)
in the intensity of the discrimination.
In the rest of paper, we focus on the case x = 1 such that group a achieves
absolute priority to group b, which we refer to as strong discrimination.
4.3.1 The case of strong discrimination: x = 1
Formally, we introduce two assumptions as Merlino (2012), which help to introduce
some heterogeneity that is not productivity-relevant among the labor pool.
Assumption 4.2. Firms are not allowed to post wages which are dependent on
the group identity.
Assumption 4.3. Firms prefer group a job applicants in the sense that firms only
hire workers from group b when group a workers are not present, i.e. x = 1.
Same as the case without discrimination, workers apply to a firm only when they
can obtain the expect market income from applying to that firm. Note that under
Assumption 4.1, all workers choose to be high skilled if there were no discrimination,
and we denote in this section the expected market income of high skilled job seekers
13Note that xˆ is a function of (qa, qb), while qa and qb in turn depend on the composition of
the two groups of workers, i.e.,  .
84
4.3 The model with hiring discrimination
from group a and group b as UaH and UbH , respectively. Thus, firms o↵er wage wH
aiming at attracting high skilled workers, by (4.8) and (4.9), under the following
constraints
UaH = FaH(qat, qbH) · wH = 1  e
 qaH
qaH
wH 14, (4.10)
and
UbH = FbH(qaH , qbH) · wH = 1  e
 qbH
qbH
e qaH wH . (4.11)
With the introduction of discrimination, workers may have the incentive to
deviate to low skill even under Assumption 4.1. We start with the case where
both group a and group b choose to be high skilled, and then proceed to find the
equilibrium of the wage posting game with skill investment, in which workers may
choose to invest low skills. Yet before this, we first review the results of Lang,
Manove, and Dickens (2005), where they study the case with discrimination but
no di↵erence in workers’ skill levels (or productivity).
4.3.2 Existing results revisited and reinterpreted
In a context where there are two groups of workers with identical productivity
(skill level) and firms strongly prefer one group, group a, to the other, group b 15.
First, LMD show that any subgame perfect competitive equilibrium (SPCE) is
separating.
Separating equilibrium. LMD show that there is no wage to which both
groups of job seekers apply. More precisely, no wage can maximize firms’ profit
while attracting both groups of workers (with both constraints (4.10) and (4.11)
binding) simultaneously. The equilibrium is separating. That is, there are some
firms posting a higher level of wage attracting only the preferred group (group a),
whereas the rest of firms o↵ering a lower wage only attracting the discriminated
group b (see Proposition 2 in LMD). Notice that the discriminated group has always
the choice of applying to the high wage; however, they choose not to do so, because
they anticipate discrimination in these firms. The most essential results of LMD
(2005) are summarized as follows:
(i) For the firms attracting group a workers, the expect profit in the equilibrium
14We omit the argument x = 1 in FaH and FbH .
15We refer to this identical skill level as high skill, H, and later add an extra H in the
subscripts (for example, use aH and bH instead of a and b), in order to make the transition to
the next subsection more visable.
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is given by
⇡⇤aH = (1  e q⇤aH   q⇤aHe q⇤aH ) yH , (4.12)
and we have
U⇤aH = e
 q⇤aH yH , (4.13)
w⇤aH =
q⇤aH e
 q⇤aH
1  e q⇤aH yH . (4.14)
(ii) For the firms attracting group b workers, the expect profit in the equilibrium
is
⇡⇤bH = (1  e q⇤bH ) (1  e q⇤aH )yH , (4.15)
and we have
w⇤bH = U
⇤
aH = e
 q⇤aH yH , (4.16)
U⇤bH =
1  e q⇤bH
q⇤bH
w⇤bH =
1  e q⇤bH
q⇤bH
e q
⇤
aH yH . (4.17)
(See equations (22)-(27) in LMD, and a sketch of the proofs of the above results
is provided in the appendix.)
Note that separating equilibrium requires firms be indi↵erent between attracting
group a and group b. That is,
⇡⇤aH = ⇡
⇤
bH , (4.18)
Let   denote the fraction of firms who attract group a, then a fraction of 1    
firms post low wage and attract group b. The above indi↵erence condition helps to
determine  ⇤ and in turn q⇤aH and q
⇤
bH , since qaH =
 N
 M =
 
   and qbH =
(1  )N
(1  )M =
(1  )
(1  ) .
(iii) Furthermore, we have  ⇤ <  ,
q⇤aH >   > q
⇤
bH , and
q⇤aH
d 
> 0,
q⇤bH
d 
> 0. (4.19)
Here we make some remarks on the features of the separating equilibrium.
Firstly, the resulted equilibrium allocations are incentive compatible. For any
particular group b job seeker, by deviating to applying for w⇤aH , the best they
could get is e q⇤aH w⇤aH (when none of the group a workers shows up in the firm he
deviates to apply to). However, this deviating payo↵ is strictly lower than sticking
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to applying to w⇤bH since
e q
⇤
aH w⇤aH
(4.14)
= e q
⇤
aH · q
⇤
aH e
 q⇤aH
1  e q⇤aH yH
(4.13)
=
q⇤aH e
 q⇤aH
1  e q⇤aH U
⇤
aH
(4.18)
= e q
⇤
bH U⇤aH
(4.16)
= e q
⇤
bH w⇤bH <
1  e q⇤bH
q⇤bH
w⇤bH
(4.17)
= U⇤bH . (4.20)
As for any particular group a job seeker, by deviating to apply for w⇤bH , the best
they can get is w⇤bH = U
⇤
aH by (4.16), which is not larger than that he can get if he
does not deviate. Secondly, we do not have the reservation wage structure, which
requires that workers apply to any wage that is higher than the certain reservation
value. In this separating equilibrium, group b job seekers apply merely to the low
wage w⇤bH but not to w
⇤
aH even it is above their reservation wage. This is because
the expected income from applying to the high wage is a strictly dominated strategy
for group b: the expected income from applying to w⇤aH is too low to match their
expected market income U⇤bH . Following are several noteworthy properties of such
an equilibrium.
Results from LMD (2005): Compared to the context without discrimina-
tion, (1) Both groups have lower expected income; (2) All firms earn higher profits;
(3) The expected income of group a and group b are such that U⇤aH > U
⇤
bH .
4.3.3 Analysis under our context
In the last subsection, we interpreted the equilibrium of the wage posting subgame
given that all workers choose to be high skilled. In this subsection, we study how
discrimination leads to di↵erent incentives of skill investment for the two groups
respectively, and attempt to find the corresponding equilibrium.
An important observation is that the skill decision for group a and group
b workers is strategic, and this is a direct consequence of the coexistence of
ranking through the productivity-dependent (skill) and productivity-independent
(discrimination) traits. Ranking by skills requires that the high skilled worker has
the priority; while ranking by productivity-independent traits means that group a
has the priority. Although multidimensional characteristics are involved, these two
ranking schedules yield a unique market hierarchy:
aH   bH   aL   bL.
It reads as follows: high skilled group a (aH) is preferred to high skilled group b
(bH), who is preferred to low skilled group a (aL), who is then preferred to low
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skilled group b (bL).16 The matching probability 1 e
 q
q captures the intensity of
competition within the same type (within type), while the probability e q captures
the intensity of competition from the higher ranked type (between type).
Under Assumption 4.1, all workers choose to be high skilled in the nondiscrimi-
natory regime. Now we see that with hiring discrimination they may have incentive
of deviating to low skill. Let ↵s be the fraction of group s choosing to be high
skilled, for s = a or b. To make the analysis simplified (but without losing the
attraction of the model), we assume
Assumption 4.4. Whenever indi↵erent, all workers with the same group identity
(as a group) choose either high or either low skilled.
For workers in the same group, whenever indi↵erent between the two alternatives
(L andH), they all randomize towards the same direction: that is to say, we consider
the group of workers as a whole, or there is perfect correlation on their skill choices.
As a result, ↵ does not represent an individuals probability of choosing high skill,
and either ↵s = 1 or ↵s = 0. Thus, we have the following four possibilities:
(P1) ↵a = 1 and ↵b = 1: group a - high, group b - high;
(P2) ↵a = 1 and ↵b = 0: group a - high, group b - low;
(P3) ↵a = 0 and ↵b = 1: group a - low, group b - high;
(P4) ↵a = 0 and ↵b = 0: group a - low, group b - low.
To decide the skill investment, workers take into account firms’ best response
in the wage posting stage to infer the expected income from the application, and
compare the payo↵s net of the cost of skill investment. In the wage posting
subgame, when facing all workers with identical skill level (as in case (P1) and
(P4)), firms’ optimal strategy is the same as stated in LMD (2005); that is, some
firms post a higher wage to attract group a, whereas the remaining firms post a
lower wage targeting merely group b. When there are both low and high skilled
workers (as in case (P2) and (P3)), firms post wages conditional on skill levels, and
it is optimal for firms to attract both skill levels and rank the high skilled in priority
to low skilled, as in Shi (2006). We then proceed to find workers’ best response
16Quantitatively, in terms of employment probability, we have FaH > FbH > FaL > FaL for
any qst > 0, where s 2 {a, b} and t 2 {H,L}. That is,
1  e qaH
qaH
> e qaH
1  e qbH
qbH
> e qaH qbH
1  e qaL
qaL
> e qaH qbH qaL
1  e qbL
qbL
. (4.21)
The inequality comes from the fact that 1 e
 q
q > e
 q and 0 < 1 e
 q
q < 1 for any q > 0. Note that
by defining 1 e
 q
q = 1 for q = 0, we can extend (4.21) for all qst   0, s 2 {a, b} and t 2 {H,L}
with weak inequalities.
88
4.3 The model with hiring discrimination
in the skill investment stage, and in turn the equilibrium in this discriminatory
context with skill investment. We will use P1, P2, P3, P4 as the superscript for
corresponding equilibrium allocations.
When ↵a = 1 and ↵b = 1, workers are composed of type aH and bH. Firms
post wages separately, and by (4.13) and (4.17), we have the payo↵ of group a (i.e.
aH) and group b (i.e. bH) are, respectively,
V P1aH = e
 qP1⇤aH yH   EH , (4.22)
and
V P1bH =
1  e qP1⇤bH
qP1⇤bH
e q
P1⇤
aH yH   EH , (4.23)
and from (4.19) we have qP1⇤aH >   and q
P1⇤
bH <  .
When ↵a = 1 and ↵b = 0, workers are composed of type aH and bL. All firms
post two wages to attract both types of workers at the same time. By (4.5) and
(4.6), we have the payo↵ of group a and b are, respectively,
V P2aH = e
 qP2⇤aH (yH   yL) + e qP2⇤aH  qP2⇤bL yL   EH , (4.24)
V P2bL = e
 qP2⇤aH  qP2⇤bL yL   EL, (4.25)
and note that qP2⇤aH =   , q
P2⇤
bL = (1   ) , and qP2⇤aH + qP2⇤bL =  .
When ↵a = 0 and ↵b = 1, workers are composed of di↵erent skill levels, aL and
bH, and we have similarly
V P3aL = e
 qP3⇤aL  qP3⇤bH yL   EL, (4.26)
V P3bH = e
 qP3⇤bH (yH   yL) + e qP3⇤aL  qP3⇤bH yL   EH , (4.27)
and similarly here we have qP3⇤aL =   , q
P3⇤
bH = (1   ) , and qP3⇤aL + qP3⇤bH =  .
When ↵a = 0 and ↵b = 0, workers are composed of type aL and bL. Both are
of the same skill level, firms discriminate and post wages as in LMD (2005), and
workers payo↵s are
V P4aL = e
 qP4⇤aL yL   EL, (4.28)
and
V P4bL =
1  e qP4⇤bL
qP4⇤bL
e q
P4⇤
aL yL   EL, (4.29)
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with qP4⇤aL >   > q
P4⇤
bL .
A pure-strategy Nash equilibrium consists of a profile of skill investment with
the property that no single group can achieve a higher payo↵ by unilateral deviation.
The existence of equilibrium depends on the value of  . The payo↵s are summarized
in table 4.1 in the appendix. By comparing the payo↵s under di↵erent strategies,
we can find the best response of workers in the skill investment. For example,
responding to group b choosing to be high skilled, it is optimal for group a to
choose high skill if V P1aH   V P3aL , i.e. e q⇤aH yH   EH   e   yL   EL, which is not
always true. Note that although both V P1aH and V
P4
aL are decreasing in  , there
could be more than one critical value which equates V P1aH and V
P4
aL . In order to
ensure a single threshold and to avoid unnecessary technical complexity, we further
assume that
Assumption 4.5. For q⇤aH( ) and q
⇤
bH( ) that are solved by (4.18),
1. 9!  ˆ1 such that e q⇤aH( ˆ1) yH   EH = e  ˆ1 yL   EL;
2. 9! ˆ2 such that 1 e q
⇤
bH ( ˆ2)
q⇤bH( ˆ2)
e q⇤aH( ˆ2) yH   EH = e  ˆ2 yL   EL.
In fact, if one group chooses to be low skilled, the best response of the other
group is always to be high skilled, while the best response to the other’s high skill
choice depends on the two thresholds (see Figure 4.1). Furthermore, the rise of
market tightness   makes workers have stronger incentive to deviate to low skill,
and group b is more prone to deviate compared to group a, in the sense that the
threshold at which group b begins to contemplate to invest in low skill is lower
that for group a.
aLaH aH
bH bL ˆ2 bL ˆ1  ˆ
Figure 4.1: Best responses given the other group choosing H.
Focusing only on the pure strategy equilibrium, we formalize the results regard-
ing the existence of equilibrium in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.3. Under Assumption 4.1 - 4.5, there exist two thresholds  ˆ1 and
 ˆ2, with 0 <  ˆ2 <  ˆ1 <  ˆ.
1. When 0 <   <  ˆ2, there exists a unique pure strategy equilibrium in which
both group a and group b workers invest in high skill, (aH, bH).
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2. When  ˆ2 <   <  ˆ1, there exists a unique pure strategy equilibrium in which
group a invests in high skill while group b invests in low skill, (aH, bL).
3. When  ˆ1 <     ˆ, there exist multiple pure strategy equilibria. Either group
a invests in high skill and group b invests in low skill, or group a invests in
low skill and group b invests in high skill, (aH, bL) or (aL, bH).
Interestingly, for values of   close to  ˆ, there exists an equilibrium where the
preferred group a chooses low skill, while the discriminated group b chooses high
skill. We have the following results on the comparison of workers expected payo↵
and firms profits compared to the case without discrimination.
Note that when the market tightness   meets the thresholds, we can also have
the following equilibria. At   =  ˆ2, both (aH, bH) and (aH, bL) can be equilibrium;
at   =  ˆ1, both (aL, bH) and (aH, bL) can be equilibrium.
Corollary 4.2. Compared the nondiscriminatory regime,
1. in (aH, bH) equilibrium, firms always earn higher expected profits, while in
(aH, bL) or (aL, bH) equilibrium, firrms earn lower expected profits.
2. in (aH, bH) equilibrium, both aH and bH workers earn lower expected payo↵,
while in (aH, bL) equilibrium group aH (group bL) earns higher (lower)
expected payo↵ and in (aL, bH) equilibrium, group bH (group aL) earns
higher (lower) expected payo↵.
Proof. In the Appendix.
4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 Comparision with wage bargaining
Consider an economy with the same discriminatory ranking as previous, but the
wage is determined by ex post bargaining after a job seeker meets an employer. In
such a context, workers only choose the amount of skills to obtain, buts not where
to search. The timing of the economy is now as follows: firstly, workers decide skill
levels simultaneously; secondly, workers and firms get matched according to the
matching technology; thirdly, the matched worker-firm pair bargain a` la Nash to
determine how to share the output y.
Denote the bargaining power for all workers as  , then workers receive  yt and
firms receive (1  )yt (fixed sharing rule). We now focus on the case where  is the
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same for both skill levels. The hiring norm is as previous: aH   bH   aL   bL.
The employment probabilities for di↵erent types of workers are inherited (as in
(4.21)), and the expected payo↵ is the corresponding employment probability times
 yt net of the skill investment cost. As in the wage posting context, we consider
the skill investment under Assumption 4.4, i.e., the whole group choose either high
or low skill; and assume that the group a is the majority:     1217 .
We focus on Nash equilibrium as the solution concept. In the wage bargaining
context, only workers make skill investment decisions, firms do not post wages since
 is exogenous. Due to the discriminatory rule, the payo↵s of skill investment for
di↵erent groups of workers are interdependent. This renders the skill investment
strategic. The equilibrium depends on the bargaining power  , as in the following
proposition
Proposition 4.4. Let     12 . There exist four thresholds  ˆaL,b   ˆbH,a <  ˆbL,a <
 ˆaH,b, such that
(1) For  2 [0,  ˆaL,b), the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium is (aL, bL);
for  =  ˆaL,b, the equilibrium can be (aL, bL) or (aL, bH).
(2) For  2 ( ˆaL,b,  ˆbH,a), the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium is (aL, bH);
(3) For  2 ( ˆbH,a,  ˆbL,a), there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium; for
 =  ˆbL,a, the equilibrium is (aH, bL);
(4) For  2 ( ˆbL,a,  ˆaH,b), the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium is (aH, bL);
at the point  =  ˆaH,b, the equilibrium can be (aH, bL) or (aH, bH).
(5) For  2 ( ˆaH,b, 1), the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium is (aH, bH).
(6) Define the threshold  ˆ of skill investment without discrimination as  ˆyH
1 e  
   
EH =  ˆyL
1 e  
  EL; then  ˆbL,a <  ˆ <  ˆaH,b.
According to Proposition 4.4, we can determine the exact values of the queue
lengths in the expression. Firms’ profit will be piecewise monotone because although
 increases continuously, the skill composition hence the average productivity of
the market improves discretely with respect to this bargaining power. The fact
that  ˆbL,a <  ˆ <  ˆaH,b suggests that although firms can gather higher profits for
 <  ˆ, they encounter loss for     ˆ compared to the case without discrimination.
The reason is that strategic competition between the group a and group b deters
the discriminated group’s skill investment decision (in the sense that group b may
still choose to be low skilled when  is su ciently high), which pulls down the
market’s average productivity and makes firms’ expected profit dim.
17    12 is more empirically relevant when we talk about gender or racial discrimination. The
case   < 12 could be also analogously derived.
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It is interesting to notice that our simple result that discrimination is costly for
firms at high skilled sector (when wages are bargained) questions the plausibility
of key assumption of Merlino (2012) that “there is more discrimination in the
high technology sector”. Although Merlino (2012) mentioned bunches of empirical
evidence in support of this assumption18, our simple results suggest that firms are
simply better o↵ not discriminating when wages are principally bargained, since
the loss in profit from discriminating in the high skilled sector may surpass the gain
from discriminating in the low skilled sector. All in all, the key di↵erence between
wage posting and wage bargaining is that the ex post wage now exogenously pegs
on the productivity, and firms can no longer manipulate their market power by
translating their discriminatory preference into constantly lower wages.
4.4.2 Free entry
LMD (2005) have shown that their economy under discrimination with workers’
identical in productivity can be generalized to take into account firms’ free entry.
Specifically, we consider a stage where firms sink capital after observing workers’
skills. Each firm has di↵erent capital cost with C1 < C2 < ... < CM < yL.
Then firms which earn expected non-positive profits after the reduction of capital
cost would simply not enter into the market. In the paper, we observe that the
equilibrium is unique with respect to  , which has a one-one relationship with M
- the number of firms in the market, so that the results in the paper could carry
through with free entry. All firms in the market expect positive net profits. When
there are di↵erent skill groups, this result could also carry through, because the
equilibrium profit of firms is still an increasing function of  .
4.4.3 Heterogeneity in skill investment cost.
Some preliminary attempts from us suggest that our context could be generalized to
a situation where workers are heterogeneous in their skill investment cost (although
more complicated): let the low skill investment cost be zero (EL = 0) for all workers,
and the high skill investment cost be, for simplicity, of two values EH,1 < EH,2;
there are still two levels of productivity: yL and yH . Focus on the corresponding  ˆ
and define it as  ˆ = log yH yLEH,2 EL . If the contracts can be contingent on EH,1 and
EH,2, the submarkets for type EH,1 workers and type EH,2 workers are separated,
and all the results in the paper carry through for the workers of cost EH,2; as for the
18See Merlino (2012) page 4 for more relevant reference.
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workers of cost EH,1, their skill investment cost is lower, hence they have stronger
incentive to remain high skilled; then for values of   close to  ˆ = log yH yLEH,2 EL , some
equilibrium which exists in the EH,2 submarket may not exist in the EH,1 submarket.
If the contracts can not be contingent on EH,1 and EH,2, both type EH,1 and type
EH,2 are in the same market and will compete; as a result, there may exist a region
of   where both high skilled group a and group b, as well as both low skilled
group a and group b, exist at the same time. The extent of the skill investment
game is in turn larger, because, for example, a particular group “a, EH,1”’s skill
investment decision should be a best response of other groups: “a, EH,2”, “b, EH,1”,
and “b, EH,2”. If heterogeneity in skill investment cost is managed, it is possible to
extend the model to multiple skill levels. Shi (2006) shows that in such a model
with multiple skill levels free of discrimination, the result that firms always rank the
high skilled workers in priority to the workers with lower skills can be generalized.
The di culty under the context with discrimination, as just stated, is on the extent
of the game.
4.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study a holdup problem where firms can use discriminatory hiring
norms to extract higher than socially optimal profits. We find that when firms rank
workers according to both productivity-dependent and productivity-independent
characteristics, skill investment becomes strategic between the discriminated and
the favored group. In case where wages are posted, we suggest that depending on the
market tightness there may be equilibrium or multiple equilibria on skill investment;
in some equilibrium the discriminated group can obtain higher expected payo↵
compared to the case without discrimination19. We also consider fixed sharing
rule (bargained wage) and make a comparison. Similar equilibrium, where the
favored group underinvests while the discriminated group remains high skilled,
exists; however, the discriminated group are in general worse o↵ compared to the
case without discrimination in the sense that they may still choose to underinvest
when  is su ciently high. Firms’ profits are piecewise monotone because the skill
composition hence the average productivity of the market improves discretely with
respect to the bargaining power, and profit loss may be incurred with discrimination
within an intermediate range of bargaining power.
19Recall that without discrimination, it is socially optimal.
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Appendix 4.A Derivation of matching probabil-
ities.
We now derive a job seeker’s matching probability (employment probability) and
his expected payo↵.
Job seekers. Having observed all the wage w = {w1, w2, ..., wM} announced
by the firms, job seekers choose which firm (or wage) to visit (or to apply for).
Consider a particular job seeker i’s problem, where i 2 {1, 2, ..., N}. The chance
of his being employed depends on how many other applications arrive in the same
firm. This number (of the other job seekers who compete with him in the firm) is
a random variable which has a realization from the set {0, 1, ..., N   1} and has a
Binomial distribution.
Let k be the realized number of his competitors. If k = 0, which happens
with probability (1   ✓)N 1,20 then worker i can be chosen by the firm with
probability 1, because this job seeker is the only candidate. If k = 1, which
happens with probability (N   1) ✓1(1  ✓)(N 1) 1, then worker i can be employed
with probability 12 . Generally, if with k competitors, he can be employed with
probability 1k+1 C
k
N 1 ✓
k(1  ✓)N 1 k.
Hence, the employment probability for the workers is
Premp =
N 1X
k=0
1
k + 1
CkN 1✓
k(1  ✓)N 1 k.
Note that 1k+1 C
k
N 1 =
1
N C
k+1
N , we have Pr
emp = 1N
PN 1
k=0 C
k+1
N ✓
k(1   ✓)N 1 k
and
N✓ Premp =
N 1X
k=0
Ck+1N ✓
k+1(1  ✓)N 1 k
=  (1  ✓)N +
NX
k=0
CkN ✓
k(1  ✓)N k = 1  (1  ✓)N .
Thus, the employment probability is
Premp =
1  (1  ✓)N
N✓
21.
20Without introducing confusion, we omit the superscript of firm index j and the subscript of
worker’s type t.
21See also Melanie Cao & Shouyong Shi, 2000.
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Hence, when the firm only attracts one type of workers, the expected payo↵
of the job seeker with type-t is 1 (1 ✓t)
Nt
Nt✓t
wt, for t 2 {L,H} (where ✓t actually
depends upon w, as we have mentioned above). And when the firm attracts both
type of workers, the expected payo↵ of high-skilled workers is 1 (1 ✓H)
NH
NH✓H
wH ,
whereas the expected payo↵ of low-skilled workers is (1  ✓H)NH · 1 (1 ✓L)NLNL✓L wL.
Appendix 4.B Sketch of the proofs of the results
in LMD (2005)
Separating Equilibrium. First we see that it is impossible to have pooling
equilibrium when there are two groups of workers with identical skill level under
the context of strong discrimination.
First, notice that group a workers only apply for wages higher than Ua, i.e.,
qa > 0 only if w > Ua. Similarly, qb > 0 only if w > Ub. Due to the discrimination,
we have Ua > Ub since group a workers always have better chances during the
hiring process. Therefore, if a firm posting wage w that can attract both groups,
the wage must be strictly larger than Ua.
Now we consider the possibility of a pooling equilibrium. Suppose all firms aim
to attract both groups of workers, then firms maximize the expected profit with
the contraints that ensures the expected market income for both groups of workers.
That is, the equilibrium would be the solution of the following program (firms can
only pose one wage since there is only one skill level):
maxw (1  e qa) (y   w) + e qa (1  e qb) (y   w)
s.to 1 e
 qa
qa
w = Ua
e qa 1 e
 qb
qb
w = Ub
The objective function can be rewritten as
(1  e qa qb) (y   w) (4.30)
From the two contraints, we can verify that d(qa+qb)dw > 0 for any qa, qb > 0. Thus,
reducing w can increasing both terms in (4.30). That is, for a firm attracting both
groups, decreasing wage (up to as close to Ua as possible) will always yield higher
expected profit. Besides, it is obviously not an equilibrium that all firms uniformly
attract a single group whenever there are two groups. Thus, pooling equilibrium
does not exist.
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In addition, we have in such an equilibrium that w⇤b = U
⇤
a . First, note that the
discrimination does not a↵ect the prefered group. Thus, as in the nondiscriminatory
context, there is a lower limit of wages that group a will apply for, i.e. U⇤a (by
(4.2)). Besides, it can be shown that there also exists an upper limit of wages that
group b workers will apply for; we denote this threshold as wˆ. The intuition is:
group b can infer that the rise of wage increases the expected number of group a job
seekers, and thus leads to more between-group competition and lower employment
probability, which is not enough to be compensated by the increase of wages. Then,
we can consider firms choice in two intervals : (U⇤b , U
⇤
a ], where only group b applies,
and (U⇤a , wˆ), where both groups apply. We can see that firms’ profit is increasing
in w in the first case, and decreasing in w in the second case, with continuity at
w = U⇤a . Therefore, the optimal wage that firms set for group b is w
⇤
b = U
⇤
a .
Furthermore, note that the expected output in the case without discrimination is
(1 e  )y while that in the discriminatory case is  ⇤(1 e q⇤a)y+(1  ⇤)(1 e q⇤b )y,
with q⇤a =
  
 ⇤ and q
⇤
b =
(1  ) 
1  ⇤ , where  
⇤ is the fraction of the firms which attact
group a in the equilibrium. Cancelling out y, we can simply compare e   with
 ⇤e 
  
 ⇤ + (1    ⇤)e  (1  ) 1  ⇤ , which has the minimum value at  ⇤ =  . That is,
e     ⇤e     ⇤ + (1    ⇤)e  (1  ) 1  ⇤ , and therefore, the expected output in the case
without discrimination is larger compared to that in the discriminatory case .
Appendix 4.C Proofs of propositions
Proof of Proposition 4.1 (Return to skills). We prove only case 1 here,
while the proof of case 2 and 3 are highly similar. Note that
yH   yL
EH   EL   e
  () e  yH   EH   e  yL   EL. (4.31)
Now we prove that the optimal choice is ↵⇤ = 1 under condition (4.31).
We prove firstly that the deviation to low skills is not optimal. By this, we prove
that a proportion ✏ of workers’ deviating to the low-skilled type is suboptimal. And
it su ces to show that after deviation, the deviator can not get higher expected
payo↵. Before deviation, the expected payo↵ of workers is e q⇤HyH   EH , where
q⇤H =  . After deviation, the expected payo↵ becomes e
 qDH qDL yL   EL, where qDt
is the expected queue length of type-t workers after deviation, t 2 {L,H}; and
moreover, we have qDH + q
D
L =  . However, under the condition 4.31, the expected
payo↵ after deviation is weakly lower. Therefore, there is no deviation to low skills
and ↵⇤ = 1 is an equilibrium solution.
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Secondly, we show the uniqueness of the equilibrium. Now we show that for
the case of ↵ = 0 and ↵ 2 (0, 1), there will be profitable deviations.
When ↵ = 0, the expected payo↵ of workers is e  yL   EL. If there is a
fraction ✏ deviating to high skilled, then the expected income for the deviator
becomes e ✏  (yH   yL) + e  yL   EH . Then this expected payo↵ after deviation
is greater than the the expected payo↵ before deviation because. e ✏  (yH   yL) >
e   (yH   yL)   EH   EL. So the deviation is profitable for the deviators. As for
the rest of the population (1  ✏), their expected payo↵ is not a↵ected. Hence
deviating weakly increases the payo↵ of all the job seekers.
When ↵ 2 (0, 1), the expected income from search is e  yL   EL for the
low skilled, and e ↵ˆ  (yHyL) + e  yL   EH for the type H job seekers, where
↵ˆ should be pinned down by workers’ indi↵erence condition e ↵ˆ  (yH   yL) =
EH  EL. However, this condition is incompatible for all ↵ < 1 with our condition
e  yH  EH   e  yL EL. So that it is impossible that job seekers are indi↵erent
from being high or low skilled.
All in all, we have proved that when the configuration of parameters is such
that e  yH  EH > e  yL  EL, there exists a unique equilibrium in which all job
seekers choose to obtain high skill, i.e. ↵⇤ = 1. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 4.2 (Social Optimality). The social planner’s maxi-
mizes the aggregate output as follows.
max (1  e qPH ) e qPL + xP (1  e qPL ) yH + (1  e qPL ) e qPH + (1  xP )(1  e qPH ) yL
     ↵P EH + (1  ↵P ) EL . (4.7)
Note that the equilibrium implies qPH = ↵
P  and qPL = (1  ↵P ) , and program
(4.7) includes all the cases of di↵erent values of ↵P . That is, when ↵P = 1, noting
that qPL = 0, (4.7) becomes
max (1  e qPH )yH     EH . (4.32)
When ↵P = 0, noting that qPH = 0, (4.7) becomes
max (1  e qPL )yL     EL. (4.33)
We solve the optimal ranking rule by taking derivative with respect to xP in
(4.7) (note that xP is irrelevant in problem (4.32) and (4.33)), which yields
(1  e qPH )(1  e qPL ) (yH   yL),
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which is positive since yH > yL. Thus, xP⇤ = 1, and problem (4.7) reduces to
max (1  e qPH )yH + e qPH (1  e qPL )yL    
 
↵PEH + (1  ↵P )EL
 
. (4.34)
Substituing qPH = ↵
P  and qPL = (1   ↵P )  into (4.34) and we can solve for the
social optimal skill investment ↵P⇤. Note that qPH + q
P
L = 1, taking derivative with
respect to ↵P gives
 
⇣
e ↵
P   (yH   yL)  (EH   EL)
⌘
. (4.35)
Thus, we know when yH yLEH EL   e , (4.35)   0 for any ↵P 2 [0, 1], and the optimal
skill investment is ↵P⇤ = 1. When yH yLEH EL  1, (4.35)  0 for any ↵P 2 [0, 1], and
the optimal skill investment is ↵P⇤ = 0. When 1 < yH yLEH EL < e
 , there exists a
unique ↵P⇤ 2 (0, 1) such that (4.35) = 0, which maximizes the aggregate output.
That is, it is optimal for social planner to arrange some workers (of fraction ↵P⇤)
to have high-skill training while the other (of fraction 1  ↵P⇤) to obtain low-skill
training. This is consistent with the decentralized result. ⌅
Proof of Corollary 4.1 . According to Proposition 4.1, all the workers obtain
high skills under Assumption 4.1, it su ces to solve the following program:
maxwH ⇡H = (1  e qH ) (yH   wH)
s.to 1 e
 qH
qH
wH = UH
From the constraint, we know
wH =
qH UH
1  e qH . (4.36)
We substitute out wages wH from the objective function and maximize with respect
to expected number of applicants qH :
max
qH
 
1  e qH  yH   qHUH
Taking derivative with respect to qH gives U⇤H = e
 q⇤HyH . By equation (4.36),
we have
w⇤H =
q⇤H e
 q⇤H
1  e q⇤H yH .
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bH bL
(P1)
⇣
e qP1⇤aH yH   EH , (P2)
⇣
e   (yH   yL) + e  yL   EH ,
aH 1 e
 qP1⇤bH
qP1⇤bH
e qP1⇤aH yH   EH
⌘
e   yL   EL
⌘
(P3)
⇣
e   yL   EL, (P4)
⇣
e qP4⇤aL yL   EL,
aL e (1  ) (yH   yL) + e  yL   EH
⌘
1 e qP4⇤bL
qP4⇤bL
e qP4⇤aL yL   EL
⌘
Table 4.1: Payo↵s of the workers with di↵erent strategies.
Substituting w⇤H into the objective function, we have
⇡⇤H =
 
1  e q⇤H   q⇤He q⇤H
 
yH .
Note that in equilibrium all the workers choose to be high skilled, q⇤H =  . ⌅
Proof of Proposition 4.3 . We summarize in Table 4.1 the payo↵s of workers
with di↵erent skill choices, with taking into account the best response of firms in
the wage posting stage. Now, we can look into the best response of workers in the
very first stage.
Given group b choosing high skill, bH, group a’s best response depends on the
comparison of V P1aH ( ) = e
 qP1⇤aH yH   EH and V P3aL ( ) = e   yL   EL. Note that
qP1⇤aH is a function of  , which is determined by (4.18) in the wage posting subgame
as in LMD; and from (4.19), we know qP1⇤aH ( ) >   . Thus, we have
V P1aH ( ˆ) = e
 qP1⇤aH ( ˆ) yH   EH < e  ˆ yH   EH = e  ˆ yL   EL = V P3aL ( ˆ),
while when   = 0, we know, by Assumption (4.1),
V P1aH (0) = yH   EH > yL   EL = V P3aL (0).
Due to the continuity of the V P1aH and V
P3
aL , there exists a  ˆ1 2 (0,  ˆ) such
that V P1aH ( ˆ1) = V
P3
aL ( ˆ1). Moreover, according to Assumption 4.5,  ˆ1 is unique.
Then, we have V P1aH ( ) > V
P3
aL ( ) for any   2 (0,  ˆ1), and V P1aH ( ) < V P3aL ( ) for
any   2 ( ˆ1,  ˆ).
Given group b choosing low skill, bL, group a’s best response depends on the
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comparison of V P2aH ( ) = e
   (yH yL)+e  yL EH and V P4aL ( ) = e qP4⇤aL yL EL,
which is true for any   2 (0,  ˆ), implying that choosing H is a dominant strategy
for group a when group b chooses L. This is because we have, for any   2 (0,  ˆ),⇣
e   (yH   yL) + e  yL   EH
⌘
  (e  yH   EH) = (e      e  )(yH   yL) > 0.
Thus, for any   2 (0,  ˆ),
V P2aH ( ) > e
  yH   EH > e  yL   EL > e qP4⇤aL ( ) yL   EL = V P4aL ( ),
where the second inequality comes from Assumption 4.1, and the last inequality
comes from qP4⇤aL ( ) >  .
Similarly, given group a’s choice aH, we see that
V P1bH (0) = yH   EH > yL   EL = V P2bL (0)
and
V P1bH ( ˆ1) < V
P1
aH ( ˆ1) = V
P3
aL ( ˆ1) = V
P2
bL ( ˆ1)
where the inequality in the latter comes from the fact that with discrimination
the expected income of group a is larger than that of group b, i.e. U⇤a > U
⇤
b (in
(P1)). Therefore, there is a  ˆ2 2 (0,  ˆ1) such that V P1bH ( ˆ2) = V P2bL ( ˆ2). And by
Assumption 4.5,  ˆ2 is unique. That is, there is a threshold  ˆ2 2 (0,  ˆ1) such that
V P1bH ( ) > V
P2
bL ( ) for any   2 (0,  ˆ2), and V P1bH ( ) < V P2bL ( ) for any   2 ( ˆ2,  ˆ).
Also, given group a’s choice aL, choosing H is dominant for group a. Since for
any   2 (0,  ˆ),⇣
e (1  ) (yH yL)+e  yL EH
⌘
 (e  yH EH) = (e (1  )  e  )(yH yL) > 0.
Therefore, for any   2 (0,  ˆ),
V P3bH ( ) > e
  yH   EH > e  yL   EL > e qP4⇤aL ( ) yL   EL = V P4aL ( ) > V P4bL ( ),
where the last inequality comes from the fact that U⇤a > U
⇤
b in (P4).
To see the equilibrium, we first consider   2 (0,  ˆ2). Neither of the two group
choose to invest to high skill as best response, and both aH and bH are the best
response to each other - (aH, bH) is the unique equilibrium. When   2 ( ˆ2,  ˆ1),
group b’s best response to aH becomes bL - as   increases, group b benefits from
deviating to low skill, and aH is also the best response to bL. Therefore, (aH, bL)
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is an equilibrium, and it is also the only equilibrium. When   2 ( ˆ1,  ˆ), we can see
that both (aL, bH) and (aH, bL) form equilibria, and we have multiple equilibria
in this circumstance. ⌅
Proof of Corollary 4.2. (1) Note that firms’ profits in the nondiscriminatory case
is (1   e      e  ) yH , by Corollary 4.1. In (aH, bH) equilibrium, the result is
proved in LMD (2005). In (aH, bL) equilibrium, firms’ profits are
⇡P2⇤aH,bL = (1  e qP2⇤aH   qP2⇤aH e qP2⇤aH )yH +
⇣
(qP2⇤aH + 1)e
 qP2⇤aH   e  (  + 1)
⌘
yL.
This term is smaller than the profit without discrimination, because
⇡P2⇤aH,bL = (1  e qP2⇤aH   qP2⇤aH e qP2⇤aH )yH +
⇣
(qP2⇤aH + 1)e
 qP2⇤aH   e  (  + 1)
⌘
yL
< (1  e qP2⇤aH   qP2⇤aH e qP2⇤aH )yH +
⇣
(qP2⇤aH + 1)e
 qP2⇤aH   e  (  + 1)
⌘
yH
= (1  e     e   )yH ,
where the inequality uses the fact that (x+ 1) e x is a decreasing function and
qP2⇤aH <  . The proof for the case of (aL, bH) equilibrium can be analogously
reproduced.
(2) Without discrimination, by Corollary 4.1, workers’ expected income in
equilibrium is e  yH . For the case (aH, bH), it follows from LMD (2005). For the
case of (aH, bL). We have
V P2aH = e
   (yH   yL) + e  yL   EH > e  yH   EH
since we know e    > e  , and
V P2bL = e
  yL   EL < e  yH   EH ,
since     ˆ. The proof for the case of (aL, bH) equilibrium can be analogously
reproduced. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 4.4. The payo↵ matrix is as follows in Table 4.2.
Define  ˆaH,b by e    1 e
 (1  ) 
(1  )   yH   EH = e    1 e
 (1  ) 
(1  )   yL   EL.
Define  ˆaL,b by
1 e (1  ) 
(1  )   yH   EH = e    1 e
 (1  ) 
(1  )   yL   EL.
Define  ˆbH,a by
1 e   
    yH   EH = e (1  )  1 e
   
    yL   EL.
Define  ˆbL,a by
1 e   
    yH   EH = 1 e
   
    yL   EL.
When     12 , it can be verified that  ˆaL,b   ˆbH,a <  ˆbL,a <  ˆaH,b.
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bH bL⇣
1 e   
    yH   EH ,
⇣
1 e   
    yH   EH ,
aH e    1 e
 (1  ) 
(1  )   yH   EH
⌘
e    1 e
 (1  ) 
(1  )   yL   EL
⌘
⇣
e (1  )  1 e
   
    yL   EL,
⇣
1 e   
    yL   EL,
aL 1 e
 (1  ) 
(1  )   yH   EH
⌘
e    1 e
 (1  ) 
(1  )   yL   EL
⌘
Table 4.2: Workers’ Payo↵s in wage bargaining context.
(1) We first prove for values of  2
h
0,  ˆaL,b
⌘
, the unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium is (aL, bL): group a choose low skill, group b choose low skill. Holding
group b high skilled, group a choose to be low skilled, because  <  ˆaL,b <
 ˆbH,a. Holding group b low skilled, group a choose to be low skilled, because
 <  ˆaL,b <  ˆbL,a. Holding group a high skilled, group b choose to low skilled,
because  <  ˆaL,b <  ˆaH,b. Holding group a low skilled, group b choose to be low
skilled, because  <  ˆaL,b. At the point  =  ˆaL,b, the equilibrium can be (aL, bH)
or (aL, bL).
(2) We prove for values of  2
⇣
 ˆaL,b,  ˆbH,a
⌘
, the unique Nash pure strategy
equilibrium is (aL, bH). Holding group b high skilled, group a choose to be low
skilled, because  <  ˆbH,a. Holding group b low skilled, group a choose to be low
skilled, because  <  ˆbH,a <  ˆbL,a. Holding group a high skilled, group b choose
to low skilled, because  <  ˆbH,a <  ˆaH,b. Holding group a low skilled, group b
choose to be high skilled, because  >  ˆaL,b. At the point  =  ˆbH,a, the unique
equilibrium is (aL, bH).
(3) We prove for values of  2
⇣
 ˆbH,a,  ˆbL,a
⌘
, there is no pure strategy Nash
equilibrium is (aL, bH). Holding group b high skilled, group a choose to be high
skilled, because  >  ˆbH,a. Holding group b low skilled, group a choose to be low
skilled, because  <  ˆbL,a. Holding group a high skilled, group b choose to low
skilled, because  <  ˆbL,a <  ˆaH,b. Holding group a low skilled, group b choose to
be high skilled, because  >  ˆaL,b. At the point  =  ˆbL,a, the unique equilibrium
is (aH, bL).
(4) We prove for values of  2
⇣
 ˆbL,a,  ˆaH,b
⌘
, there is a unique pure strategy
Nash equilibrium (aH, bL). Holding group b high skilled, group a choose to be
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high skilled, because  >  ˆbH,a. Holding group b low skilled, group a choose to be
high skilled, because  >  ˆbL,a. Holding group a high skilled, group b choose to
low skilled, because  <  ˆaH,b. Holding group a low skilled, group b choose to be
high skilled, because  >  ˆaL,b. At the point  =  ˆaH,b, the equilibrium can be
(aH, bL) or (aH, bH).
(5) We prove for values of  2
⇣
 ˆaH,b, 1
⌘
, there is a unique pure strategy Nash
equilibrium (aH, bH). Holding group b high skilled, group a choose to be high
skilled. Holding group b low skilled, group a choose to be high skilled. Holding
group a high skilled, group b choose to high skilled, because  <  ˆaH,b. Holding
group a low skilled, group b choose to be high skilled, because  >  ˆaL,b.
(6) At last, notice that  ˆ = EH ELyH yL ⇥
⇣
1 e  
 
⌘ 1
,  ˆbL,a =
EH EL
yH yL ⇥
⇣
1 e   
  
⌘ 1
,
and  ˆaH,b =
EH EL
yH yL ⇥
⇣
e    1 e
 (1  ) 
(1  ) 
⌘ 1
. It is straightforward to verify that
 ˆbL,a <  ˆ <  ˆaH,b because
⇣
1 e   
  
⌘ 1
<
⇣
1 e  
 
⌘ 1
<
⇣
e    1 e
 (1  ) 
(1  ) 
⌘ 1
. ⌅
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Chapter 5
General Conclusion
This thesis studies the role of information imperfection both from a theoretical
perspective and a problem with asymmetric information in the credit market.
Besides, market imperfections such as discrimination in labor market are also
analyzed here.
First of all, we consider a decision problem with uncertainty in which the
decision maker can receive a signal which reveals some of the information about
the unknown true state. In such a context, decisions, after signals being observed,
are made according to the posterior distributions. The expectation conditional
on signals is likely to be crucial, and Ganuza and Penalva’s precision criteria
seem attractive. For this reason, the connections between precision criterion
and traditional criteria are examined. Chapter 2 focuses on the supermodular
precision criterion, which is defined on the conditional expectations by the dispersive
order. By looking into the intrinsic property of the dispersive order, we show that
Blackwell’s informativeness criterion does not necessarily imply or be implied by
the dispersion of conditional expectations in general discrete cases, while in the
monotone decision problems the relationship between dispersion of conditional
expectations and some informativeness criterion, which is defined similar as accuracy
criterion, could be built up under some conditions. This could provide theoretical
basis for applying the dispersive orders directly to decision analysis. Actually, this
is just a preliminary study in this topic, and more informativeness and dispersion
criteria are under investigation.
In Chapter 3, we consider a signaling problem in a competitive credit market
with asymmetric information and focuses on the role of dissipative signals. Bor-
rowers can choose to reveal information on the quality of their projects; signaling
is costly, and borne by the borrowers. The existence of equilibrium depends on the
interest rate - when the interest rate is very low, the exists only an opaque equilib-
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rium in which all borrowers choose not to reveal information and are financed, and
when the interest rate it high enough, there only exists a transparent equilibrium
in which only borrowers who reveal information can be funded; in addition, in the
intermediate level, there can be multiple equilibria. Therefore, when the interest
rate is moderate, it is possible to experience a jump from an opaque equilibrium
to a transparent one, where a decrease of interest rate is in line with a decrease of
credit supply, which provides us a possible way of understanding the credit crunch.
Moreover, the extension of the model into a dynamic OLG context provides us a
macroeconomic viewpoint of the instability of credit market: the market is likely
to converge to either an opaque or a transparent equilibrium, and for some con-
figurations of parameters there exist permanent oscillations between two di↵erent
regimes.
Finally, we study a holdup problem where firms can use discriminatory hiring
norms to extract higher than socially optimal profits. We find that when firms rank
workers according to both productivity-dependent and productivity-independent
characteristics, skill investment becomes strategic between the discriminated and
the favored group. In case where wages are posted, we suggest that depending
on the market tightness there may be equilibrium or multiple equilibria on skill
investment; in some equilibrium the discriminated group can obtain higher expected
payo↵ compared to the case without discrimination. We also consider fixed sharing
rule (bargained wage) and make a comparison. Similar equilibrium, where the
favored group underinvests while the discriminated group remains high skilled,
exists; however, the discriminated group are in general worse o↵ compared to the
case without discrimination in the sense that they may still choose to underinvest
when  is su ciently high. Firms’ profits are piecewise monotone because the skill
composition hence the average productivity of the market improves discretely with
respect to the bargaining power, and profit loss may be incurred with discrimination
within an intermediate range of bargaining power.
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Re´sume´ (Summary in French)
Une chose qui est omnipre´sent dans l’e´conomie est l’imperfection de l’information,
par laquelle nous nous re´fe´rons a` une situation dans laquelle les di↵e´rentes parties
d’une transaction ont des informations di↵e´rentes. Un exemple courant qui se
passe dans le marche´ du travail. Les travailleurs ont une connaissance meilleure
sur leurs compe´tences, leur assiduite´ et la productivite´, tandis que les employeurs
peuvent di cilement connaˆıtre la ve´ritable qualite´ des travailleurs potentiels, meˆme
si ils sont en mesure d’obtenir des informations sur les candidats tels que le
niveau d’e´ducation. Ces imperfections sont e´galement partage´es sur le marche´
des capitaux: les relations entre les banques et les emprunteurs agissent comme
une relation de travail entre les employeurs et les travailleurs. Les emprunteurs
sont ge´ne´ralement plus familiers avec leurs projets et posse`dent des informations
plus pre´cises sur la qualite´ de leurs projets, alors que les preˆteurs comme les
banques ont un acce`s limite´ a` ces informations et ont des di culte´s a` savoir s’il
est probable pour les emprunteurs d’eˆtre insolvable. D’autres exemples sont le
commerce des marchandises entre un vendeur et un acheteur, la signature d’un
contrat d’assurance entre un assureur et son client, et ainsi de suite.
L’impact de l’information peut de´pendre de la structure du marche´ et dans
quelle mesure les participants au marche´ peuvent acce´der a` l’information. Les
proble`mes cause´s par les imperfections de l’information peuvent eˆtre atte´nue´s
quand il y a des signaux qui peuvent re´ve´ler l’information cache´e, au moins dans
une certaine mesure. Par exemple, les employeurs demandent des certificats ou
des tests de conception et d’entretiens pour de´duire les ve´ritables productivite´s des
travailleurs candidats; les banques proce`dent a` des analyses d’investissement ou
demandent des garanties ou autres exigences des emprunteurs. Les signaux, ou
l’information provenant des signaux, jouent un roˆle important dans le processus de
113
RE´SUME´
prise de de´cision.
Cette the`se se concentre sur le roˆle de l’information et se compose de trois
chapitres autonomes. Chacun peut eˆtre lu inde´pendamment des autres. Il com-
mence a` partir d’un point de vue the´orique en examinant les crite`res d’information,
puis conside`re deux proble`mes concernant le marche´ du cre´dit et de marche´ du
travail, respectivement.
L’information imparfaite et crite`res d’information
Dans un proble`me de de´cision avec l’asyme´trie d’information, il est possible
et commun pour la partie des informations inconve´nient de recueillir des informa-
tions avant que la de´cision soit prise. Nous pourrions dire que l’information est
signale´e peu importe si ce recueil d’information est actif ou passif. Les de´cideurs
observent des signaux et actualisent leur croyances et les convictions mises a` jour
- les croyances poste´rieures - sont mises a` profit pour prendre leurs de´cisions.
Pourtant, les informations contenues dans les signaux ne sont pas toujours vrai
et pre´cises, car les signaux et les caracte´ristiques inconnues ne sont ge´ne´ralement
pas parfaitement corre´le´s. Il est naturel de penser que les signaux plus fiables
avec des informations plus pre´cises pourraient contribuer a` une performance plus
e cace. Pour formuler cette e´valuation des signaux, un syste`me d’information
ou une structure d’information est ainsi utilise´ pour de´crire la relation entre les
signaux et les e´tats sous-jacents, di↵e´rents crite`res d’information sont propose´es
sur la base du syste`me d’information. En vertu de cela, nous sommes autorise´s a`
examiner de quelle fac¸on collecter des informations moins bruyants et sont donc
plus fiable.
Un crite`re classique a e´te´ de´veloppe´ par Blackwell (1951, 1953), qui fait suite
a` l’intuition qu’un syste`me d’information moins informatif peut eˆtre reproduit a`
partir d’un autre plus informatif en ajoutant des erreurs ale´atoirede transmission.
Une grande litte´rature suit le crite`re de caracte`re informatif de Blackwell, d’autres
crite`res ont e´galement e´te´ introduits (voir Lehmann (1988), Kim (1995), Persico
(2000), Jewitt (2007), et Quah et Strulovici (2009)). D’autre part, il existe des
crite`res d’information qui sont de´finis sur des moyennes conditionnelles relatives a`
la re´alisation des signaux. Vu que ces de´cisions sont prises apre`s observation des
signaux et sont e↵ectue´s selon les distributions a posteriori, l’espe´rance condition-
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nelle sur les re´alisations de signal semble eˆtre cruciale. Un signal plus informatif est
cense´ avoir un impact plus grand sur les signaux poste´rieures, et donc les attentes
conditionnelles devraient eˆtre plus disperse´e (voir Ganuza et Penalva (2010)). Ce
genre de crite`res est tre`s intuitif et donc d’inte´reˆt pour nous. La question qui se
pose est celle de savoir quel type de crite`res d’information pourrait eˆtre adopte´ dans
un proble`me de prise de de´cision avec asyme´trie d’information. Par conse´quent, la
relation entre les crite`res d’information classiques et la dispersion des espe´rances
conditionnelles est examine´es dans le premier chapitre, qui fournit e´galement une
base the´orique sur la fac¸on de formaliser la re´ve´lation de l’information.
Dans le chapitre 2, intitule´ l’Informativite´ et la dispersion des distributions
poste´rieures, je passe en revue certains crite`res de l’information et preˆtes une
attention particulie`re sur les crite`res de pre´cision qui sont de´finis sur les espe´rances
conditionnelles par Ganuza et Penalva (2010). Plus pre´cise´ment, l’e´tude vise
a` trouver des liens entre le crite`re de pre´cision super-modulaire et le crite`re
de Blackwell. Le re´sultat montre que le crite`re de Blackwell ne signifie pas
ne´cessairement ou peut eˆtre de´duit de la dispersion des espe´rances conditionnelles
dans des cas distincts en ge´ne´ral, bien que le caracte`re de Blackwell peut impliquer
la dispersion des espe´rances conditionnelles lorsque le signal est binaire. En outre,
le crite`re de Persico est aussi analyse´. Sur la base du crite`re de Persico, un
crite`re similaire est construit, ce qui peut impliquer la dispersion des espe´rances
conditionnelles sous certaines conditions.
Informations imperfection sur le marche´ du cre´dit et la crise
du cre´dit
Dans le marche´ du cre´dit, il a compris depuis longtemps que l’asyme´trie
d’information joue un roˆle central dans la de´termination des e´quilibres de marche´
(depuis Stiglitz et Weiss (1981)). Une grande litte´rature a e´tudie´ l’influence
significative de l’asyme´trie de l’information sur le marche´ du cre´dit, en montrant
comment les strate´gies et les interactions des preˆteurs et des emprunteurs sont
de´termine´es dans les circonstances de l’information asyme´trique. Le manque
d’information sur les caracte´ristiques pertinentes des emprunteurs de preˆteurs peut
entraˆıner dans le re´sultat de sous-investissement. Le cre´dit est dit eˆtre rationne´ dans
ce sens. Toutefois, la possibilite´ pour le revers de la me´daille de cette histoire est
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aussi largement e´tudie´e: le niveau d’investissement peut se re´ve´ler au-dela` du niveau
social e cace (voir De Meza et Webb (1987) et Alberto et Filippo (2013)). Avec
l’asyme´trie d’information, les preˆteurs ont des di culte´s a` savoir s’il est probable
pour les emprunteurs insolvables, ce qui conduit a` des ale´as moraux et de se´lection
adverse des proble`mes dans le marche´ financier. Par conse´quent, les interme´diaires
financiers comme les banques peuvent choisir soit le de´pistage ou de surveillance,
ou les deux technologies pour atte´nuer ces proble`mes. Nous poursuivons notre
e´tude le long de leurs lignes, mais proce´dons a` partir d’une perspective di↵e´rente:
dans quelle mesure la re´ve´lation de l’information sur la qualite´ des projets impacte
le montant finance´ des projets, et donc, du type d’e´quilibre?
En faisant re´fe´rence a la crise financie`re que nous avons connue, en particulier
la crise du cre´dit en 2007-2008, nous avons vu qu’il a e´te´ principalement cause´
par l’investissement et les activite´s relatives aux valeurs mobilie`res opaques tels
que les titres adosse´s a` des hypothe`ques (MBS), Credit Default Swaps (CDS). Les
ve´hicules financiers qui sont structure´s de fac¸on complique´e ont e´te´ en plein essor.
Des cre´dits ont e´te´ propose´s meˆme si les investisseurs n’avaient pas su samment
d’information sur ces projets. Cependant, comme l’e´clatement de la crise, les
normes de preˆt et de cre´dit serre´es sont the´saurise´es. Un resserrement du cre´dit a
e´te´ re´pandu dans le marche´ financier et ce dernier a conduit a` des contractions
de l’e´conomie re´elle (voir Brunnermeier (2009), Acharya et Skeie (2011) et ainsi
de suite). Par conse´quent, nous conside´rons un mode`le dans un marche´ du cre´dit
concurrentiel ou` les emprunteurs ont la possibilite´ de re´ve´ler des informations (en
payant un couˆt) ou le maintien opaque (sans frais), discuter de l’opacite´ du marche´
dans l’e´quilibre, et tenter d’expliquer le resserrement du cre´dit et l’instabilite´ du
marche´ financier.
Chapitre 3, un travail conjoint avec Professeur Bertrand Wigniolle, est intitule´
Re´ve´lation endoge`ne de l’information dans un marche´ du cre´dit concurrentiel et
resserrement du cre´dit. Nous conside´rons une relation preˆteur-emprunteur ou`
les emprunteurs ont une meilleure information sur leurs propres projets que les
preˆteurs et peuvent choisir de divulguer ou non ces informations. La signalisation
est couˆteuse et est supporte´ par les emprunteurs. La de´cision de la re´ve´lation
d’informations est endoge`ne, et est donc l’opacite´ du marche´. Nous caracte´risons
l’e´quilibre par rapport au taux d’inte´reˆt sans risque et nous montrons que l’existence
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et les caracte´ristiques de l’e´quilibre de´pendent du niveau du taux d’inte´reˆt sans
risque: il existe seulement un e´quilibre opaque, dans lequel tous les emprunteurs
ne re´ve`lent pas l’information et sont finance´s, lorsque le taux d’inte´reˆt est faible; il
existe seulement l’e´quilibre transparente, dans laquelle seuls les emprunteurs qui
posse`dent de bons projets re´ve`lent des informations et sont finance´s, lorsque le
taux d’inte´reˆt est assez e´leve´; et il y a des e´quilibres multiples ou` les deux e´quilibres
opaques et transparentes peuvent eˆtre possible que lorsque le taux d’inte´reˆt est
dans une gamme interme´diaire. L’existence de plusieurs e´quilibres admet une
certaine possibilite´ de sauter d’un e´quilibre transparent a` un e´quilibre opaque. Cela
fournit un moyen possible d’expliquer le phe´nome`ne de resserrement du cre´dit,
nous avons observe´ dans la crise financie`re, ou` une diminution des taux d’inte´reˆt
et une re´duction de l’o↵re de cre´dit se sont de´roule´s au a la meˆme pe´riode.
En outre, nous e´tendons le mode`le a` un contexte OLG et examinons la conver-
gence de l’e´quilibre de long terme. Selon des parame`tres di↵e´rents, le marche´ est
susceptible de faire converger soit a` un opaque ou un e´tat stationnaire transparent,
et plus inte´ressant, pour certaines configurations de parame`tres il n’y a pas de
convergence dans le long terme; nous pouvons avoir des oscillations permanentes
entre e´quilibres opaques et transparentes. Tant le statique et les cadres dynamiques
fournir des explications possibles de l’instabilite´ du marche´ du cre´dit et indiquent
une voie possible d’expliquer la crise du cre´dit pendant la crise financie`re.
Imperfections du marche´ du travail et la discrimination
Le marche´ du travail est un autre exemple ou` l’information imparfaite pre´vaut.
L’asyme´trie de l’information a↵ecte de la de´cision d’embauche, ainsi que celle des
travailleurs sur leur attitudes et investissement acade´mique. Un exemple bien
connu est la discrimination statistique. Lang et Manove (2011) montrent que,
dans l’asyme´trie d’information, les Noirs sur-investissent sur des caracte´ristiques
observables (par exemple l’e´ducation) pour surmonter l’inconve´nient de la recherche
d’emploi que les employeurs trouvent qu’il est plus di cile d’e´valuer les Noirs
par rapport au blanc. Les travaux empiriques avec des faits similaires peuvent
e´galement eˆtre vu dans Rivkin (1995), et Cameron et Heckman (2001).
Pourtant, Lang et Manove (2011) gardent le silence sur la friction du marche´
du travail capture´e par le taux d’emploi, qui devient une autre mesure centrale de
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la discrimination dans la litte´rature de nos jours. Le but du quatrie`me chapitre
est donc de proposer une the´orie traitable base´e sur une branche relativement
nouvelle du mode`le de recherche pour expliquer pourquoi le groupe fait preuve
de discrimination, par rapport au groupe privile´gie´, peut investir davantage dans
les compe´tences lorsque la discrimination est potentiellement pre´sent dans le
marche´. Di↵e´rent du mode`le de recherche ale´atoire, Moen (1997) ainsi que Shimer
(1996) sugge`rent que si les entreprises individuelles sont en mesure de poster des
salaires afin de maximiser le be´ne´fice attendu, alors l’allocation sociale optimale
des re´sultats en matie`re de ressources. La di↵e´rence essentielle entre ce contexte
et recherche ale´atoire avec la ne´gociation est de savoir si les informations sur les
salaires sont disponible pour les travailleurs. Si oui, alors la strate´gie de recherche
des travailleurs de´pend de ces salaires, ou leur recherche est dirige´e par les salaires.
En outre, les travailleurs prennent en compte le compromis entre les salaires et
la probabilite´ d’adaptation induite de manie`re optimale afin de maximiser leur
utilite´ attendue de la recherche; les entreprises perc¸oivent cette relation qui est
induite par leur salaire poste´, sujet auquel le profit est maximise´. L’externalite´ de
la recherche peut eˆtre internalise´e et l’e cacite´ peut re´sulter.
Chapitre 4, un travail conjoint avec Sheng Bi, est intitule´ Hold-up et la dis-
crimination a` l’embauche avec la friction de la recherche d’emploi.Dans le chapitre
4 nous e´tudions comment la discrimination a` l’embauche peut influence´e sur
la de´cision d’investissement des compe´tences des travailleurs dans le mode`le de
recherche dirige´e. Nous voyons qu’un proble`me de hold-up sur l’investissement
de compe´tences des travailleurs se pose lorsque les employeurs peuvent adopter
des normes d’embauche discriminatoires pour re´aliser un profit plus e´leve´ que
celui socialement optimal. Lorsque la priorite´ d’embauche est de´termine´e a` la fois
par (niveau de compe´tence) de la productivite´ de´pendante et les caracte´ristiques
-inde´pendante (discrimination), la de´cision d’investissement des compe´tences de-
vient strate´gique entre le groupe discrimine´ et favorise´. Dans les marche´s de
friction avec salaire poste´, l’investissement de compe´tences en e´quilibre de´pend de
la tension du marche´. Le groupe discrimine´ a tendance a` sous-investir dans les
compe´tences lorsque le marche´ se resserre par rapport a` celui privile´gie´, meˆme s’il
existe aussi un e´quilibre ou` les groupes privile´gie´s sous-investissent tandis que celui
discrimine´e ne le fait pas. D’ailleurs, nous discutons plus loin sur le proble`me dans
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le cadre des ne´gociations salariales (re`gle de partage fixe). Avec le salaire ne´gocie´,
l’e´quilibre similaire existe et les entreprises encourent des couˆts pour une gamme
interme´diaire du pouvoir de ne´gociation quand elles sont discriminatoires.
Chapitre 2: Informativite´ et la dispersion des dis-
tributions poste´rieures
L’incertitude existe presque partout dans l’e´conomie, tels que le prix futur d’un
stock, le rendement incertain d’un projet sur le marche´ financier, ou la compe´tence
non-observable d’un travailleur sur le marche´ du travail. La reconnaissance de
l’information imparfaite a eu une influence profonde et a fourni une me´thode
remarquable pour expliquer les phe´nome`nes e´conomiques et sociaux. Bien que
les agents ne peuvent pas eˆtre suˆr de l’e´tat vrai, ils peuvent, dans la plupart des
cas, surmonter l’incertitude par l’obtention d’informations pertinentes qui sont
ve´hicule´e dans certains signaux, qui peuvent eˆtre de´rive´e de l’enqueˆte personnelle,
sugge´re´ par un expert, achete´ de certains institutions, ou meˆme vole´s. Leur de´cision
sera alors base´e sur la connaissance re´vise´ de l’e´tat vrai, c’est-a`-dire la croyance
poste´rieure de l’e´tat.
Mais comment peuvent les signaux distinctifs influencer le processus de de´cision?
Comment pourrions-nous juger la qualite´ de l’information? Pour formuler le
caracte`re informatif, le concept de syste`me d’information ou de la structure de
l’information, qui capture la distribution conjointe des signaux et des e´tats sous-
jacents, est introduit, et divers crite`res sont de´finis sur ceci.
Dans une autre perspective, si nous conside´rons un cas extreˆme ou` les sig-
naux peuvent re´ve´ler exactement l’e´tat futur, alors la croyance re´vise´e de´pendra
entie`rement de la valeur re´alise´e du signal plutoˆt que la croyance ante´rieure; si le
contenu informationnel du signal est relativement faible, la croyance poste´rieure
sera similaire a` la croyance ante´rieure et di↵e´rentes re´alisations de signaux ne feront
pas beaucoup di↵e´rences dans les croyances poste´rieures. Cela implique que la
distribution a posteriori se disperse dans une moindre mesure sous signaux moins
informatifs. Cela pourrait e´galement eˆtre e´tendue a` l’utilite´ espe´re´e de l’agent con-
ditionnelle a` des re´alisations de signal. Donc plus d’informations devrait conduire
a` plus de dispersion dans les espe´rances conditionnelles. En e↵et, suite a` cette
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intuition, Ganuza et Penalva (2010) proposent un nouveau type de crite`res pour
e´valuer le caracte`re informatif, qu’ils de´signent comme des crite`res de pre´cision.
Ce type de crite`res de pre´cision sont pratique car les de´cisions sont souvent
prises sur la base des espe´rances conditionnelles, et ils sont donc utiles pour un
large e´ventail de proble`mes dans les de´cisions e´conomiques, telles que les enche`res,
les investissements en matie`re d’e´ducation, etc., et la formalisation des crite`res
de pre´cision fournit un moyen plus facile a` interpre´ter le caracte`re informatif de
signaux. Ne´anmoins, il est peu conventionnel d’e´valuer le caracte`re informatif
fonde´ sur les espe´rances conditionnelles plutoˆt que directement sur les syste`mes
d’information sous-jacents. Par conse´quent, je tente de combler le fosse´ entre les
crite`res de pre´cision et les crite`res de informativite´ traditionnels, tels que le crite`re
de Blackwell (1951 et 1953) et le crite`re de Persico (2000), qui sont conside´re´s dans
le document pre´sent. Quant aux crite`res de pre´cision, je ne me concentre ici que
sur le crite`re de pre´cision supermodulaire Ganuza et de Penalva, qui est de´fini a`
l’ordre de dispersion.
En outre, il est naturel de supposer qu’un de´cideur peut de´duire un e´tat attendu
plus e´leve´ ou un utilite´ espe´re´e plus e´leve´ de l’observation d’un signal avec une valeur
plus e´leve´e, et donc pre´fe´rer un signal plus e´leve´. En fait, cette hypothe`se intuitive
peut eˆtre assure´e par l’e´tablissement du rapport de vraisemblance monotone
(Monotone likelihood ratio property, ou MLRP, en Anglais), qui est applicable a`
tous les syste`mes d’information que nous conside´rons dans le pre´sent document.
En examinant les proprie´te´s de l’ordre de dispersion, nous voyons qu’en ge´ne´ral
le crite`res de Blackwell n’implique pas ou n’est pas implique´e par la dispersion
supermodulaire, bien qu’il puisse y avoir un lien entre les deux crite`res dans
un cas binaire dans le sens ou` il n’y a que des re´alisations de signaux binaires.
En outre, nous fournissons une condition ne´cessaire de l’ordre de dispersion des
variables ale´atoires discre`tes ainsi qu’une caracte´risation pour le cas des variables
ale´atoires binaires. De plus, nous conside´rons le crite`re de Persico, avec lequel
nous construisons un crite`re similaire. Et le re´sultat montre que le genre de
crite`res de pre´cision est possible d’eˆtre connecte´ avec la dispersion des espe´rances
conditionnelles (en terme de crite`re supermodulaire de Ganuza et Penalva).
D’abord, ce article examine le lien entre le crite`re de pre´cision supermodulaire
( sm) de Ganuza et Penalva et le crite`re de linformativite´ de Blackwell ( i). Le
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crite`re de linformativite´ de Blackwell suit l’intuition qu’un syste`me plus informatif
doit avoir une valeur supe´rieure quelque soit les proble`mes de de´cision en question
ou croyances ante´rieures que les de´cideurs partagent. D’autre part, un syste`me
plus informatif doit eˆtre statistiquement su sant pour pour un syste`me moins
informatif, dans le sens que un syste`me moins informatif peut eˆtre reproduit
a` partir d’un syste`me plus informatif en ajoutant une erreur de transmission
ale´atoire. Cependant, le crite`re de Ganuza et Penalva, qui est base´ sur l’ordre
de dispersion, de´crit la proprie´te´ de dispersion des espe´rances conditionnelles.
L’intuition est qu’un signal plus informatif devrait fournir des re´visions plus
e caces pour mettre a` jour la croyance. Lorsque les signaux peuvent e↵ectivement
re´viser la croyance poste´rieure, l’espe´rance conditionnelle varie beaucoup avec les
re´alisations di↵e´rentes des signaux. Par conse´quent, il est naturel de relier la
pre´cision des signaux avec la dispersion de l’espe´rance conditionnelle de signaux.
Ici, je conside`re la relation entre les deux crite`res dans un contexte discret.
Avant d’entrer dans l’examen de la relation, je fournis d’abord une condition
ne´cessaire de l’ordre de dispersion, ce qui est base´ sur la pre´cision supermodulaire.
Notons  disp que l’ordre de dispersion, on a
Soit x˜ et z˜ deux variables ale´atoires discre`tes avec les supports {x1, ..., xn} et
{z1, ..., zn}, respectivement, ou` x1 < ... < xn et z1 < ... < zn. Ensuite, x˜  disp z˜
implique que Pr(x˜ = xi) = Pr(z˜ = zi) pour tout i 2 {1, ..., n}.
Je peux vous re´fe´rer a` cette condition ne´cessaire de l’ordre de dispersion comme
la condition de probabilite´ e´gale. Et a` partir d’un cas binaire, je fournis une
caracte´risation de l’ordre de dispersion,
Soit x˜ et z˜ deux variables ale´atoires discre`tes, avec les supports supp(X) =
{lx, hx} et supp(Z) = {lz, hz}, respectivement. Ensuite, x˜  disp z˜ si, et seulement
si, (1) hx   lx   hz   lz; et (2) Pr(x˜ = lx) = Pr(z˜ = lz).
Cette caracte´risation comprend la condition de probabilite´ e´gale et que la
di↵e´rence entre les deux re´alisations possibles est plus grande si la variable ale´atoire
est plus disperse´e. Base´ sur la caracte´risation ci-dessus je soutiens que le crite`re
de Blackwell peut impliquer le crite`re de Ganuza et Penalva dans un cas binaire
sous la condition de probabilite´ e´gale. Plus pre´cisement, conside´rons syste`mes
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d’information binaires ({qL, qH}, {yL, yH}, F ) et ({qL, qH}, {yL, yH}, G) avec la
distribution a priori (⇡, 1  ⇡), ou`
F =
 
1  p1 p1
p2 1  p2
!
et G =
 
1  q1 q1
q2 1  q2
!
avec p1, p2, q1, q2 2 (0, 1), p1 + p2 < 1 et q1 + q2 < 1. Nous avons
F  i G implique F  sm G pour les priors 0 < ⇡ < 1 tel que PrF (y˜ = yL) =
PrG(y˜ = yL).
Ce re´sultat peut eˆtre e´tendu au cas avec plusieurs e´tats aussi longtemps que le
signal est binaire. En outre, tous les re´sultats peuvent eˆtre reproduits a` l’utilite´
espe´re´e des gains, tant que la fonction d’utilite´ est strictement croissante.
En outre, d’autres crite`res pour la comparaison les deux di↵e´rents syste`mes
d’information ont e´galement e´te´ introduites dans la litte´rature. Par exemple,
Lehmann (1988) conside`re les syste`mes d’information avec MLRP, qui est e´galement
connu comme la proprie´te´ d’a liation. Pour cette certaine classe de proble`mes
de de´cision, Lehmann a propose´ ce que l’on appelle le crite`re de l’e cacite´ de
l’intuition qu’une meilleure information devrait eˆtre plus corre´le´e a` l’e´tat vrai.
Persico (2000) formalise le crite`re de Lehmann, ou` le caracte`re informatif d’un
syste`me d’information est de´fini de la manie`re suivante. Inspire´ par le crite`re de
Persico, nous conside´rons maintenant deux syste`mes d’information avec des signaux
x˜⌘ et x˜✓, respectivement, ce qui satisfait la proprie´te´: f ✓(Tv(x)|v˜  v) = f ⌘(x|v˜ 
v), 8v 2 V, ou` T 0v(x) < 1 8x 2 (0, 1). Je montre que les syste`mes d’information avec
la proprie´te´ ci-dessus peuvent impliquent la dispersion de l’espe´rance conditionnelle,
bien que les restrictions soient dures et di ciles a` interpre´ter.
Pour re´sumer, avec la recherche dans la proprie´te´ intrinse`que de l’ordre de
dispersion, cet article met l’accent sur le crite`re de pre´cision supermodulaire, qui
est de´fini sur la dispersion de l’espe´rance conditionnelle sur les re´alisations de signal.
Je tente de relier ce crite`re de pre´cision pour l’autre crite`re d’information. Bien
que le crite`re de pre´cision soit intuitivement attirant, nous ne pouvons pas voir
les liens bien au-dela` du cas binaire; tandis que dans les proble`mes de de´cision
monotone la rapport entre la dispersion de l’espe´rance conditionnelle et un crite`re,
qui est de´fini semblable a` le crite`re de pre´cision de Perciso, peut eˆtre construit sous
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certaines conditions.
Chapitre 3: Re´ve´lation endoge`ne de l’information
dans un marche´ du cre´dit concurrentiel et resser-
rement du cre´dit
Nous avons traverse´ la grande instabilite´ financie`re pendant la crise financie`re
mondiale de 2007-2008, dont la cause a e´te´ principalement attribue´e a` des titres
adosse´s a` des cre´ances hypothe`ques (Mortgage-backed securities en anglais). Les
fondements pose´s dans la pe´riode pre´-crise sont l’environnement de taux d’inte´reˆt
faible et une de´gradation des normes de cre´dit. Des ve´hicules d’investissement
structure´s e´taient en plein essor et l’e´tendue de la titrisation a amene´ a` une opacite´
excessive dans le marche´ financier. Pourtant, comme l’e´clatement de la crise, le
capital des institutions financie`res s’est e´rode´ et, dans le meˆme temps, les normes
de preˆt se sont resserre´es. Meˆme en injectant de la liquidite´ venant des banques
centrales, les banques ont commence´ a` the´sauriser des fonds et sont devenues
re´ticentes a` preˆter, meˆme entre elles. Les e´carts des taux interbancaires en Europe
sont monte´s en fle`che atteignant un pic d’environ 200 points en Septembre 2008,
tandis qu’aux e´tats-Unis, ces e´carts peuvent monter jusqu’a` 500 points de base,
si on se re´fe`re au niveau d’environ 10 points de base avant la crise (Heider et al.,
2009). Un resserrement du cre´dit a e´te´ e´tendu par les agents e´conomiques, et ce
resserrement a conduit a` des contractions de l’e´conomie re´elle - les prix des actifs
ont chute´, le choˆmage a augmente´, et la croissance des productions s’est embourbe´e
(voir Brunnermeier (2009), Acharya et Skeie (2011) et ainsi de suite).
L’asyme´trie d’information entre les emprunteurs et les preˆteurs pourrait eˆtre une
des raisons pour expliquer le preˆt inapproprie´. Ayant l’avantage de l’information, les
emprunteurs peuvent recourir a` un moyen couˆteux pour re´ve´ler leurs informations
afin d’augmenter les chances d’eˆtre finance´s. Avec cette hypothe`se cle´ de divulgation
couˆteuse d’information, nous sommes en mesure de repre´senter l’existence de
di↵e´rents e´quilibres, et meˆme l’existence d’e´quilibres multiples. En outre, a` partir
du mode`le nous sommes en mesure d’observer que les emprunteurs non qualifie´s
peuvent aussi eˆtre finance´s s’ils restent opaques et lorsque le marche´ du cre´dit est
relativement souple. Ainsi, l’asyme´trie d’information et la re´ve´lation couˆteuse des
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informations pourraient eˆtre un moyen possible d’expliquer la crise du cre´dit que
nous avons connue et la volatilite´ du marche´ du cre´dit.
Dans cet article, nous conside´rons un proble`me de signalisation sur le marche´ du
cre´dit concurrentiel. Dans notre mode`le, les emprunteurs, qui cherchent des fonds
pour financer leurs projets, ont des informations prive´es concernant le retour sur
leurs propres projets, et ils l’option entre divulguer leur information monnayant un
couˆt ou rester opaque. Les banques, qui collectent des de´poˆts et servent en tant que
preˆteurs, facturent des taux d’inte´reˆt en fonction du type des emprunteurs (opaque
ou transparent). En endoge´ne´isant le taux d’inte´reˆt et en tenant compte de l’o↵re de
cre´dit imparfaitement e´lastique, nous montrons que, selon les di↵e´rentes valeurs du
taux d’inte´reˆt se´curitaire, il peut exister trois types d’e´quilibre - l’e´quilibre opaque
dans lequel tous les emprunteurs ne re´ve`lent aucune information et sont finance´s,
l’e´quilibre transparent dans lequel seuls les emprunteurs qui posse`dent de bons
projets re´ve`lent des informations et sont finance´s, et les e´quilibres multiples, ou` les
e´quilibres a` la fois opaque et transparent peuvent eˆtre possibles. En outre, nous
e´largissons le contexte a` un cadre dynamique en endoge´ne´isant le taux d’inte´reˆt a`
travers un mode`le a` ge´ne´rations imbrique´es, ou` l’e´pargne de la pe´riode t constitue
l’o↵re de cre´dit sur le marche´ du cre´dit a` la pe´riode t + 1. A chaque pe´riode,
l’e´conomie peut eˆtre soit dans un e´quilibre opaque soit dans un e´quilibre transparent.
Nous fournissons la dynamique du marche´ du cre´dit, qui est re´gie par l’e´volution de
deux variables - le taux d’inte´reˆt et le type de l’e´tat. Les deux e´tats stationnaires
opaques et transparents peuvent e´ventuellement se produire dans le long terme.
Depuis le travail pionnier de Stiglitz et Weiss (1981), une vaste litte´rature a
e´tudie´ le roˆle joue´ par l’asyme´trie d’information sur la de´termination des e´quilibres
du marche´ de cre´dit. L’absence d’information des preˆteurs dur les caracte´ristiques
des emprunteurs pourrait re´sulter a` un sous-investissement. Le cre´dit est alors
dit rationne´. Cependant, la possibilite´ de l’autre cas de figure est aussi largement
e´tudie´e : le niveau d’investissement pourrait exce´der le niveau social e cace. Par
exemple, De Meza et Webb (1987) montrent que si les rendements escompte´s sur le
projet peuvent di↵e´rer, un surinvestissement pourrait survenir sous des hypothe`ses
plausibles sur la fonction de distribution du rendement du projet. Un papier
re´cent de Alberto et Filippo (2013) renforce cette orientation dans un contexte
dynamique sur comment la se´lection adverse favorise fortement l’investissement,
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l’accumulation de capital et l’a✏ux e capitaux. Nous poursuivons notre e´tude en ce
sens, mais nous proce´dons avec une perspective di↵e´rente : comment sont a↵ecte´s
les e´quilibres si on tient compte de l’option des emprunteurs a` re´ve´ler l’information
sur les rendements de leur projet.
Comme dans le cas des proble`mes de signal en marche´ de cre´dit, des e´tudes
peuvent remonter a` Leland et Pyle (1977), qui conside`rent un proble`me similaire
et supposent un signal a` travers le choix de la structure financie`re. De plus, un
traitement classique du proble`me de se´lection adverse sur le marche´ de cre´dit peut
eˆtre vu notamment dans Besanko et Thakor (1987), ou` l’agent principal conc¸oit des
contrats qui l’auto-se´lection. D’autres e´tudes peuvent eˆtre observe´es dans Milde
et Riley (1988), Cremer et Khalil (1992), et Tirole (2006). Toutefois, dans notre
mode`le, nous simplifions le proble`me de prise de de´cision de l’agent principal (la
banque) sans perdre de vue les de´couvertes essentielles de cette litte´rature.
Concernant l’e´tude sur les dynamiques macroe´conomiques dans le marche´ de
cre´dit, des re´sultats similaires se trouvent dans Azariadis et Smith (1998), e´tablis
en conside´rant un secteur de production et en se focalisant sur la manie`re dont le
stock de capital varie, et par conse´quent bascule entre di↵e´rents e´quilibres. Dans
notre papier, nous nous inte´ressons plus sur le marche´ de cre´dit et entamons avec
la de´cision prise par des emprunteurs et preˆteurs typiques, qui fournissent plus de
fondements microe´conomiques.
Le re´sultat principal dans le mode`le statique est que le niveau du taux d’inte´reˆt
sans risque de´termine le type de l’e´quilibre sur le marche´ de cre´dit, and donc
l’opacite´ du marche´. Nous conside´rons un marche´ de cre´dit constitue´ de deux
types d’agent : entrepreneurs et investisseurs. Les entrepreneurs (ou emprunteurs)
ont besoin de mobiliser des capitaux pour lancer leurs projets, tandis que les
investisseurs (ou preˆteurs) leur accordent des preˆts. Emprunteurs et preˆteurs sont
neutres face au risque. Chaque emprunteur a besoin d’une unite´ de fonds pour
proce´der avec son projet, qui rapporte un rendement ale´atoire V . Les emprunteurs
sont ne´anmoins he´te´roge`nes ; le rendement du projet varie suivant les emprunteurs
et constitue une information prive´e pour le de´tenteur du projet. La divulgation
d’information est one´reux. Ce couˆt est exclusivement a` la charge de l’emprunteur.
Les emprunteurs qui divulguent les informations sont appele´s transparents, et
ceux qui ne le font pas sont dits opaques. Les preˆteurs connaissent pre´cise´ment le
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rendement re´alise´ de`s que l’information est communique´e ; dans le cas contraire, ils
ne posse`dent pas plus d’information sur le rendement en dehors de la distribution
de V. Les preˆteurs (banques) accordent des preˆts qui doivent eˆtre rembourse´s avec
inte´reˆt a` la fin de la pe´riode. Les remboursements requis par les preˆteurs sont
di↵e´rents pour les emprunteurs transparents et opaques.
Nous montrons qu’il existe un e´quilibre transparent lorsque le taux d’inte´reˆt
sans risque est e´leve´, tandis qu’un taux d’inte´reˆt faible induit un e´quilibre opaque.
Plus pre´cise´ment, lorsque le taux d’inte´reˆt sans risque est assez faible, c’est-a`-dire
en dessous du seuil infe´rieur, seul un e´quilibre opaque peut avoir lieu. Ceci est
en concordance avec notre intuition. Lorsque le couˆt de financement est faible,
les banques ont tendance a` re´duire leurs crite`res de preˆt, prennent plus de risque
et investissent sans l’ information ade´quate sur les projets, certains d’entre eux
peuvent eˆtre non rentables. Par ailleurs, lorsque le taux d’inte´reˆt se trouve sur
une gamme de valeurs mode´re´es, chacun des deux types d’e´quilibre peut survenir,
refle´tant l’e´troitesse de l’octroi de fonds. Par conse´quent, si nous conside´rons
l’opacite´ du marche´ de cre´dit comme e´tant la propension des emprunteurs opaques
parmi les emprunteurs finance´s, nous pouvons aussi constater que l’opacite´ du
marche´ de cre´dit diminue conside´rablement, de ze´ro a` un, alors que le taux d’inte´reˆt
sans risque s’accroit.
Dans notre mode`le, nous avons simplifie´ le mode`le de base, qui inclut la
connaissance parfaite du rendement de l’emprunteur et une re´ve´lation comple`te de
son information prive´e. A travers ceci apparaˆıt une discontinuite´ de la demande de
cre´dit l’opacite´ du marche´ en fonction du taux d’inte´reˆt sans risque, la proprie´te´
principale du mode`le est maintenue : la demande de cre´dit tend a` diminuer avec le
taux d’inte´reˆt, tandis que la transparence du marche´ de cre´dit est croissante quand
le taux d’inte´reˆt fondamental croˆıt.
Il est inte´ressant d’observe et de s’adresser sur l’existence d’e´quilibres multiples,
puisque cela pourrait clarifier l’inde´termination sur le marche´ de cre´dit. Pendant
la pe´riode ou` il est facile d’obtenir du cre´dit (graˆce a` un plus large a✏ux de
fonds et une plus grande volonte´ des banques a` preˆter), comme ce que nous avons
connu avant que la crise financie`re ne s’e´clate, le taux d’inte´reˆt est relativement
faible et le couˆt de financement d’un preˆteur est aussi faible. Cela permet aux
preˆteurs de prendre plus de risque en investissant dans des projets opaques mais
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e´ventuellement non profitables. Comme l’o↵re de cre´dit devient plus serre´e quand
le taux d’inte´reˆt diminue jusqu’a` un certaine gamme interme´diaire, les banques
pourraient toujours eˆtre incite´es a` octroyer des preˆts a` des projets opaques, puisque
le couˆt n’est pas tre`s e´leve´, meˆme s’il se pourrait aussi qu’elles n’octroient des
preˆts qu’aux emprunteurs transparents et qualifie´s, si leur confiance au marche´ est
moindre et se elles sont plus concerne´es par les futurs de´fauts de paiement, qui a`
la fin re´sultent a` un e´quilibre transparent. Cela veut dire que c’est un e´quilibre qui
pourrait eˆtre soit opaque soit transparent. Dans une telle situation, il pourrait y
avoir un saut d’un e´quilibre a` un autre, et si un saut a` partir d’un e´quilibre opaque
survient, nous pouvons observer une diminution de l’o↵re de cre´dit accompagne´e
d’une diminution du taux d’inte´reˆt. Par conse´quent, le mode`le nous apporte une
e´ventuelle explication the´orique concernant la pe´nurie de cre´dit, qui aboutit a`
moins de projets finance´s et moins de production dans l’e´conomie, comme observe´
pendant le crise financie`re.
De plus, nous inte´grons le mode`le statique dans une e´conomie a` ge´ne´rations
imbrique´es. A chaque pe´riode, un continuum d’agents de masse unite´ sont ne´s.
Chaque agent vit sur trois pe´riodes : jeune, adulte et vieux. Quand il est jeune,
l’agent est dote´ d’un projet qui requiert une unite´ de fonds pour proce´der a` la
pe´riode suivante. Comme dans le mode`le classique, il peut de´cider entre de de´voiler
ou non le rendement de son projet et d’eˆtre certifie´/ suivi pendant l ’imple´mentation
du projet en supportant un couˆt additionnel a` la pe´riode suivante. Pendant l’age
adulte, l’agent peut e↵ectuer le projet s’il est fiance´ et la production est re´alise´e.
En supposant que l’agent consomme seulement pendant les deux dernie`res pe´riodes,
il alloue son revenu total, pendant son age adulte, entre la consommation actuelle
et l’e´pargne qui financera sa consommation quand il sera a` la retraite.
Les interme´diaires financiers, comme les banques, encaissent les e´pargnes et
financent les projets quand c’est profitable. Les banques ne posse`dent aucune autre
information sur les projets que la distribution, si les emprunteurs ne le divulguent
pas. Les banques n’ont pas de couˆts d’exploitation et sont en concurrence parfaite.
A partir d’une telle inte´gration de mode`le static de base dans le cadre des
ge´ne´rations imbrique´es, nous formons la dynamique du taux d’inte´reˆt sans risque,
en montrant qu’il peut y avoir une convergence vers di↵e´rents types d’e´quilibre
a` long terme, et en re´glant certains parame`tres, il peut y avoir des oscillations
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cycliques entre e´quilibres opaques et transparents. Les re´sultats des simulations
avec di↵e´rents niveaux de salaire sont en accord avec l’analyse dans le mode`le
statique. Lorsque le salaire est tre`s bas, le cre´dit est restreint car il y a moins
d’e´pargne qui constitue l’o↵re de cre´dit, et il n’existe qu’un e´quilibre stationnaire
transparent avec un taux d’inte´reˆt relativement e´leve´ sur le marche´ de cre´dit ; la
production est entrave´e puisqu’un nombre limite´ de projets sont finance´s et le
couˆt ne´cessaire de certification apporte plus d’ine cacite´ a` l’e´conomie. Pourtant,
lorsque le salaire est su samment e´leve´, l’o↵re de cre´dit est su sante et l’e´quilibre
opaque se produit avec un haut niveau de production et un taux d’inte´reˆt faible.
Avec un certain salaire a` niveau mode´re´, la dynamique peut e´voluer sans suivre un
certain rythme, surtout quand le taux d’inte´reˆt tombe dans la gamme interme´diaire,
ou` l’e´volution peut suivre un chemin incertain. En outre, l’e´tat peut changer entre
e´quilibres opaques et transparents, et l’on peut meˆme observer des commutations
cycliques entre les e´tats opaques et transparents. Bien qu’un tel chemin ne soit
pas stable, il pourrait illustrer quelques fluctuations permanentes du marche´ du
cre´dit et, a` son tour, de l’e´conomie re´elle. De plus, comme la production dans un
e´quilibre opaque est toujours plus e´leve´e que celle dans un e´quilibre transparent, le
passage d’un e´tat opaque dans un cre´dit a` un e´tat transparent indique e´galement
une contraction e´conomique.
Pour re´sumer, une caracte´ristique de notre mode`le est l’incorporation du signal
sur la de´cision de dissipation. Dans le mode`le statique avec un taux d’inte´reˆt
endoge`ne, en de´pit de la configuration simple que nous avons choisie, la de´cision
de re´ve´ler des informations est endoge´ne´ise´e, l’opacite´ du marche´ est donc aussi
endoge´ne´ise´e. Contrairement a` la litte´rature avec asyme´trie d’information sur
le marche´ du cre´dit, les emprunteurs dans notre mode`le peuvent choisir d’eˆtre
transparents ou opaques selon le contexte financier qu’ils connaissent - a` savoir,
le niveau du taux d’inte´reˆt se´curitaire et la volonte´ des preˆts de banques. Ainsi,
nous sommes en mesure de caracte´riser l’e´quilibre par rapport a` un taux d’inte´reˆt
de marche´ exoge`ne se´curitaire, et par conse´quent, d’aborder le lien entre le couˆt
fondamental de financement et le type de l’e´quilibre, ainsi que l’opacite´ du marche´
et de la production globale. Une autre caracte´ristique est que nous abordons
les fluctuations a` long terme, en plus de l’inde´termination a` court terme. Par
conse´quent, nous sommes en mesure de de´montrer que les commutations entre les
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types d’e´quilibre et le resserrement du cre´dit peuvent expliquer les fluctuations
e´conomiques.
Chapitre 4: Hold-up et la discrimination a` l’embauche
avec la friction de la recherche d’emploi
Un proble`me de hold-up se pose lorsque les investissements sont coule´s ex ante
par une partie, et la re´compense des investissements est partage´e avec partenaire
de cette partie. Comme le couˆt n’a pas d’autre utilisation une fois coule´, alors
le partenaire commercial de la partie qui investit aura tout inte´reˆt a` presser le
be´ne´fice au stade ex post. Dans une e´tude importante sur un tel proble`me dans
un marche´ du travail avec la recherche d’emploi, Acemoglu et Shimer (1999b)
montrent que, si les entreprises font les investissements capitaux ex ante et les
salaires sont de´termine´s ex post par ne´gociation, l’e´quilibre est toujours ine cace,
puisque les salaires verse´s aux travailleurs peuvent eˆtre si e´leve´s de telle sorte que
l’incitation ex ante de l’investissement des entreprises soit nuite; tandis que si les
entreprises sont en mesure d’annoncer des salaires avant la recherche d’emploi, les
salaires peuvent diriger la recherche d’emploi des travailleurs, alors le proble`me
de holdup de l’investissement a` des entreprises ne se de´roule non plus; l’e cacite´
peut eˆtre atteinte, car si les salaires sont annonce´s aux travailleurs, les travailleurs
peuvent observer ces o↵res et choisir ou` a` postuler, donc les travailleurs vont
maximiser leur utilite´ espe´re´e de la recherche d’emploi aux entreprises en faisant
un compromis entre chaque salaire observe´ et la probabilite´ de l’obtenir pour tous
les salaires. Dans un cadre conventionnel de l’annonce de salaire, nous apercevons
une autre source d’ine cacite´ dans un proble`me de holdup ou` les travailleurs
paient le couˆt d’investissement de compe´tences: lorsque le marche´ est bonde´ pour
les entreprises (le nombre des entreprises est grand), en adoptant une norme a`
l’embauche discriminatoire, les entreprises sont capable d’exproprier un niveau de
profit qui est supe´rieur au niveau socialement optimal; il s’ave`re que dans cette
situation, les incitations de l’investissement pour le groupe des travailleurs favorise´s
et le group des travailleurs discrimine´s sont tous les deux a↵ecte´es ne´gativement.
Nous analysons l’impact d’un tel comportement de la recherche de rente des
entreprises sur la structure de la segmentation du marche´, et sur les incitations a`
l’investissement de compe´tences des travailleurs.
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Lorsqu’il n’y pas de discrimination, l’e´conomie de l’annonce de salaire avec
les investissements ex ante de compe´tences des travailleurs atteint e cacite´ dans
les e´quilibria, et nous pouvons montrer que quel e´quilibre e´merge de´pend de la
comparaison des valeurs entre le rendement logarithmique de l’investissement de
compe´tences et la tension du marche´ (le rapport travailleurs/entreprises), qui
mesure l’intensite´ de concurrence sur le marche´ du travail. Et nous montrons
que les de´cisions des travailleurs sur l’investissement de compe´tences sont sociale-
ment optimales. La raison fondamentale de ce re´sultat de l’e cacite´ est que les
salaires peuvent de´pendre explicitement du niveau des compe´tences (le niveau
des compe´tences est une qualite´ qui peut eˆtre le´galement e´crite dans les contrats
salariaux). Il est une autre histoire lorsque d’autres caracte´ristiques qui ne sont
pas fortement lie´s a` la productivite´, comme le sexe, la race, taille, origine, etc.
entrent e´galement dans la pre´fe´rence des entreprises. Conforme´ment a` la le´gislation
sur l’e´galite´ salariale, les salaires annonce´s sont interdits d’eˆtre conditionne´ ex-
plicitement a` ces caracte´ristiques; toutefois, si les entreprises toujours se´lectionnent
les travailleurs selon leur pre´fe´rence sur ces caracte´ristiques binaires, un e´quilibre
se´parateur peut se de´rouler, et dans un tel e´quilibre les di↵e´rentes entreprises
annoncent di↵e´rents niveaux de salaires, et les travailleurs de di↵e´rents groupes se
trient et postulent a` des salaires di↵e´rents: le marche´ est alors se´gre´ge´ de fac¸on
endoge`ne. Du coˆte´ des entreprises, elles ont inte´reˆt a` adopter une telle norme de
l’embauche d’emploi discriminatoire, lorsque le rendement de l’investissement de
compe´tences des travailleurs est su samment e´leve´; dans ce cas, la discrimination
leur permet de saisir un niveau de profit qui est plus e´leve´ que le niveau socialement
optimal, et les travailleurs vont toujours choisir d’eˆtre qualifie´s. Du coˆte´ des
travailleurs, il se re´ve`le que l’utilite´ espe´re´e du groupe des travailleurs discrimine´s
et l’utilite´ espe´re´e du group des travailleurs favorise´s sont tous les deux infe´rieures
au niveau socialement optimal: concernant le groupe discrimine´, il est parce que
la discrimination re´duit discre`tement l’opportunite´ de trouver un emploi dans le
marche´ du travail pour ces travailleurs, qui, anticipent la discrimination, exigent
des salaires plus bas, ce qui les rend moins cher d’embaucher du point de vue
des entreprises; concernant le groupe favorise´, il est ainsi parce que lorsque les
entreprises sont capable d’embaucher les travailleurs discrimine´s a` moindre couˆt, il
est comme si les entreprises be´ne´ficient un plus grand niveau de pouvoir de marche´
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elles peuvent menacer les travailleurs du groupe favorise´ que s’ils n’acceptent le
salaire bas, elles vont embaucher les travailleurs du groupe discrimine´. Naturelle-
ment, anticipant la discrimination, tous les groupes attendent un niveau d’utilite´
espe´re´e infe´rieure de la recherche d’emploi, ce qui a↵ecte de fac¸on ne´gative leurs
incitations a` l’investissement de compe´tences.
Une caracte´ristique importante de notre e´tude est la multi-dimensionnalite´
des caracte´ristiques des travailleurs base´es sur laquelle les travailleurs sont classe´s.
D’une part, on conside`re le classement par l’identite´ de type qui de´pend de la
productivite´ des travailleurs: les travailleurs sont soit qualifie´s (type H) soit
peu qualifie´s (type L); les travailleurs qualifie´s ont la priorite´ par rapport aux
travailleurs peu qualifie´s simplement parce que cette priorite´ (ou ce classement)
donne aux entreprises des profits plus e´leve´s. D’autre part, on conside`re e´galement
le classement par l’identite´ du groupe qui est inde´pendante de la productivite´:
les travailleurs appartiennent soit au groupe favorise´ (groupe a) soit au groupe
discrimine´ (groupe b). Le classement final a l’ordre suivant: aH   bH   aL   bL.
On peut le comprendre de la fac¸on suivante: e´tant donne´ un niveau de compe´tence,
les travailleurs du groupe a sont pre´fe´re´s aux travailleurs du groupe b; au meˆme
temps, les travailleurs qualifie´s sont toujours pre´fe´re´s aux travailleurs peu qualifie´s.
Selon un tel classement, la de´cision de l’investissement de compe´tences des groupes
di↵e´rents devient strate´giquement interde´pendante. On se concentre sur l’e´quilibre
de Nash en strate´gies pures sur les investissements de compe´tences des travailleurs
dans l’e´conomie de l’annonce des salaires, et nous constatons que selon la valeur
de la tension du marche´ il peut y avoir d’e´quilibre ou des e´quilibria multiples
sur l’investissement de compe´tences en raison de l’interde´pendance strate´gique.
Par rapport au cas ou` la discrimination est absente, lorsque le marche´ est tre`s
bonde´ pour les entreprises (ou la tension du marche´ est faible), la discrimination
est rentable pour les entreprises en ce sens que les entreprises peuvent gagner un
niveau de profit supe´rieur au niveau socialement optimal, et tous les travailleurs
sont moins bien en termes d’utilite´ espe´re´e; lorsque le niveau de la tension du
marche´ augmente, tous les deux groupes peuvent choisir de sous-investir dans les
compe´tences et a` l’e´quilibre chaque fois qu’un groupe sous-investissent, l’autre
groupe restent qualifie´s et vont recevoir un niveau de l’utilite´ espe´re´e supe´rieur au
niveaux socialement optimale, alors que les profits des entreprises sont infe´rieurs
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par rapport au cas ou` la discrimination est absente. En particulier, il existe un
e´quilibre ou` le groupe des travailleurs favorise´s sous-investissent, tandis que le
groupe des travailleurs discrimine´s choisissent de rester qualifie´s; et dans ce cas
les profits des firmes sont infe´rieurs au niveau socialement optimal, parce que le
fait qu’il y a des travailleurs qui sous-investissent dans les compe´tences conduit
a` une baisse de la productivite´ moyenne de l’e´conomie par rapport au cas ou` la
discrimination est absente.
Dans l’e´conomie ou` les salaires sont ne´gocie´s (ou de´termine´s selon une re`gle de
partage de surplus fixe) apre`s une firme et un travailleur se rencontrent et donc
ne dirigent pas la recherche d’emploi des travailleurs, nous trouvons des e´quilibres
similaires par rapport a` l’e´conomie ou` les salaires sont annonce´s. En particulier, on
a un e´quilibre ou` les travailleurs favorise´s sous-investissent, donc gagnent un niveau
de surplus espe´re´ infe´rieur par rapport au cas ou` la discrimination est absente
dans une certaine re´gion du pouvoir de ne´gociation des travailleurs; dans un tel
e´quilibre, le surplus est transfe´re´ des entreprises et des travailleurs favorise´s aux
travailleurs discrimine´s. Les profits d’entreprises sont monotones et de´croissantes
par morceaux, parce que l’augmentation de pouvoir de ne´gociation des travailleurs
peut accroˆıtre leur incitation de l’investissement des compe´tences, et donc ame´liorer
discre`tement la composition des compe´tences de marche´ et la productivite´ moyenne
de l’e´conomie. Nous constatons e´galement qu’il y a une gamme interme´diaire
du pouvoir de ne´gociation des travailleurs pour valeurs desquelles les profits des
entreprises sont infe´rieurs par rapport au niveau socialement optimal lorsqu’elles
discriminent, en raison de l’investissement de compe´tences de´courage´ de groupe des
travailleurs discrimine´s. Dans l’ensemble, la di↵e´rence principale entre le contexte
de l’annonce des salaires et le contexte de la ne´gociation salariale est que le salaire
re´el ne´gocie´ de´pend d’une manie`re exoge`ne sur la productivite´, et les entreprises
ne peuvent plus manipuler leur pouvoir de marche´ en traduisant leur pre´fe´rence
discriminatoire sur les salaires constamment infe´rieurs.
La recherche d’emploi est un moyen important par lequel la discrimination
fonctionne au marche´ du travail. Plusieurs articles ont mis en e´vidence l’impact
de la discrimination a` travers le canal de recherche d’emploi sur les ine´galite´s
salariales. Pour en nommer quelques uns, Pendakur et Woodcock (2010) montrent
que les plafonds de verre existants pour les travailleurs immigre´s et des minorite´s
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peuvent eˆtre attribue´s par une large mesure a` leur faible acce`s aux emplois dans les
entreprises a` hauts salaires; En outre, dans un article important du Ritter et Taylor
(2011), ils montrent que la plupart de la disparite´ du taux de choˆmage ne pouvait
eˆtre explique´e par les compe´tences cognitives qui e´mergent a` un stade pre´coce, bien
que pour l’e´cart salarial, il pourrait eˆtre le cas. Ce re´sultat concernant la disparite´
entre les taux de choˆmage est confirme´ par la constatation que cette disparite´
est encore importante, meˆme pour les travailleurs de niveaux de compe´tences
similaires.
Notre e´tude est plus e´troitement lie´e a` la litte´rature de recherche d’emploi
dirige´e. Dans cette litte´rature, les frictions lie´es a` la recherche d’emploi sont
de´rive´es de fac¸on endoge`ne par les interactions strate´giques se´quentielles des agents.
Tenant compte de l’interaction strate´gique permet que l’externalite´ de la recherche
d’emploi soit internalise´e. L’e´conomie re´sultant demeure concurrentielle, mais avec
une structure de marche´ non-Walras, et les prix jouent un roˆle d’allocation pour
atteindre l’e cacite´. Au mieux de nos connaissances, dans la litte´rature de la
discrimination avec les frictions a` la recherche d’emploi, seulement deux d’entre
eux sont construits sous le contexte d’annonce des salaires. Lang, Manove, et
Dickens (2005, ci-apre`s LMD) montrent qu’une re`gle d’embauche discriminatoire
pourrait conduire a` une segmentation du marche´ du travail et un e´cart salarial
important avec meˆme une di↵e´rence ne´gligeable de la productivite´; cependant, le
groupe des travailleurs discrimine´s se re´ve`lent avoir un taux de choˆmage infe´rieur,
ce qui est en contraste frappant avec des e´vidences empiriques. Merlino (2012)
vise a` ame´liorer le re´sultat de LMD (2005). Il conside`re en outre l’investissement
pre´-marche´ du coˆte´ des entreprises, et obtient la dispersion de la technologie et
l’e´cart de choˆmage re´aliste. Ses re´sultats reposent sur l’hypothe`se forte qu’il y a plus
de discrimination dans le secteur de la haute technologie, et il est silencieux sur les
niveaux de compe´tences des travailleurs. Notre papier di↵e`re de la leur, en ce que
notre objectif est d’analyser comment discrimination a` l’embauche pourrait fausser
les incitations a` l’investissement de compe´tences des travailleurs et la structure de
la segmentation du marche´.
Dans cet article, nous commenc¸ons avec le cadre sans discrimination, ou`
nous conside´rons un mode`le de recherche dirige´e, et on ajoute une phase de
l’investissement de compe´tences des travailleurs. Plus pre´cise´ment, a` l’e´tape 0
133
RE´SUME´
de ce jeu, les travailleurs choisissent leurs niveaux de compe´tence, soit L ou
H, et paient les couˆts correspondants; a` l’e´tape 1, les entreprises observent les
compe´tences des travailleurs, et elles annoncent les contrats salariaux dans lesquels
les entreprises peuvent spe´cifier quel niveau de compe´tences des travailleurs elles
veulent embaucher; a` l’e´tape 2, les travailleurs observent les o↵res salariaux et
peuvent choisir ou` a` postuler (ou quelle firme a` visiter); a` l’e´tape 3, les entreprises
observent combien de postulations elles ont rec¸ues et se´lectionnent les travailleurs
parmi ces demandes rec¸ues, et elles choisissent des travailleurs qui ont de compe´tence
identique avec une probabilite´ e´gale. Ensuite, la production est re´alise´e et les gains
sont re´alise´s. Nous nous concentrons sur e´quilibres de Nash parfait par sous-jeux
concurrentiels (subgame perfect competitive equilibria, SPCE, en anglais). Les
entreprises choisissent les salaires pour maximiser les profits, et les travailleurs
maximisent leur gain espe´re´ en choisissant d’abord le niveau de compe´tence et puis
quelle entreprise a` postuler.
Dans un tel contexte avec investissement de compe´tences et sans discrimina-
tion, nous montrons que la de´cision optimale de l’investissement des compe´tences
des travailleurs de´pend de la comparaison entre le rendement logarithmique de
l’investissement des compe´tences et la tension du marche´. Lorsque la valeur du
rendement logarithmique des compe´tences est su samment grande par rapport
a` la tension du marche´, qui mesure l’intensite´ de la concurrence du marche´, les
demandeurs d’emploi trouvent que l’investissement dans de hautes compe´tences
est une strate´gie dominante. Dans ce cas, le bien-eˆtre social est plus e´leve´ parmi
tous les e´quilibres. Lorsque la valeur du rendement logarithmique des compe´tences
est mode´re´e, il existe un e´quilibre ou` les demandeurs d’emploi sont indi↵e´rents
d’eˆtre qualifie´s ou peu qualifie´s; toutes les entreprises trouvent qu’il est optimal
d’attirer les deux types de compe´tences en meˆme temps et le bien-eˆtre social est
au niveau plus faible par rapport a` l’e´quilibre pre´ce´dent. Enfin, lorsque la valeur
du rendement logarithmique de l’investissement des compe´tences est su samment
faible, il ne fournit pas aux travailleur su samment d’incitation d’investir pour
eˆtre qualifie´s; le niveau du bien-eˆtre social a` l’e´quilibre se re´ve`le eˆtre le plus faible.
Ensuite, nous analysons le mode`le ou` la discrimination est pre´sente. Nous
conside´rons une e´conomie ou` les travailleurs peuvent eˆtre divise´es en deux groupes,
le groupe a et le groupe b, selon certaine caracte´ristique qui est sans rapport avec la
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productivite´, par exemple, le sexe. Les deux groupes sont ex ante identiques dans
tous les autres aspects. Les entreprises n’embauchent les travailleurs du groupe b
que dans le cas ou` aucun travailleur du groupe a est pre´sent. En se concentrant
uniquement sur l’e´quilibre de Nash en strate´gies pures, nous formalisons les re´sultats
concernant l’existence d’e´quilibre comme suivants
Il existe deux seuils  ˆ1 et  ˆ2, avec 0 <  ˆ2 <  ˆ1 <  ˆ.
Lorsque 0 <   <  ˆ2, il existe un e´quilibre de Nash en strate´gies pures unique
dans lequel le groupe a et le groupe b investissent tous les deux dans hautes
compe´tences.
Lorsque  ˆ2 <   <  ˆ1, il existe un e´quilibre de Nash en strate´gies pures unique
dans lequel le groupe a investit dans hautes compe´tences, cependant le groupe b
investit dans faible niveau de compe´tences.
Lorsque  ˆ1 <     ˆ, il existe des e´quilibres de Nash en strate´gies pures multiples.
Soit groupe a investit dans hautes compe´tences et le groupe b investit dans faible
niveau de compe´tences, ou le groupe a investit dans les compe´tences faibles et le
groupe b investit dans hautes compe´tences.
Nous voyons que si un groupe choisit d’eˆtre peu qualifie´s, la meilleure re´ponse
de l’autre groupe est toujours de choisir a` eˆtre qualifie´s, tandis que la meilleure
re´ponse au choix de hautes compe´tences de l’autre de´pend des deux seuils. En outre,
lorsque la tension du marche´ augmente, les travailleurs ont plus forte incitation
a` de´vier a` faible niveau de compe´tences, et le groupe discrimine´ est plus enclin a`
de´vier par rapport au groupe favorise´, dans le sens que le seuil a` partir duquel le
groupe b commence a` envisager d’investir a` faible niveau de compe´tences est plus
faible pour le groupe b que pour le groupe b.
Nous discutons aussi le proble`me dans une e´conomie ou` le salaire est de´termine´
par la ne´gociation apre`s un travailleur et un employeur se rencontrent avec le meˆme
classement discriminatoire. Dans un tel contexte, les travailleurs ne choisissent
que le niveau de compe´tences, mais pas ou` a` postuler. Le timing de l’e´conomie
est de´sormais le suivant: tout d’abord, les travailleurs de´cident simultane´ment les
niveaux de compe´tence; en suite, les travailleurs et les entreprises se rencontrent
selon une technologie d’appariement; troisie`mement, le travailleur et l’entreprise qui
forment une paire de´terminent comment partager la production par ne´gociation a` la
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Nash. La norme d’embauche est identique comme pre´ce´dent: aH   bH   aL   bL.
Les probabilite´s d’emploi pour les di↵e´rents types de travailleurs sont he´rite´es, et
le gain espe´re´ est le produit de la probabilite´ d’emploi et son salaire moins le couˆt
d’investissement de compe´tences. Comme dans le cadre de l’annonce de salaire, nous
conside´rons l’investissement de compe´tences sous l’hypothe`se que tout le groupe
choisit soit d’eˆtre qualifie´s soit d’eˆtre peu qualifie´s, et nous supposons que le groupe a
est la majorite´. En raison de la re`gle discriminatoire, les utilite´s de l’investissement
des compe´tences pour di↵e´rents groupes de travailleurs sont interde´pendantes.
Cela rend encore la de´cision de l’investissement strate´gique. Selon les valeurs
di↵e´rentes du pouvoir de ne´gociation, les e´quilibres similaires au contexte pre´ce´dent
de l’annonce de salaire existent. Par exemple, il existe un e´quilibre ou` le groupe
favorise´ n’investit pas, tandis que le groupe discrimine´ reste hautement qualifie´. Le
groupe discrimine´ est en ge´ne´ral moins bien par rapport au cas ou` la discrimination
est absente, dans le sens qu’ils peuvent toujours choisir a` sous-investir lorsque le
pouvoir de ne´gociation est su samment e´leve´. Les profits des entreprises sont
monotones par morceaux parce que la composition des compe´tences (donc la
productivite´ moyenne) du marche´ ame´liore discre`tement a` l’e´gard du pouvoir de
ne´gociation, et pour un niveau interme´diaire de pouvoir de ne´gociation, le profit
des entreprises est infe´rieur par rapport au niveau correspondant a` l’e´conomie ou`
la discrimination est absente.
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